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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, effective protection for the traditional
knowledge, genetic resources, and folklore (“TKGRF”) of
indigenous societies has emerged as a major controversy in
intellectual property law.1 One approach is to view TKGRF as
mere variants of the commonly accepted forms of intellectual
property (“IP”), necessitating the same manner of protection as
other qualifying material. Alternatively, some IP scholars argue
that TKGRF are inherently different and require new types of legal
protection. A third approach, held by a small minority working in
the TKGRF area, advises that with so many indigenous societies
producing infinite variations of TKGRF, one category of laws will
not suffice.
To use an image originating from Native American cultures,
are U.S. officials “speaking with a forked tongue” in international
forums when they profess the United States’ special concern for
protecting indigenous TKGRF? Do current U.S. laws, poorly
implemented and often spawned for reasons unrelated to TKGRF
protection, merely pay lip service to indigenous TKGRF
preservation, while actually protecting corporate commercial
1

See Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 929, 955–56 (2002). One reason for the increased interest in TKGRF is that
many countries are “rich with traditional knowledge, especially genetic resources and
folklore,” but do not benefit from “traditional forms of intellectual property.” Id. at 956.
Additionally, aboriginal communities have been gaining political clout in many countries.
Id.
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interests? Or are these inconsistencies between stated policy and
actual implementation—even if factually indisputable—merely
benign examples of the normal bureaucratic shortcomings that
commonly riddle the U.S.’s cumbersome and complex democracy?
In the global debate on TKGRF, many U.S. and foreign
government officials and legal scholars assert that TKGRF are
regulated most appropriately within the traditional categories of
well-established Western intellectual property law, i.e., the
standard bodies of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret, and
unfair competition law.2 Even if TKGRF do not fit any of these
categories, they would benefit most from the stable and predictable
protections that these existing, well-defined bodies of law provide.3
However, some legal scholars recognize that TKGRF have
unique attributes not addressed by the standard IP categories.4
Unlike common IP materials, TKGRF have amorphous
characteristics that would have to be defined to achieve effective

2

But see Graham Dutfield, TRIPs-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 233 (2001). For convenience of reference only, the author uses the
terms “Western intellectual property law” or “Western legal system” to mean the national
legal system of a recognized government in any country in the world, without regard to
whether such country might properly be labeled “Western” or “industrialized” in another
context (geographical, cultural, political, etc.). These terms are, in the context of this
paper, interchangeable with “national legal systems of industrialized societies,” although
this expression would not, of course, withstand careful scrutiny when referring to the
national legal system of a largely agrarian or nomadic society, such as Cameroon or
Mongolia, since neither is particularly industrialized or Western per se. This rough
terminology, is not intended to convey any greater or higher value to Western legal
systems. Rather, “Western” is used to distinguish the national common and civil law
systems in use today by majority populations and national legislatures from those systems
of customary law still traditionally employed in indigenous societies to govern their own
internal affairs. While some participants in the TKGRF debate have made this distinction
based on whether or not a national legal system stems directly from European
colonization, the author believes such an approach to be both unnecessarily pejorative
and indeterminate.
3
Symposium, The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore, Traditional Knowledge,
and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 785 (2002).
For a discussion regarding the usefulness but also the inherent limitations of traditional
intellectual property law in protecting traditional knowledge, see generally David R.
Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge,
25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 253 (2000).
4
See Dutfield, supra note 2, at 240.
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legal protection.5 These scholars’ proposed solution for substantial
protection of TKGRF includes: clearly delineating the nature of its
unique attributes, locating the specific coverage voids that exist in
traditional intellectual property law, and formulating sui generis
laws designed to address those unique attributes and legal voids.6
This approach could entail creating national laws or an
international treaty to protect TKGRF outside the established
intellectual property regimes, similar to the sui generis laws
adopted in many countries to protect semiconductor chips or
computer programs.7
A third, far smaller group suggests that TKGRF material has
exceedingly diverse properties and cannot be defined clearly.
Since TKGRF have developed holistically, usually within many
small communities dependent upon their natural environments,
TKGRF are subject to nearly infinite variation.8 Thus, any attempt
to define TKGRF per se and to determine a single substantive
governing law will undoubtedly fail.9 Within this group of
thinkers, some advocate that effective regulation of TKGRF lies in
developing a flexible legal mechanism that integrates Western and
customary law with the ideas of both Western and indigenous legal
scholars.10 Appropriate management of any given use, publication,
5

For example, the traditional tribal communal ownership of art is not recognized by
U.S. intellectual property schemes. See Amina Para Matlon, Safeguarding Native
American Sacred Art by Partnering Tribal Law and Equity: An Exploratory Case Study
Applying the Bulun Bulun Equity to Navajo Sandpainting, 27 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
211, 213–14 (2004).
6
See generally Elements of a Sui Generis System for the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources,
Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/8 (Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter
Elements],
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_8.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
7
Gervais, supra note 1, at 951–52.
8
See Elements, supra note 6, at 12–13.
9
Id. at 11–13.
10
This approach has been most clearly and convincingly articulated in a variety of
forums by Mr. Antony Taubman, currently Acting Director and Head of the Traditional
Knowledge Division, Genetic Resources and Folklore at the World Intellectual Property
Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. I am very grateful to Mr. Taubman for all of his
invaluable insights into this area of law, as well as for his unerring kindness to me and
patience with my attempts over the last two years to understand this complex and
fascinating area of law. See also Michael F. Brown, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE 242–
45 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002).
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or dispute involving TKGRF could be determined in a forum
consisting of both indigenous elders familiar with applicable
customary law and experts in Western intellectual property
concepts. This would facilitate allowing for consideration of the
diverse combination of human and environmental factors
inevitably operating in any given TKGRF scenario.
Within each of these three schools of thought, there are
proponents of formal recognition of TKGRF as distinct and
valuable forms of intellectual property needing regulation by
international treaty in the near future.11 However, other members
from each of these groups believe that TKGRF protection should
instead evolve mainly out of national legislation, as other forms of
intellectual property have historically developed.12
The global legal debate surrounding indigenous TKGRF has, to
date, been eclipsed in the United States by other intellectual
property topics of greater commercial concern. While legal
questions relating to the patenting of genes and genetic sequences
have received much attention in the U.S. legal community in recent
years,13 other aspects of intellectual property law relating to
genetic material have been less prominent.14 The U.S. legal
community has ignored questions involving the ownership,
control, and access to genetic material husbanded by indigenous
people; the traditional knowledge often associated with such

11

See Traditional Knowledge, Traditional Cultural Expressions and Genetic
Resources: The International Dimension, at 14–15, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on
Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/6
(Nov. 30, 2003) [hereinafter International Dimension], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2004/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_6_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
12
Such national legislation would be subject to each country’s distinctive
jurisprudence, societal norms, and needs. Brown, supra note 10, at 55 (chronicling the
history of copyright law in Great Britain and the United States).
13
Ironically, in developing countries, where most indigenous TKGRF originate, the
larger question of whether to allow patenting of genetic resources is far from settled. See,
e.g., Freedom from IPR: Towards a Convergence of Movements, SEEDLING, Oct. 2004,
http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=301 (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
14
See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA
Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory
Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623 (2001).
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genetic material; and the traditional cultural expressions which are
often vehicles for collecting and relaying such knowledge.15
United States officials claim that the U.S. strongly supports
legal protection of TKGRF and cite several tools of federal law
that ostensibly give special protection to Native American creative
material.16
On an international level, the U.S. advocates
implementing protective legislation for TKGRF on a nation-bynation basis only, strictly within the traditional limits of existing
intellectual property law and eschewing establishment of any
binding international guidelines or sui generis laws.17 Yet the
domestic legal tools that U.S. officials regularly cite abroad as
evidence of undivided support for domestic TKGRF protection
have not been implemented in meaningful ways, and some actions
taken by domestic agencies in TKGRF regulation seem
inconsistent with stated policy values.18
Against a background of fragmented international discussion,
this Article examines the official U.S. policy position on TKGRF,
as reflected in selected intellectual property laws. This Article also
addresses whether present U.S. law and policy offer tangible,
meaningful protection for the TKGRF of Native Americans and
other indigenous groups in the United States, or whether such
protection exists in theory only.
To facilitate understanding of this law and policy discussion,
Part I of this Article presents an overview of TKGRF, starting with
the many difficulties of defining, conceptualizing, and working
with TKGRF as distinct intellectual property forms. It then
15

In 1999, WIPO’s Working Group on Biotechnology began gathering information on
intellectual property and biotechnology from 57 countries. Their data illustrates the
varied responses to protection. See Information Provided by WIPO Member States
Concerning Practices Related to the Protection of Biological Inventions, WIPO,
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge &
Folklore, WIPO/IP/GR/00/2 (Apr. 6, 2001), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2001/igc/pdf/grtkfic1_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
16
See U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Intervention on Article XX, Intellectual Property Rights
of the Organization of American States (“OAS”), “Draft American Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” [hereinafter U.S. OAS Statement], at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/oas/20827pf.htm (Feb. 25, 2003).
17
Dutfield, supra note 2, at 273.
18
See infra Part II.B (discussing U.S. policy).
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examines why effective legal protection for TKGRF within
presently available regimes of intellectual property law may be
problematic. As an illustration, the article considers the wide
variety of TKGRF controversies that have arisen in recent years
and summarizes the various solutions being tested by international
courts and legislatures. Part II gives a brief overview of the
genesis and development of the ongoing TKGRF debates at the
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), introduces the
divergent opinions among delegates to those talks, and summarizes
the U.S. policy articulated in that forum.
Part III examines some of the U.S. legal tools most commonly
cited by U.S. officials as examples of U.S. protection for
indigenous TKGRF. These include the Indian Arts and Crafts Act
of 1990,19 the indigenous handicraft certification scheme embodied
in the Alaska Silver Hand Program,20 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act.21 Another frequently cited tool is the Database
of Native American Tribal Insignia maintained by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).22 With respect to
each of these, the Article considers the motivation for creation,
whether the law functions as was originally intended, and whether
it gives meaningful protection to indigenous TKGRF.
Part IV suggests several ways in which U.S. domestic
intellectual property laws could be amended or expanded to
provide further TKGRF protection, while still remaining within
established regimes of Western intellectual property law.
Proposed changes include expanding the use of certification and
collective marks to incorporate indigenous creations, expanding
federal and state moral rights laws, and establishing a prospective
U.S. system of geographical indications law for TKGRF. This
19
Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). For an interesting—albeit
somewhat outdated—discussion of potential shortcomings of the Act, see generally Jon
Keith Parsley, Regulation of Counterfeit Indian Arts and Crafts: An Analysis of the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487 (1993).
20
ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.010-070 (Michie 2000).
21
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994).
22
To access the database, see USPTO, Frequently Asked Questions about the Database
of Native American Tribal Insignia, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tribalfaq.htm (last modified Nov. 16, 2003) [hereinafter USPTO, FAQ].
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Article advocates prompt ratification of the Convention on
Biological Diversity, repair of existing, defective, federal
legislation, and widespread education campaigns, in an effort to
create national awareness of all IP laws, including TKGRF. The
Article also suggests immediate judicial recognition of a clear link
between patent enforceability and source disclosure in patent
applications for TKGRF-related inventions. Moreover, state and
federal laws should be passed to ensure minimum contracting
safeguards in TKGRF ventures including, prior informed consent
of indigenous participants, access to properly qualified legal
counsel, and appropriate benefit-sharing among all parties. This
Article proposes removal of USPTO officials as the main de facto
spokespeople and policymakers for the U.S., and replacing them
with either an autonomous group of intellectual property counsel
or an autonomous body of such counsel and officials within the
Solicitor General’s office.
Finally, Part V questions whether the TKGRF debate is really
just a minor, sub-issue in the evolution of intellectual property law
or whether it may have greater repercussions on the field than is
presently realized in the U.S. The Article argues the latter,
suggesting some areas in which those repercussions may soon be
felt, and urges a more genuine participation by the United States in
the search for understanding and protecting TKGRF. Greater U.S.
openness to new ideas and to concepts originating in other legal
systems, including customary law, will offer a more realistic
chance of solving the TKGRF dilemma in the near future. This
Article hypothesizes that such a shift in approach to TKGRF might
also provide the U.S. with new models to solve other legal
interface and IP problems, including in cyberspace.
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I. AN OVERVIEW: WHAT IS TKGRF, HOW DOES IT DIFFER FROM
OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND WHAT ARE SOME OF THE
TKGRF-RELATED LEGAL CONTROVERSIES AND PROPOSED
SOLUTIONS THAT HAVE ARISEN IN RECENT YEARS?
A. Defining and Differentiating TKGRF
The lack of agreed legal definitions for “traditional
knowledge,” “folklore,” or “genetic resources”23 has presented
problems for many international groups and non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) examining the TKGRF protection issue in
recent years.24 Some groups believe definitional clarity is a
precondition to substantive discussion and have spent a great deal
of time examining the limits of terminology. Others have
bypassed the definitional issue altogether, only to find that
formulating solutions is impossible when the objects of protection
remain indeterminate. WIPO takes a more pragmatic approach: it
continuously develops and refines definitions of TKGRF, while
simultaneously exploring potential protection mechanisms.25
23

See generally Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge,
and Folklore, at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/publications/genetic_resources.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). “While ‘genetic resources’ are defined under several
international instruments, there is to date no universally recognized definition for
traditional knowledge as such.” Id.
24
See Comparative Summary of Sui Generis Legislation for the Protection of
Traditional Cultural Expressions, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. &
Genetic Resources, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/INF/3 (Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Comparative
Summary], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_inf_3.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
25
Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, at 5–6, WIPO General Assembly, WO/GA/26/6 (Aug. 25,
2000) [hereinafter Matters Concerning IP], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/ga26_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004); Preliminary
Systematic Analysis of National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Expressions of
Folklore, at 6–8, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources,
Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/3 (Oct. 20, 2002) [hereinafter
Systematic
Analysis],
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_3.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004). For a discussion of terminology issues, see
Traditional Knowledge—Operational Terms and Definitions, WIPO, Intergovernmental
Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9 (May 20, 2002) [hereinafter Operational Terms],
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkfic3_9.pdf (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004).
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Proposed definitions and potential protections are works in
progress, continually adjusted as understanding of the relevant
concepts grow.26
For the purposes of this Article, “genetic resources” refers to
plant, animal, and human genetic material owned, cultivated, or
otherwise arising out of the custodianship of individuals or
collective groups within an indigenous society. Though genetic
material may be the most easily definable category of TKGRF, it
recently has engendered numerous ownership and use
controversies.27
For example, several disputes have arisen
surrounding patent applications filed by the U.S. National
Institutes of Health for T-cell lines used to combat leukemia and
hepatitis.28 Some of these cell lines were originally developed
from blood samples taken from Papua New Guineans, Solomon
Islanders, and Pandilla tribespeople.29 Many of the original donors
have alleged that their prior informed consent was not obtained
before the U.S. government used and patented—for its exclusive
benefit—derivatives from their genetic material.30 Similarly,
agricultural germplasm banks, many of which were established to
support food crop experimentation by indigenous farmers,31 have
generated controversy.32 Agribusinesses have become embroiled
in a variety of patent infringement and licensing disputes involving
indigenous farmers’ seed storage and reuse, as well as contractual
disputes concerning required farmer repurchase of genetically
modified seed.33 At the heart of many agriculture-related conflicts
26

Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 8.
DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
TOWARD TRADITIONAL RESOURCE RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES 26–27 (International Development Research Centre, 1996).
28
Id. These cases are discussed further in this paper. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
29
Id.
30
See, e.g., id.
31
Id. at 22.
32
Id. at 36–37.
33
See generally ETC group–action group on Erosion, Tech. & Concentration, at
http://www.etcgroup.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (The ETC group was formerly known
as the Rural Advancement Foundation International [RAFI]); Food and Agriculture Org.
(FAO) Comm’n on Genetic Res. for Food & Agric., International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, at http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/IU.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2004); Inst. for Agric. & Trade Policy, at http://www.iatp.org (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004).
27
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lies the fact that often the newly patented plant material involved
was developed directly from landraces husbanded by indigenous
farmers for hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of years.34
The definition of “traditional knowledge” is somewhat more
problematic than “genetic resources,” and controversies
surrounding its appropriate use are even more numerous.35 In this
Article, “traditional knowledge” means those systems of traditionbased knowledge developed over time by indigenous peoples or
local communities in any sphere of scientific or artistic application,
regardless of whether such knowledge is collected and conveyed
through written, oral, or other form.36 This could apply to
indigenous peoples’ inventions, discoveries (such as plant usage,
for example), designs, symbols, and secret or sacred knowledge,
but it is not by any means limited only to these areas.37 Often,
traditional knowledge has scientific or practical application, such
as knowledge about the healing properties of medicinal plants or
the growth and reproductive habit of food plants.38 It extends, for
example, to such matters as the particular suitability of certain
types of animal pelts for human clothing, such as the waterproof
properties of seal intestine for rain gear or the frost-resistant
properties of wolverine fur for lining the facial openings of winter
parkas.39
There is no commonly accepted definition of “traditional
knowledge,” in part because it covers such a diverse body of
34

POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 15, 17.
See infra Part II.B.2.
36
This is the author’s own current working definition, but many other definitions have
been proposed by international organizations, research institutions, indigenous groups,
and NGOs. See generally, George Hobson, Traditional Knowledge is Science, 20
NORTHERN PERSP. (Summer 1992), http://www.carc.org/pubs/v20no1/science.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2004).
37
See also Operational Terms, supra note 25, at 11; see generally Hobson, supra note
36.
38
See Hobson, supra note 36.
39
For information on the waterproof qualities of seal intestines, see Nat’l Museum of
Natural History, Looking Both Ways: Heritage and Identity of the Alutiiq People of
Southern Alaska, at http://www.mnh.si.edu/lookingbothways/text/living.html (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004). For information on the frost-resistant wolverine fur, see Alaska Dep’t of
Fish & Game, Wolverine: Wildlife Notebook Series, at http://www.adfg.state.ak.us/pubs/notebook/furbear/wolverin.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
35
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information and in part because traditional knowledge tends to be
holistic by nature.40 It is often intimately tied not just to the
material object of the knowledge itself, but also to the larger
environmental context of the knowledge.41 Traditional knowledge
also is often deeply interwoven with spiritual or sacred concepts,
and it is regularly expressed and preserved via ritualistic or artistic
traditions that, unlike Western artistic habit, may be executed and
passed down through generations only within firmly fixed
parameters of expression.42
It is this holistic quality of traditional knowledge that defies its
neat categorization into any distinct body of Western intellectual
property law and invites reconsideration of some of the basic
Western definitions of intellectual property.43 In TKGRF, many of
the legal concepts involved are novel and not yet well-understood
in any sophisticated way by anyone other than the members of the
relevant indigenous societies.44 Such concepts may not be easily
reduced to a few clear and succinct legal principles.45 Thus it is
not surprising that many of the qualities embodied in traditional
knowledge cannot be effectively protected within the present reach
of established intellectual property law in the industrialized
Western world.46
Some of the more subtle and original legal thinking concerning
the nature of traditional knowledge is surfacing at WIPO.47 In a
seminar last year, one leading scholar asked his audience members
40

Dutfield, supra note 2, at 240–41.
Id.
42
To obtain a sense of these general precepts within the specific context of Australian
aboriginal visual art, see Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous
Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 10 (Fall 1997).
43
See id. at 2.
44
Id. at 10.
45
Id. at 10–11.
46
Id. at 2, 30–31, 41; see also id. at 7, for a discussion of Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty.
Ltd., (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240, 244 (Austl.). This case discusses how Western copyright
protection would fall short of protecting sacred Australian Aboriginal images used
without permission on carpets.
47
WIPO is a United Nations specialized agency and administers twenty-three
international treaties relating to intellectual property protection. As of Sept. 2004, some
181 nations were member states. For extensive information on WIPO’s general mission,
see General Information, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/gib.htm (last visited Nov.
5, 2004).
41
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to consider the inherent nature of traditional knowledge by asking
themselves a series of questions:48 What characteristics, if any,
make traditional knowledge different from other known forms of
intellectual property? 49 Might the legal means to protect it be sui
generis?50 Or is this type of knowledge itself sui generis?51 If so,
what makes it that way—its epistemological nature, or something
else?52 Is it “intellectual?”53 What makes it “knowledge?”54 Is it
actually a completely different knowledge system—cosmological,
for example?55
If defining traditional knowledge is difficult, establishing the
legal parameters of “folklore” or “traditional cultural expression”
is at least equally challenging.56
Just as with traditional
knowledge, the parameters of folkloric terminology are frequently
under discussion in a wide variety of international forums.57
48

For more information on WIPO’s work in TKGRF specifically, see Antony
Taubman, Seminar sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (“AAAS”) to consider a draft version of the AAAS’s proposed handbook on
protecting intellectual property of traditional ecological knowledge holders, Geneva,
Switz. (Dec. 14, 2002) [hereinafter TAUBMAN PRESENTATION] (notes of discussion on file
with author). The AAAS is an international federation of scientific and engineering
societies and is headquartered in Washington, D.C. It holds accredited non-governmental
organization status at the WIPO IGC. See generally AAAS, at http://www.aaas.org (last
visited Nov. 5, 2004); The AAAS Project on Traditional Ecological Knowledge, at
http://shr.aaas.org/tek/handbook (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
49
Id. All of the questions in this paragraph were presented by Mr. Taubman to seminar
attendees.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
While this paper uses the term “folklore” for convenience, “traditional cultural
expression” seems to be the increasingly preferred terminology. See Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore Legal and Policy Options, at 6–7, WIPO,
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge &
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/3 (Dec. 1, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2004/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_6_3.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
57
See, e.g., United Nations Educ., Cult., & Soc. Org. (“UNESCO”), Convention for the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, at 2, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15782&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (wherein UNESCO unanimously adopted a related legal
definition for “tangible cultural heritage”).
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WIPO has not settled on a definition yet, but WIPO experts explain
that any definition of traditional cultural expression would have to
cover all works characteristic of an indigenous society or local
community that reflect its own social and cultural experiences,
using the vehicle of its own particular artistic expectations and
habits.58 This would include, but would not be limited to, works of
art, handicraft, and design; written and oral verbal works, including
songs, poetry, stories, and riddles; music; and works expressed
through action, such as dances, rituals, and plays. Increasingly, as
WIPO notes, traditional cultural expressions are viewed as a subset
of the larger concept of traditional knowledge, and these folkloric
expressions often consist of both tangible and intangible
components.59
For example, a largely unpublicized but typical case of cultural
encroachment worldwide involves the Tuareg nomads of Saharan
Africa, whose traditional range spans several countries and who
possess rich folkloric traditions that are currently under siege.60
Distinctive Tuareg tribal jewelry has been repeatedly copied,
allegedly without authorization, for sale to tourists in North and
West Africa by Japanese and Senegalese entrepreneurs.61 Tuareg
traditional music has similarly been recorded and produced in CDs
widely sold in Europe and the United States.62 Since national
patent and copyright systems are often not developed enough to
provide any protection for the Tuareg, and because the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights gives only the broadest of IP
protection guarantees, they, like other citizens of third-world
58

See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 6–7.
Id. at 8.
60
See, e.g., Press Release, Mary Robinson, High Commissioner for Human Rights,
United Nations (May 13, 2002), http://www.un.org/news/briefings/docs/2002/IPFbrf.doc.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
61
Interview with Saoudata Aboubacrine, representative of Tin-Hinan, a
nongovernmental organization from Burkina Faso, at the 4th Session of the WIPO
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (“IGC”), in Geneva, Switz. (Dec. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter Aboubacrine Interview] (on file with author). For an example of Japanese
sale
of
Tuareg
jewelry,
see
Indigenous
People
Collection,
http://www.morita.ne.jp/hikkigu/delta/tuareg.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
62
See, e.g., HOGGAR, VOCAL AND INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC OF THE TAUREG (Le Chant Du
Monde 1994).
59
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countries, now feel that WIPO is the only realistic forum in which
they can petition for help.63
How to define TKGRF and identify its unique attributes, then,
are two threshold questions facing legal scholars in this field.
Western lawmakers and legal scholars should widely discuss these
issues with as many indigenous community representatives as
possible, so that nonindigenous thinkers can begin to understand
more about the true nature of TKGRF. Constructing a flexible
legal interface between established intellectual property law and
customary law might then become possible—a tool that is vitally
important if this creative material is not to be either permanently
lost or so far removed from its original context that it loses its
meaning and usefulness.
B. Summary of the Legal Issues and Disputes to Date in TKGRF
Like the definitional difficulties, the legal and social issues
relating to TKGRF are extremely complex and diverse.64 Disputes
are rapidly arising in a variety of venues.65 As a result, national
legislatures, private businesses, trade associations, international
organizations, and, increasingly, indigenous groups themselves, are
all experimenting with a variety of potential solutions.66
1. Complexity of TKGRF Legal Issues
A statement given on behalf of the Saami67 Council at a recent
WIPO conference illustrates the complexity of legal issues
common to TKGRF discussions.68 The speaker, from the border
63

See Aboubacrine Interview, supra note 61.
See, e.g., AJEET MATHUR, MISSING MARKET IN WORLD TRADE: THE CASE FOR ‘SUI
GENERIS’ PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (Indian Council for Research on Int’l
Econ. Relations, Working Paper No. 141, Aug. 2004), http://www.icrier.res.in/wp141.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See Frank Horn, National Minorities of Finland, Virtual Finland, at
http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/minorit3.html (2004) (“The Sámi are an indigenous
people living in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Russia. Known widely in the past as
Lapps, the term ‘Lapp’ is now considered derogatory by many Sámi.”).
68
See Report, at 19, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic
Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/15 (Dec. 17, 2002)
64
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area of Finland and Norway, addressed various troubling aspects of
the exploitation of traditional Saami culture by other, non-Saami
Scandinavians.69 One example of this exploitation occurs when
outsiders inaccurately copy and wear the distinctive Saami national
dress, usually for commercial reasons.70 When authentically
designed and appropriately worn, this clothing is used within
Saami culture to convey extensive and specific nonverbal
information about the wearer’s family of origin, clan, geographic
location, marital status, and other identity factors.71 When
inappropriately worn and inauthentically designed by outsiders, it
is robbed of the communication characteristics integral to its
design and use in the indigenous society in which it originates.72
Many members of Saami society find this offensive, but are unsure
how to remedy the situation.73
Similarly, Saamis view emulation of their customs and
religious rites by non-Saami travel agencies as demeaning and
disrespectful of their culture.74 They are concerned not only about
unauthorized and handicraft counterfeiting and the loss of tourist
income to genuine Saamis, but about the impact of these cultural
abuses on young Saamis.75 The Saamis are typical of growing
indigenous populations searching for self-determination and for
protection of their traditional cultures (part of which constitutes
(statement of Piia Nuorgam, representative of the Saami Council),
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/doc/grtkf_ic_4_15.doc (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004).
69
Id. at 31–32.
70
Id. at 31. This national costume, traditionally designed in royal blue material with
extensive and intricate red trim, is well-known around the world and clearly inherently
distinctive. See Bata Shoe Museum, Lapland/Saami, at http://www.batashoemuseum.ca/shoesections/lapland.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2004).
71
See Report, supra note 68, at 31.
72
See Consolidated Analysis of the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural
Expressions, at 22, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/3 (May 2, 2003),
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/doc/grtkf_ic_5_3.doc (last visited
Nov. 5, 2004).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
See Kati Eriksen, Address at the Meeting on Youth Policy in the Arctic (Sept. 14,
2001), http://www.arctic-council.org/files/sahkavuorru-140901/sahkavuorru-140901.pdf
(last visited Nov. 5, 2004).

KREMERS FORMAT

18

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

1/25/2005 6:10 PM

[Vol. 15:1

intellectual property) from widespread adaptation and unauthorized
use.76
Many isolated ethnic communities have developed unique and
complex visual art, music, and storytelling cultures that have been
recently “discovered” by the outside world.77
Allegedly,
indigenous cultural creations, like so many other artistic and
musical works, are regularly being illegally copied and resold by
commercial entities, often via new technologies such as digital
sampling.78 Researchers commonly misuse (perhaps unwittingly)
and improperly disseminate material gleaned from indigenous
cultural traditions.79 Labor-intensive local textiles, jewelry, and
cultural artifacts are commonly copied and passed off as the work
of indigenous craftspeople by entrepreneurs with access to capital
and labor-saving machinery, and the duplicates are usually massproduced and of poor quality.80 When cheap knockoffs flood local
and export markets, the original artisans may cease working
altogether.81 Traditional skills, methods, and designs, as well as
the cultures they reflect, are thus permanently lost.82
A more widely publicized example of the same problem
involves pharmaceutical and agribusinesses’ “bioprospecting”
among indigenous societies for unfamiliar genetic material and
associated traditional knowledge.
This practice, now
commonplace, has alarmingly and destructively invaded the world
of traditional medical knowledge and indigenous local plants.83
76

See Tebtebba, The Kimberly Declaration—International Indigenous Peoples Summit
on Sustainable Development, http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/wssd/ipsummitdec.html (Aug. 28, 2002).
77
See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 10; see also Mrs. P.V. Valsala G. Kutty,
National Experiences with the Protection of Expressions of Folklore/Traditional Cultural
Expressions: India, Indonesia and the Philippines 1 (Nov. 25, 2002), at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/studies/cultural/expressions/study/kutty.pdf (last visited Nov.
8, 2004).
78
See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 10; Kutty, supra note 77, at 2.
79
See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 34–37.
80
Id. at 11.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
See generally POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27; MARK J. PLOTKIN, TALES OF A
SHAMAN’S APPRENTICE (Penguin Books 1994); BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE: EQUITABLE PARTNERSHIPS IN PRACTICE (Sarah A. Laird ed., 2002)
[hereinafter BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE].
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Bioprospecting activity, legitimate and otherwise, is now a routine
and widely accepted industrial practice and is pursued aggressively
by private, and occasionally public, actors all over the world.84
Illegal acquisition activity is also increasing, occasionally
including the outright stealing of genetic material and knowledge;
the term “biopiracy” was thus coined to refer to the illegitimate
appropriation and commercialization of human, plant, and other
genetic material without the informed consent of its owners or
traditional custodians.85
TKGRF, and the diverse legal questions they entail, are
inextricably intertwined with a larger debate over whether
intellectual property law contributes positively to economic
development in poor countries, or whether it predominantly
protects the interests of developed countries.86 Contentious debate
about TKGRF is underway, not only at WIPO, but in a variety of
international forums, including the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), the Food and Agriculture Organization (“FAO”), the
UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (“UN Working
Group”), United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Social
Organization (“UNESCO”), the Organization of American States
(“OAS”), and the Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”).87
Among legal scholars and economists, the long-held
assumption that strong intellectual property laws inherently
facilitate the transfer of technology and wealth from industrialized
84

See BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 285; see also
Telephone Interview with Eric Wilson, Deputy Director for the Office of American
Indian Tribes, U.S. Department of the Interior (Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Wilson
Interview 2002] (on file with author) (“Company researchers are out every day, searching
the Internet, combing libraries for information, and dispersing themselves among
indigenous communities to inquire about material that might lead [to profitable
patents].”).
85
See BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 7–8.
86
See generally Comm’n on Intell. Prop. Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property
Rights and Development Policy (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Integrating IP Rights],
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2004); Patently Problematic, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2002, at 75 [hereinafter Patently
Problematic]; W. Lesser, The Effects of TRIPS-Mandated Intellectual Property Rights on
Economic Activities in Developing Countries (Apr. 17, 2001), http://www.wipo.int/aboutip/en/studies/pdf/ssa_lesser_trips.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
87
See generally UNCTAD, Seminar on Traditional Knowledge, at
http://r0.unctad.org/trade_env/test1/meetings/delhi.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
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countries to less developed countries may be falling into disfavor.88
In fact, the limited empirical evidence available suggests that
strong intellectual property laws can actually inhibit such transfers
and reinforce existing income and development disparities.89
While few scholars in the developing world would question the
need for a predictable intellectual property law system conforming
to well-established international norms, they legitimately doubt the
ability of a developing economy lacking its own technological base
to develop efficiently while in direct competition with foreign
technology owners who hold monopoly powers under local patent
and copyright laws.90 At least in the short run, intellectual
property laws tend mainly to protect the interests of current
intellectual property owners, and in the developing world, these
consist overwhelmingly of foreign enterprises from industrialized
countries.91 This realization, of course, runs contrary to the
interests of entrenched political and economic actors in
industrialized countries, including the United States.92 In the
TKGRF debate, analogous arguments can be made against the
research and development transfer practices of many
bioprospecting companies across pharmaceutical, agricultural,
horticultural, and ethnobotanical sectors.93
The TKGRF debate is also affected by the increasing
polarization among member states at WIPO and the WTO on
patentability and protection standards for plants, animals, and
biological processes.94 Not surprisingly, developed countries seek
88

See Integrating IP Rights, supra note 86, at 23.
Id. at 23–24.
90
Id. at 24–25.
91
Id. at 21.
92
See Dutfield, supra note 2.
93
See generally Padmashree Gehl Sampath & Richard G. Tarasofsky, Study on the
Inter-Relations between Intellectual Property Rights Regimes and the Conservation of
Genetic Resources, Ecologic-Institute for International and European Environmental
Policy (Dec. 31, 2002), http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/abs/abswg-02/information/abswg-02-inf-ext-en.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
94
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND art.
27.3(b), 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (providing that “plants,
animals other than micro-organisms, and biological processes for producing these may be
excluded from patentability, but Member States shall protect plant varieties, either
89
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to strengthen intellectual property protection in these areas, while
developing countries want to broaden the flexibility of applicable
treaty standards.95 Indigenous TKGRF holders have a direct
interest in the progress and outcome of this debate, but they are
often not represented at these discussions.96
This altered perception of the role of intellectual property
rights in economic development, together with increased
awareness of TKGRF as a potentially valuable component of IP
rights, is causing many less-developed nations to reconsider the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(“TRIPS”).97 TRIPS was negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round
trade negotiations, which also produced the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade of 1994 and established the WTO.98 TRIPS sets
up guidelines99 and timetables100 within which all members must
implement national legislation establishing internationally agreed
upon minimum standards for intellectual property protection.101 It
provides an international mechanism for settling trade-related
intellectual property disputes.102
TRIPS resulted from a powerful lobbying effort led by the
United States, mainly at the joint behest of corporate copyright
owners (who were concerned about rampant global piracy in
computer software and digitized music and films) and
pharmaceutical patent holders (who were interested in maintaining
patent drug exclusivity and in limiting compulsory licensing.)103
through patents, an effective sui generis system, or a combination thereof”), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm. Interpretation and application of
this provision is the subject of considerable debate and study within the WTO at present.
For information on Article 27.3(b) and the issues it raises, see TRIPS: Reviews, Article
27.3(b) and Related Issues, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
95
See Sampath & Tarasofsky, supra note 93, at 15.
96
See Dutfield, supra note 2, at 238.
97
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, art. 27.3(b), 33 I.L.M. 1197; Sampath &
Tarasofsky, supra note 93, at 16.
98
See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 94.
99
See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94.
100
Id. at arts. 65–67.
101
See generally id.
102
Id. at art. 64.
103
Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481,
481–89 (2002). (examining TRIPS history from the context of the U.S. pharmaceutical
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Apparently, the developing countries, viewing TRIPS as part of a
larger trade package, found it was to their advantage to make
concessions to the United States and the European Union on
intellectual property issues, in exchange for their promised
reduction of agricultural export subsidies, a phasing–out of textile
import quotas, and extension of trade concessions on tropical
products.104 But many developing countries now feel that, while
they have made costly concessions on intellectual property issues,
some of the promised changes from the industrialized countries
have not been forthcoming, especially the lowering of soaring U.S.
and E.U. agricultural subsidies.105
This state of affairs
undoubtedly contributed to the September 2003 breakdown in
negotiations at the WTO Ministers’ Summit in Cancún, Mexico.106
Given this contentious international climate, great significance
attaches to the debate on TKGRF. Developing countries realize
that intellectual property laws, however distasteful, are now an
unavoidable part of the international trade landscape; instead of
objecting to them, they increasingly believe they must use the
system to their benefit, by seeking intellectual property protection
for TKGRF.107 For this to occur, TKGRF need global recognition
as legitimate forms of intellectual property, and its custodians need
clear and enforceable means by which to protect their ownership
and development interests.108
Undoubtedly the most important single event relating to
widespread recognition of these interests and to formal legal
protection of TKGRF was the creation and signature of the

industry interests in patented drugs and compulsory licensing, and explaining the motives
behind many developing countries’ acceptance of TRIPS).
104
Id. at 520; see also Special Report on Patents and the Poor: The Right to Good
Ideas, THE ECONOMIST, June 23, 2001, at 22.
105
See Sell, supra note 103, at 520.
106
See Claire Melamed, The Collapse of the WTO Talks (Sept., 16, 2003), at
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/cancun/030916feature.htm (At the summit, “[t]he
governments of developing countries were demanding that the WTO guarantee their
rights to help farmers facing impossible competition from cheap imports, while rich
countries were demanding that developing countries throw open their borders as the price
of any reduction in agricultural subsidies.”).
107
See Patently Problematic, supra note 86, at 76.
108
Id.
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Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) in 1992.109 The
United States signed the CBD a number of years ago, but it has not
been ratified by the Senate, primarily due to opposition from
biotechnology and agrochemical industries.110
The CBD demonstrates international recognition of the need to
protect and preserve the global natural environment through the
conservation and preservation of biological diversity and through
the use of environmentally sustainable methods of development.111
In particular, Article 8(j) expresses the vital importance of
traditional knowledge and resources held by indigenous peoples,
and it emphasizes the need for indigenous peoples’ active
involvement towards reaching these goals.112 Obtaining prior
informed consent from indigenous custodians before using their
traditional knowledge or genetic resources is mandatory for
contracting parties under the CBD, and users are required to share
any resultant benefits with the relevant source communities,
including economic benefits arising from commercialization.113 A
set of working guidelines for implementing these requirements,
known as the “Bonn Guidelines,” has been drafted and approved
for member use.114 These guidelines recommend that each
member state establish a national “clearing-house mechanism” to
oversee and ensure compliance with CBD terms for all contractual
relationships involving access to, use, and commercialization of
genetic material in the custodianship of indigenous
communities.115
Effective TKGRF legal protection involves many
complicating factors in addition to the incendiary economic
109

See
Convention
on
Biological
Diversity,
Convention
Text,
at
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp (last updated Dec. 6, 2003).
110
Rosemary Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and Community
Traditional Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 276 (2001)
[hereinafter Coombe, Recognition].
111
See Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on Earth 2 (Apr. 2000),
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/cbd-sustain-en.pdf.
112
Id. at 6.
113
Id. at 9.
114
Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision VI/24, Access and Benefit-Sharing as
Related to Genetic Resources, Apr. 2002, http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/?m=cop-06.
115
Id. at Annex, art. II.A., ¶ 13.
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development backdrop.116 For one thing, the sheer diversity of
cultural traditions, variety of creative and genetic material, and
number of distinct groups of people involved are nearly
overwhelming.117 A “one-size-fits-all” legal solution, whether in
treaty or other form, seems far more likely to compound current
conflict than to clarify issues and delineate responsibilities. Many
ethnic groups seeking TKGRF protection live and tend their crops
in territory that overlaps several national, and thus legal,
boundaries.118 Then, too, national intellectual property regimes
already vary enormously from country to country. Disparities
among TKGRF legal protections will likely increase, at least in the
near term, as some legislatures begin to experiment with
regulation, and others do not.
In addition, some of the basic concepts inherent in intellectual
property law are directly at odds with the goals of some indigenous
people.119 Many indigenous societies seek perpetual and exclusive
possession of their communities’ cultural expressions and
traditional knowledge.120
Some factions within indigenous
societies want certain kinds of knowledge, usually those that are
sacred or relate to the spiritual realm, to remain completely secret
and forbidden from any use by the outside world.121 By contrast,
many intellectual property laws are, of course, aimed at the
eventual dissemination of information.122 Neither copyright nor
patent law are designed to give any creator a permanent monopoly
over his creation; one of the main objectives underlying limited
term protection is to ensure a perpetual injection of new material
into the public domain to stimulate further innovation.123 Whether
or not modern patent or, especially, copyright systems function
effectively in this way today may be debatable, but outright
116

See generally Integrating IP Rights, supra note 86.
See, e.g., Systematic Analysis, supra note 25.
118
See, e.g., Horn, supra note 67.
119
Farley, supra note 42, at 54. Ms. Farley’s discussion of the variance between
normative values in traditional indigenous societies and the economics-driven values of
Western intellectual property regimes is a particularly clear illumination of this
commonly-discussed issue. See generally id.
120
Id. at 14–15.
121
Id. at 54–55.
122
Id. at 55.
123
Id.
117
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monopolistic grants of unlimited duration to specific groups of
people would not only greatly deter the continuing evolution and
development of their cultures and knowledge,124 but might also
noticeably increase inter-ethnic tension and logjams in court
systems around the world. And while trademark and trade secrets
laws can, at least theoretically, give protection for “unlimited
times,” these areas of law, like the broader U.S. law of unfair
competition, traditionally have been defined and developed on a
strictly local basis, so lack of uniformity in protection might be
substantial.125
Even for indigenous stakeholders interested in allowing outside
use or commercialization of their TKGRF, established intellectual
property regimes are rife with other problems.126 Copyright law in
many countries, for example, requires identification of one or more
specific authors of a work and does not allow for the type of
collective authorship common in folkloric works.127 Traditional
folkloric works may also not be considered “original” in the
copyright sense, because they are products of the cultural public
domain, are developed incrementally over time, and are often
executed according to strictly observed rules to which each
successive generation of authors is bound.128 Some countries,
including the United States, require fixation of a work before
copyright protection can exist,129 which can be problematic in
TKGRF because some of the most common methods for
expressing, preserving, and disseminating knowledge in
124

Id.
Id. at 50–54 (discussing the applicability and limitations of the law of unfair
competition and trade secrets in the context of traditional art).
126
Id. at 17–40 (discussing the problems that indigenous stakeholders face, including
the duration of the rights, the originality requirement, the fixation requirement, group
rights, and the fair use exception).
127
Id. at 29–30.
128
Id. at 18–22.
129
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2004). “[C]opyright protection subsists in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. . . .” Id. In the U.S., categories of
copyrightable works of authorship include literary, musical, and dramatic works,
pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architectural works. Id.
125
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indigenous societies include storytelling, riddles, songs, and other
oral traditions.130
From a TKGRF perspective, patent protection can be equally
problematic. Patenting centuries-old traditional knowledge is often
unavailable to indigenous owners because of the novelty and
nonobviousness requirements of most patent regimes.131 Time
bars for public use or sale132 would also operate against indigenous
communities who might otherwise apply today for patents
incorporating such knowledge considered new by the larger world,
yet long used within the confines of the traditional community.133
Laws in some developing countries may not allow any patent
protection for genetic material from plants, animals, and
microorganisms, while comparable laws in the United States and
other industrialized countries do often allow such patents.134 This
disparity can enable those who are able to obtain expensive patents
in industrialized countries to collect monopoly rents for
“discovering” material and knowledge originating with indigenous
communities, who may themselves be unable to patent their
TKGRF at home and who may have neither the sophistication nor
the financial resources to protect it abroad in their own name.135
Also, while much traditional knowledge presently is codified only
in oral traditions, some countries’ patent examination procedures
sometimes recognize only written prior art,136 further increasing
the chances that patent protection may be granted to usurping third
parties for “inventions” long known among local traditional
communities.137
130

Farley, supra note 42, at 27–28; see also Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 8.
In the U.S., these requirements are found at 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2004). Similar
requirements exist in most national laws and international patent regimes. See also
European
Patent
Convention,
art.
54,
http://www.european-patentoffice.org/legal/epc/e/ar54.html (last updated Mar. 2004).
132
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102.
133
See Heinz Goddar, Biotech Patents and Indigenous Knowledge (July 20, 2002), at
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number8 (last updated Oct. 4, 2004).
134
See 35 U.S.C. § 102; see generally European Patent Convention,
http://www.european-patent-office.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
135
For a more in-depth discussion of this concept, see Dutfield, supra note 2, at 255–56.
136
The United States, for example, limits consideration of prior art to the available,
printed, material during its examination proceedings. See 35 U.S.C. §102.
137
Dutfield, supra note 2, at 256.
131
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2. Representative Sampling of TKGRF Disputes
A number of interesting and unusual copyright and patent
disputes have arisen over the last decade relating to TKGRF, and
courts and government agencies have begun to grapple with these
conflicts, sometimes in creative and interesting ways.
a) Copyright Disputes
A recent Australian copyright case involved the importation
into Australia of printed fabric using unauthorized designs derived
from a local Aboriginal artist’s painting, “Magpie Geese and Water
Lilies at the Waterhole.”138 Both the painter and his tribe’s
representative separately sued the foreign textile manufacturer for
copyright infringement in 1996.139 The Federal Court of Australia
for the Northern Territory District examined customary Aboriginal
law to determine the factual nature of the relationship between the
painter and his tribe, as well as the painter’s authority to use sacred
information and designs belonging to the tribe in making his
painting.140 The court determined that under Australian law the
painter had a fiduciary duty to the tribe to ensure that his artistic
work would not be exploited in a manner contrary to tribal law and
custom.141
Since the painter had successfully brought an
infringement action against the textile manufacturer, however, he
had appropriately discharged his fiduciary obligations to the tribe,
and the tribe thus had no right to any further cause of action
against the manufacturer.142
In another landmark case, an Australian federal judge
determined that an award of collective damages to a group of
Aboriginal artists was appropriate redress for “cultural harm”

138

Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles Pty. Ltd., 157 A.L.R. 193 (1998), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/1998/1082.html?query=%5e+bulun (last modified Sept. 8, 1998).
139
Id. at 246.
140
Id. at 247.
141
Id. at 264.
142
Id.
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caused by a Vietnamese carpets importer who was found to have
infringed the artists’ copyrighted painting designs.143
In an earlier case, Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia,144 an
Aboriginal artist created a Morning Star Pole, which is a sculptural
work generally created for and used in Aboriginal ceremonies
memorializing the death of important tribe members.145 The artist
in this case was authorized by his tribe to create the work, and he
held a valid copyright in the work.146 When the Bank of Australia
reproduced an image of the work on its ten-pound note, however,
the artist sued the bank, claiming he had no authority from his tribe
to allow reproduction not in accordance with customary law.147 In
addressing the juncture of customary law and Australian copyright
law, the court ultimately found that the latter does not recognize
protection of artistic works that are communal in origin.148
b) Patent Disputes
In the patent arena, patents and patent applications for
derivations (developments from, or processes relating to, genetic
material originating with indigenous custodians) have sparked
increasingly frequent disputes. Most commonly, these have
involved plant substances that have been long used by traditional
societies for healing and other properties, but are new to the
industrialized world, where they are subsequently patented by third
parties who profess to have “discovered” them.149

143

See Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd., 54 F.C.R. 240 (1993), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/journals/AILR/1996/backup/20.html?query=%5e+milpurrurru (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
144
Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, 21 I.P.R. 481 (1991), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/unrep4955.html?query=%5e+yumbulul (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
145
Terri Janke, Minding Culture: Case Studies on Intellectual Property and Traditional
Cultural Expressions, Dec. 2, 2002, at Case Study 3, p. 61 n.45 and accompanying text,
http://wipo.int/tk/en/studies/cultural/minding-culture/studies/finalstudy.pdf.
146
Id. at 61.
147
Id.
148
See id.
149
Srividhya Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 1, 11 (2001) (citing Estelle Doris Long & Antony D’Amato, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1056–57 (West Group 2000)).
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Probably the most famous example of this to date occurred in
1995, when the USPTO issued a U.S. patent for turmeric,150 a
cooking and healing substance used for these purposes for
centuries in India.151 The Indian Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research opposed the patent, claiming prior art based on
an ancient Sanskrit text and an Indian Medical Association paper
published in 1953.152 The controversy resulted eventually in the
revocation of the patent by the USPTO,153 but the “turmeric
incident” has become a celebrated instance of TKGRF misuse and
has contributed to widespread criticism of U.S. patent examination
procedures.154
Presently, over 400 patents based on various uses of turmeric
can now be found in the USPTO patent database, including some
for such age-old uses as breath-fresheners,155 for curing warts,156
and as a nutritional supplement for fending off colds and sore
throats157—uses that would be unlikely to surprise any householder
in India. Questioning the novelty and nonobviousness of such
products and uses by those long familiar with them is certainly
legitimate, as is the inquiry concerning whether such products and
uses should be given monopoly commercial status in any country.
These inquiries seem particularly legitimate when no disclosure is
made in the patent application regarding the existence or source of
the traditional knowledge lying at the heart of the patent in
question, and where the patent holder does not share any of the
eventual commercial benefits with the original knowledge-holding
community.
Another plant, neem, has been the subject of numerous patents
and extensive global dissent, including establishment of a
generalized anti-patent campaign by one Indian research
foundation.158 Neem has also been widely used in Indian healing
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Coombe, Recognition, supra note 110, at 281.
U.S. Patent No. 6,511,679 (issued Jan. 28, 2003).
U.S. Patent No. 6,593,371 (issued July 15, 2003).
U.S. Patent No. 6,596,313 (issued July 22, 2003).
Ragavan, supra note 149, at 12.
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and agriculture for centuries.159 Despite this, one much-publicized
incident involved a neem extract patented by W.R. Grace Inc. in
the U.S. for its storage stability properties.160 Although the Indian
government filed a complaint with the USPTO, the patent has not
been revoked.161 However, another patent held by the same
company, using neem as an anti-fungal agent, was revoked six
years after issuance by the European Union Patent Office, based on
testimony of an employee at an Indian agricultural business that
they had been using the same substance for this purpose several
years before the filing of the European application.162 Other
patents based on neem derivatives for pesticidal uses also have
been issued in the U.S., despite the fact that these properties of the
plant are well-known in Indian agriculture.163 At least one patent
holder has applied for similar patent registrations in Latin America
and Europe.164
Another particularly celebrated plant patent controversy
surrounded the issuance of U.S. patents to Loren Miller, owner of
the International Plant Medicine Corporation, for processing and
commercialization of ayahuasca, a plant sacred to many
Amazonian peoples for ritual use.165 There is neither evidence that
Mr. Miller obtained permission from the Ecuadorian government
to remove the original plant sample upon which his patent claims
were eventually based, nor evidence that the sample was taken
with the prior informed consent of the indigenous community on
whose land holdings it was grown.166
According to the
Coordinating Secretariat of Organizations of Indigenous Peoples
from the Amazon (“COICA”), the supposed new variety of

159

Id.
Id.
161
Id. at 12.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 13.
165
Rosemary Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and
the Conversation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 88 (1998)
[hereinafter Coombe, New Dilemmas].
166
Id. at 89.
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ayahuasca that Mr. Miller claims to have “discovered” was
actually domesticated locally hundreds of years ago.167
A recent TKGRF controversy that has captured widespread
international media attention involves hoodia, a cactus eaten by
South African San tribesmen to stave off thirst and hunger during
extended travel.168 Traditional knowledge holders revealed their
knowledge of this plant’s properties to South African government
researchers at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(“CSIR”), a public agency charged with helping local communities
develop natural resources into commercial products.169 CSIR
isolated and patented the appetite suppressant in the plant and then
licensed it to a small British company, which in turn sublicensed it
to Pfizer for expected commercialization into a blockbuster diet
pill.170 The British company claimed that CSIR said that the
original inventors had long since disappeared; CSIR claimed it had
planned to divulge the resulting patenting and commercialization
plans to the San, once regulatory approval was obtained.171 Since
this often occurs a decade or more after initial isolation of the
active chemistry of a medicinal plant, CSIR did not want to raise
unwarranted San expectations of profits.172 When publicity
concerning the Pfizer deal surfaced, the San became aware of the
situation and hired counsel to protect their interests.173 CSIR was
widely condemned for failing to earmark any of the projected
royalties for either general conservation efforts or for the San.174
Recently, CSIR reached an agreement with the San concerning an
appropriate benefit-sharing scheme.175
Closer to home, several plant patent issues are being contested
by Native Americans and by small producers of long-established
167

Id.
Julia Finch, Bushmen Aim for Cactus Rich Pickings, Guardian Unlimited (Nov. 10,
2001), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4296262,00.html.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
BBC News, S. African Bushmen Hail Drug Deal (Mar. 24, 2003), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/2883087.stm.
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food crop plants.176
Minnesota’s Chippewa Indians have
informally contested a plant patent application on a type of wild
rice filed by NorCal Wild Rice of Woodland, California, and are
asking the company to stop genetic research on the product.177 The
group may file an interference at the USPTO, but NorCal insists
the controversy is merely a miscommunication about the nature of
its patent and related research.178 Another recent case involved a
patent infringement suit brought by the holder of a Certificate of
Protection for a type of yellow bean that others, including the
Mexican government and Tutuli Produce, an Arizona company,
contend has been in existence and grown by many for years.179
Sixteen Colorado producers and processors settled the case with
the patent holder in 2002, but experts predict that the rights of
indigenous peoples in genetic resources will continue to be tested,
especially in connection with transgenic (genetically modified)
plants.180
Human genetic material sampled originally from indigenous
community donors has given rise to another group of patent
dilemmas. One case involved isolation by Western scientists of a
gene apparently responsible for resistance to leukemia; it was
found in blood sample collected from a woman from the Guaymi
tribe in Panama.181 A joint research program between Panamanian
scientists and the U.S. National Institutes of Health (“NIH”),
sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) of the U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services, led to the development of a
T-cell line out of the original blood sample, and NIH promptly
filed a patent application.182 International protest followed,
including complaints to the secretariats of the GATT and the
Secretariat InterGovernmental Committee on the CBD,183 despite
the fact that U.S. officials claim the donor gave her informed oral

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Victoria Slind-Flor, Cultivating the Rice Wars, 3 IP LAW AND BUSINESS 16 (2003).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 26.
Id.
Id.
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consent.184 Some experts question whether her consent, even if
given, included a full understanding of the implications of patent
applications, and many believe that the NIH eventually bowed to
the international outcry when it withdrew the patent application.185
However, even with the application withdrawn, the cell line may
be deposited for a maximum of 30 years under the Budapest
Treaty; so far, it has not been returned to the tribe.186 Some fear
that the cell line will ultimately become public domain property,
eliminating any possibility for the tribe to share in the benefits of
commercialization.187
At least two other situations involving patent applications filed
on cell lines isolated from genetic material donated by indigenous
peoples have occurred within the last ten years.188 Both involved
NIH as patentee, and in each case NIH contends that the donors
gave their prior informed consent.189 The NIH view was strongly
disputed in both instances: in one of the cases, the government of
Papua New Guinea unsuccessfully objected to the U.S. patent, and
in the other, the government of the Solomon Islands has asked that
the patent application be withdrawn.190
3. The Current Range of Proposed Solutions to TKGRF Issues
A variety of solutions to TKGRF disputes are currently under
consideration and experimentation. These range from regulating
private contracting conduct to passing protective sui generis
national legislation to drafting regional model laws on TKGRF.191
Intermediate forms of management include permitting joint patent
ownership, changing patent application disclosures, establishing
public database registries for traditional knowledge, and creating a

184

Id.
Id.
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Ragavan, supra note 149, at 11.
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Id.
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POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 27.
189
Id.
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Id.
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See Farley, supra note 42, at 43–46 (discussing model laws for the protection of
TKGRF).
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flexible legal interface dispute resolution mechanism for TKGRF
conflicts.192
a) Resolution through Private Contracting
Although many industry representatives do not dispute that
bioprospecting has become an accepted and widespread business
practice, some question how big a problem biopiracy really is,
because no reliable empirical evidence exists on how often it
occurs.193 There is a lack of statistical information clearly showing
evidence of widespread inequities in commercial benefitsharing,194 so the perception among some industry and Western
patent offices is that the publicity surrounding biopiracy
exaggerates the severity of the situation.195 Some trade spokesmen
believe that many corporate entities would be willing to accept
reasonable source disclosure and benefit-sharing requirements in
patent applications, so long as these legal requirements were clear,
unambiguous, and not likely to be arbitrarily or rapidly
overturned.196
To a certain extent, TKGRF issues that may arise in a
developing country are indistinguishable from the difficulties
inherent in any transnational contracting situation involving largescale foreign investment in a developing country.197 The rule of
192

See Technical Proposals on Databases and Registries of Traditional Knowledge and
Biological/Genetic Resources, at 5, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. &
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/14 (Dec. 6,
2002)
[hereinafter
Technical
Proposals],
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_14.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
193
Telephone Interview with Lila Feisee, Director of Intellectual Property,
Biotechnology Information Organization (“BIO”) (Jan. 28, 2003) (on file with author).
BIO is a U.S.-based trade association of over 1100 research institutions, companies and
universities, with members located in all fifty states of the U.S. and in thirty-three foreign
countries.
194
Id.
195
Id; see also Telephone Interview with Linda Lourie, Attorney-Advisor, USPTO
(Dec. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Lourie Interview] (on file with author).
196
Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Jeff Kushan, Partner, Sidley, Austin, Brown
& Wood (Jan. 30, 2003) (on file with author). Mr. Kushan participated on behalf of the
USPTO in the 1992 negotiations leading to creation of the CBD; he served at the time of
interview as outside counsel to BIO.
197
This discussion is based on the author’s own experience as counsel with a Fortune
100 oil exploration company in Central Africa, but any practitioner who has negotiated
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law may not be fully established locally, and laws and
implementing regulations governing the transaction may be vague,
subject to constant change, or even nonexistent at the time of initial
negotiations. Understandably, foreign investors seek a stable
investment environment, with clear and predictable rules of law—
including intellectual property laws—before committing the
enormous sums of money necessary to establish a biotech or large
agribusiness venture overseas.
At the same time, however, indigenous communities (and
national governments) have a legitimate interest in knowing
exactly what their contribution to the venture will be, how it will
be used, and how and when they are to be compensated, so that
they can determine from the outset whether the economic and
cultural costs and benefits justify their participation. In particular,
parties entering into a venture based in whole or in part on
indigenous TKGRF should consider and negotiate contractual
terms with regards to: requiring registration with national and local
authorities (via national permit systems) before engaging in
research or collection activity, obtaining the prior informed
consent of the indigenous groups whose land will be entered and
knowledge will be collected, sharing the data and sample
collections with host governments and local community
participants, and agreeing on how benefits will be shared and
source attributions made.198 But the parties must also recognize
that TKGRF-related negotiations are likely to be even more
protracted than those earlier experienced in traditional foreign
investment sectors, such as the petroleum and timber industries.
Similarly, the education process surrounding transactions
involving TKGRF is also likely to be more protracted because of
the complex interplay of cultural, social, legal, and environmental
factors involved.199
Numerous mechanisms have been suggested to enable a more
equitable and transparent contracting process, some of which are
technical contracts in a developing country is likely to find these ideas quite
commonplace and unremarkable.
198
See BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 176.
199
See World Bank Operational Directive 4.20, Indigenous Peoples and Biodiversity in
Latin America: A Survey of Current Information (Aug. 11, 1996) at Tables 2 and 3.
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true advances in thinking, and some of which may not be realistic
in what are often still, essentially, business negotiations. These
include: having the foreign investor pay the indigenous
community’s legal fees upfront, so that both sides have the benefit
of counsel from the start of negotiations;200 having a third-party
mediator participate in contract negotiations to ensure that both
sides are fully informed of the nature and consequences of their
proposed contractual arrangements;201 and giving the indigenous or
local community party the right to unilaterally discontinue the
project at any time,202 presumably even after an agreement is
signed and the project is underway.
This last suggestion seems particularly unrealistic, at least in
the business context. No responsible investor could be expected to
enter into a deal where the other party could cancel at any time
without incurring responsibility for the substantial adverse legal
and economic consequences. To allow indigenous parties to do
this as a matter of standard policy, as advocated by some in the
TKGRF field,203 would be both inequitable and irresponsible.
Contractual provisions for free contract cancellation or information
use retraction at any time must be seriously questioned, since part
of any business deal commonly involves risk—not just with
respect to profit realization, but that the actual project realization
may not be what the parties envisioned when they entered the
contract or that it may entail higher costs (not always economic)
and lesser benefits than expected. To a certain extent, these are
merely the same risks borne by all parties in every business deal,
large or small. Insulating one party completely from the
consequences of its own decisions would not further anyone’s
interests in a responsible manner. If not carefully managed, these
kinds of provisions could also have damaging repercussions to the

200

POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 157.
Id. at 73–74 (referencing provisions of The Global Coalition for Biocultural
Diversity Covenant on Intellectual, Cultural and Scientific Resources,
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~wgtrr/gcbcd.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2004)).
202
Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, Negotiating Research Relationships in the North,
Programme for Traditional Resource Rights, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~wgtrr/inuit.htm#top
(last updated May 30, 1996).
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Id.
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host countries, by weakening the host country’s reputation for
supporting the rule of law and the sanctity of contracts.
However, the motivation behind the suggestion for a late-stage
cancellation option for indigenous TKGRF contributor
communities is sound. Indeed, what is an indigenous community
to do if, as a project progresses, it becomes clear that continued
participation is having dangerously destructive and unforeseen
effects on the community, on its natural habitat, or on the survival
of the contributed TKGRF itself? One solution in this scenario
would be to enable the community to halt the project and for the
investor to receive compensation for sunk costs and lost profits
projected at the time of contracting, perhaps from a national or
international fund set up for this purpose. Such funds could also
be used to reimburse the foreign investor for the upfront, paid-in
costs of indigenous legal fees in completed projects, once
profitability occurs and benefits flow to local and national
populations.
Ensuring that indigenous communities receive adequate legal
representation in these types of business dealings is also a
legitimate objective for formulators of TKGRF policy. Local
communities should have the benefit of objective and neutral legal
expertise and advice (preferably in their own languages), and of
business advice and planning as well, so that they are as wellinformed as possible about the consequences of entering into any
particular project affecting their TKGRF.
But repaying
cancellation costs might be impossibly high, even if an
international or national fund were established for this purpose,
and compensation for lost time and manpower to the foreign
investor also would be astronomical in many cases. Similarly, the
forced introduction of a third party “facilitator” into what is
already an extremely complex and time-consuming negotiating
process could easily ensnare contracting parties in a political and
bureaucratic mire, creating, instead of resolving, problems.
b) Patent Disclosure and Joint Ownership of Patents
Various changes in patent practices are often suggested as a
means by which indigenous groups could obtain greater
recognition for their TKGRF contributions and a greater share in
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associated commercial benefits.204 Among the more frequent
proposals are (1) joint ownership of patents developed from
indigenous TKGRF, wherein both the indigenous community and
the accessing party share the patent as co-owners, and (2) required
disclosure of TKGRF-related information on patent applications.
The former proposal likely could be resolved through private
contracting or through stipulated requirements in national TKGRF
contracting guidelines, while the latter probably would have to be
formalized either by amending the TRIPS requirements for
patentability,205 by changing national patent office application
procedures, or by implementing national patent legislation in the
country of origin of the indigenous community.
Joint ownership by the investor and the contributor community
is one solution often advanced as a way for indigenous groups to
achieve some of their goals. This solution, however, may not be
realistic in the TKGRF context for the same reason it often proves
unrealistic among two parties in the industrialized world: if the
parties cannot agree on use of a jointly owned patent, the result
may be a complete lack of exploitation. Even worse, joint
ownership by disagreeing parties can result in harmful licensing
practices. Normally, each owner of a jointly owned patent may
grant licenses under the patent without the consent of other
owners, and no accounting need be made to them, absent prior
agreement to the contrary.206 Co-owners are each entitled to their
share of licensing royalties, but nonroyalty interests would not
have to be respected,207 and an unwitting indigenous community
could find its patent being used in undesirable ways by other,
uncontrolled corporate licensees. Since sole ownership of patents
by indigenous communities seems highly unlikely in any joint
project, a better practice would probably be careful negotiation and
drafting of a contractual relationship with a sole corporate owner
concerning how the patent can be exploited and licensed. Of
course, indigenous community access to counsel with the
204

See Ragavan, supra note 149, at 32.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, art. 27.
206
Brian G. Brunsvold & Dennis P. O’Reilley, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS
10–11 (1998).
207
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205

KREMERS FORMAT

1/25/2005 6:10 PM

2004] U.S. I.P. PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURES

39

appropriate specialized expertise would be a prerequisite for this
strategy to be successful.
Mandatory disclosure of source information in patent
applications for TKGRF-related patents is also regularly urged as
another solution in this area.208 Many people advocate amending
the current patentability requirements to include information about
the geographic source of genetic material from which patent claims
derive or are developed, as well as disclosure of the source of any
traditional knowledge used in developing patent claims.209 Some
even advocate requiring evidence of prior informed consent in
patent applications.210
Opponents often point out that TRIPS mandates minimum
international standards for patentability,211 and that any change in
these standards in national legislation or generally accepted patent
office practices would be inconsistent with treaty obligations.212
Obviously, amending the TRIPS agreement would solve this
problem, but this is not likely to occur anytime in the near future,
because many industrialized countries, most importantly the
United States, oppose making this a mandatory solution.213 Even if
TRIPS were amended, new patent office procedures and national
legislation would still be needed to effect conformity with the
treaty change and to ensure treatment uniformity.
A more workable solution would be widespread recognition by
courts and patent offices—buttressed where necessary by national
legislation—of an equitable link between application disclosure
and enforceability of a subsequently issued patent.214 As one
208

Downes, supra note 3, at 274.
Id.
210
Id.
211
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, § 5, art. 27 (requiring for patentability a showing
that an invention is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of industrial
application).
212
Linda Lourie, statements and comments in floor discussion on behalf of the United
States delegation to the fourth WIPO Intergovernmental Committee (Dec. 12–19, 2002)
[hereinafter Lourie Statements] (on file with author).
213
Nuño Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources
and Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications without Infringing the TRIPS
Agreement, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371 (2000).
214
Id. at 372.
209
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eminent legal scholar has pointed out, failure to disclose
appropriate source information in a patent application could be
remedied by judicial refusal to enforce the patent, especially in
situations where the patentee acted improperly in deriving an
invention directly or indirectly from an abusive act, such as
unauthorized acquisition and use of genetic material or traditional
knowledge.215 Applying the U.S. patent doctrine of fraudulent
procurement in this situation would yield a beneficial result and
would not require treaty or legislative amendment.216 In the U.S.,
lack of candor in a patent application in nonessential matters can
result in non-enforceability of the patent until such time as the
patentee corrects the misrepresentation or other inequitable
conduct, such as failure to disclose, and thus “cleans his hands.”217
This solution seems to offer the considerable advantage of
potentially prompt implementation by court systems and equally
prompt results for the complaining party, since most patentees are
likely to respond immediately to a potential threat of patent
unenforceability.
Unfortunately, despite its reasonableness,
practicality, and consonance with the spirit of TKGRF, this
particular solution does not yet appear to have received widespread
attention in the TKGRF debate.
Recently, however, at a meeting of the WIPO Working Group
on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”), Switzerland
made a similar proposal, suggesting that the PCT Regulations be
amended to require a declaration of the source of genetic material
and associated traditional knowledge for inventions directly based
on such material and knowledge.218 Such a declaration could be
made during or after the international filing phase of the
application; member states’ national legislation would be allowed
to provide for a halt in processing any application during the
national phase until such time as the necessary declaration was
215

Id. at 395.
Id.
217
Id. at 397.
218
Proposals by Switzerland Regarding the Declaration of the Source of Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent Applications, Annex at 1, WIPO, Int’l
Patent Cooperation Union, Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT), PCT/R/WG/4/13 (May 5, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/meetings/reform_wg//pdf/pct_r_wg_4_13.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
216
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provided.219 Switzerland also proposed that the Patent Law Treaty
be changed to allow its members to pass national legislation
requiring such declarations in national patent law applications and
punishing the absence of such declarations by invalidating the
patent in cases where such absence is due to fraudulent
intention.220
c) Database Registries
Traditional knowledge and cultural expressions, as well as
certain genetic material, can be registered in database “libraries”
that chronicle indigenous communities’ ownership, use, and
husbandry of TKGRF.221
These databases can be used
“defensively” to combat third party usurpation of TKGRF by
accurately recording ownership and making this information
available to patent examiners.222 Databases can also be used
“positively” to record and preserve TKGRF for use by future tribal
generations or, where appropriate, for exchange with other
indigenous communities to meet a common need.223
Numerous projects of this nature are now underway in a variety
of bilateral and multilateral forums.224 One of the earliest and most
ambitious of these efforts deals with traditional medicine and is
being spearheaded by India, with WIPO assistance. This database
will eventually include all known texts on traditional Ayurvedic
(Indian) medicine, translated from local languages to ensure the
widest possible accessibility.225 A similar database has been
established for Chinese traditional medicine.226
One expert closely involved in some of the traditional
knowledge database registry projects in India estimated in
December 2002 that at least 700–800 U.S. patents have been
issued that are improperly based on TKGRF, and he had revised
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

Id.
Id. at 2.
See Technical Proposals, supra note 192, at app.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3 (referencing Traditional Knowledge Digital Library of Ayurveda).
Id. (referencing China Traditional Chinese Medicine (“TCM”) Patents Database).
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his estimate substantially upward by June 2003.227 He and many
others believe that much of the foundational knowledge for such
patents is taken directly from traditional Sanskrit documentation of
the sort now being translated into major world languages and
placed in these registries.228 Registration may help curtail the
future proliferation of inappropriate patent applications,
particularly those presently filed by scientists or entrepreneurs who
are now employed in the West but who have grown up in
developing countries where the knowledge originates and where it
is viewed as available for use by anyone.
An interesting related project in public/private TKGRF registry
is being developed by the Tulalip Tribes in Washington State.229
This Native American group is working on an innovative computer
software program that can provide confidential database protection
for such TKGRF as storytelling traditions, knowledge about native
plants, and traditional salmon fishery management.230 The
program is readily adaptable for use with many other kinds of
TKGRF.231 It operates on a tiered accessibility platform, so that
information of various types can be afforded different levels of
confidentiality; different groups or individuals within an
indigenous society, such as tribal councils or shamans, can control
access to higher levels of information.232 If community members
agree, all or part of the files can be made accessible to government
patent examiners for defensive searching.233 Tribal representatives
demonstrated a prototype of the program to the WIPO IGC in June
2002, where it was particularly well-received because it was
conceived and developed by indigenous people themselves,
independent of government supervision and control.234

227

E-mail from V.K. Gupta, Director, National Institute of Science & Information
Resources, New Delhi, India, June 8, 2003 (on file with author).
228
Id.
229
Technical Proposals, supra note 192, at app.
230
Julia Gold & Preston Hardison, Cultural Stories Project: Integrating Traditional
Knowledge into a Tribal Information System (2003) (on file with author).
231
Telephone Interview with Preston Hardison, Tulalip Tribes of Washington State
(Mar. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Hardison Interview] (on file with author).
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
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d) Protective National Legislation for TKGRF
Not surprisingly, the solution that has received the most
widespread attention in the search for TKGRF protection is
passage of national regulatory legislation.235 This legislation is
quite varied; it includes the collective ownership of copyrights, the
right to contest culturally offensive trademark registrations,
regional systems of model laws on TKGRF contracting and
regulation, and the sui generis legislation236 mentioned earlier.
Panama, Nigeria, Tunisia, and New Zealand are a few
examples of the nations that have recently written protective
TKGRF legislation using a variety of creative approaches. Panama
has introduced a new system of copyright-like rights that allows
collective ownership registration in certain creative works.237 The
first such registration was filed by an indigenous tribe, the Kuna,
for collective ownership of its popular traditional textile form, the
mola.238 Nigeria has criminalized the intentional distortion of
expressions of folklore, and it also punishes source
misrepresentation when a third party misuses an expression of
folklore.239 Tunisian law provides blanket copyright protection for

235

This body of law is quite extensive and can only be examined thoroughly on a
country-by-country basis. For a brief introduction, see Systematic Analysis, supra note
25; Revised Version of Traditional Knowledge: Policy and Legal Options, WIPO,
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge &
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/4 Rev. (Feb. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Revised Policy],
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2004/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_6_4_rev.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2004).
236
See supra Farley, note 42, at 43–46.
237
Special Intellectual Property Regime on Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples for
the Protection and Defense of their Cultural Identity and their Traditional Knowledge,
Republic of Panama, Law No. 20 of June 26, 2000; see also Provisions on the Protection,
Promotion and Development of Handicraft, Republic of Panama, Law No. 27 of July 24,
1997.
238
Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 11.
239
Presentations on National and Regional Experiences with Specific Legislation for
the Legal Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions, at Annex III, WIPO,
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge &
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/INF/2 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Presentation on
Experiences], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_inf2.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
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works of national folklore under a special sui generis regime,240
together with state collection of usage fees for public domain
cultural works.241 By statute, a part of these fees is to be
redistributed to the source communities of the relevant folkloric
work.242
New Zealand is currently amending its trademark laws to
provide for restrictive registrations based on the ethnic origin of
mark design and authenticity of indigenous product origin.243 If
products meet the new statutory criteria, they will be entitled to
carry a special “Maori Made” or “Mainly Maori” mark.244 No
mark will be granted if its use or registration is likely to offend a
significant section of the community, including the Maori.245 This
would preclude, for example, issuance of a mark incorporating a
sacred Maori design.
Some regional groups, such as the Andean Pact246 and the
island nations of the Pacific Community,247 have taken a very
assertive stance in TKGRF legal management and have developed
extensive new laws for TKGRF protection.248 Regional laws are
often based on the earliest model laws relating to TKGRF, which
were originally developed jointly by WIPO and UNESCO in

240

Law 94-36 of Feb. 24, 1994 (concerning literary and artistic property); see also
Comparative Summary, supra note 24.
241
Comparative Summary, supra note 24.
242
Id.
243
See Trade Marks Act, cl. 17, 2002 (N.Z.), available at http://www2.piperpat.co.nz/tmlaw/s000.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
The members of the Andean Pact are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela. See http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm (last visited Nov. 12,
2004).
247
The Pacific Community has 27 members: American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands,
Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Palau, Papua
New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu, Wallis, Futuna, Australia, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the
United States of America. See Secretariat of the Pacific Community, SPC Members, at
http://www.sidsnet.org/pacific/spc/members.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2002).
248
See, e.g., Grain & Kalpavriksh, Traditional Knowledge of Biodiversity in AsiaPacific, http://www.grain.org/briefings_files/tk-asia-2002-en.pdf (Nov. 2002).
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1982.249 In 1996, the five countries of the Andean Pact passed
legislation creating a common legal regime on access to genetic
resources.250
Some regional groups are actively lobbying for WIPO’s direct
assistance in drafting extensive national and regional TKGRF
legislation.251 U.S. government officials, though, point out that
overly aggressive regulatory legislation has resulted in a scientific
research moratorium in various ecosystems in the Andes area and
in the Philippines, an effect that was largely unforeseen and
probably unintended by legislators.252 This is counterproductive
for all parties and may even unintentionally undermine the
legitimate preservation and conservation objectives of the CBD.253
e) Flexible Jurisprudential Interface Mechanism
A few voices in the TKGRF debate have put forth the idea that,
because of the diversity of TKGRF and the equal diversity of the
cultures and social contexts within which TKGRF disputes arise,
part of the solution lies in creating a flexible legal mechanism to
provide an interface between Western and customary law that can
be adapted to specific cultural contexts and factual situations.254 If
traditional knowledge is indeed fundamentally different from the
other forms of intellectual property presently known to us, its
effective legal management may also require a novel approach.255
Participation of native elders, consideration of customary law
concepts, and use of traditional dispute settlement mechanisms
may need to be integrated systematically with the Western IP
judiciary, laws, and enforcement methods to achieve meaningful
249

Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore
against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions, WIPO & UNESCO (1985)
[hereinafter Model Provisions], http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/documents/pdf/1982-folkloremodel-provisions.pdf.
250
Andean Community, Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Decision 391–
Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/JUNAC/decisiones/DEC391e.asp (last visited Nov. 29, 2004).
251
Telephone Interview with U.S. State Department officials (Dec. 17, 2002) (on file
with author).
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
TAUBMAN PRESENTATION, supra note 48.
255
Id.
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legal protection of TKGRF.256 Whatever the ultimate—or even
interim—solutions in this area, it is evident that with the
complexity of TKGRF issues, legal thinkers and indigenous
stakeholders must engage in creative thinking and experiment with
novel approaches.
A main interest of some traditional knowledge holders is
effective control of, and equitable participation in,
commercialization of their knowledge and cultural material. But,
as mentioned earlier, other traditional knowledge holders are more
interested in preventing any dissemination whatsoever of their
knowledge and cultural expression to the outside world.257 From
this perspective, certain knowledge, particularly sacred or ritual
knowledge and symbols, should remain secret and should never be
subject to any dissemination. A middle view might allow limited
dissemination for specific purposes, such as demonstrative use
only of a dance or painting in a formalized cultural setting to
educate outsiders about the indigenous society, without granting
third party rights to replicate or reproduce the material in any
fashion whatsoever.258
As has been ably discussed in the TKGRF legal literature to
date,259 these are radically different viewpoints that directly affect
analysis of the appropriate legal protections. Since a main
underlying purpose of many types of intellectual property law is to
facilitate, rather than to prevent, dissemination of knowledge,
determining which of these perspectives is at issue in any given
instance is critical in assessing whether any given body of
intellectual property law offers appropriate protection. This
characteristic of TKGRF issues seems to necessitate a flexible
solution system, in which the particular TKGRF at issue can be
assessed on a case-by-case basis, within its particular indigenous
and environmental context.

256

Id.
See generally text accompanying notes 67–76.
258
See Systematic Analysis, supra note 25, at 34, ¶ 117 et seq.
259
See generally Farley, supra note 42; Coombe, New Dilemmas, supra note 165;
Downes, supra note 3.
257
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The ayahuasca dispute referred to earlier was an early example
of a “sacred-use” situation,260 and COICA cogently expressed the
offense felt at the ability of a single person to appropriate, assert
proprietary rights in, and derive monetary benefit from the sacred
symbol the plant embodies.261 This dilemma—how to protect the
sacred aspects (or, at least, the holistic essence) of TKGRF via the
laws of dominating cultures that tend to view and protect
intellectual property as a commodity—is one of the perplexing
problems that cuts across all TKGRF sectors and presents one of
the thorniest legal issues confronting legislators and scholars. It is
a core dilemma that may justify creation of sui generis laws. It
certainly also justifies Western judges in exploring and seeking
guidance from applicable customary law in appropriate
circumstances.
II. HOW DID THE TKGRF DEBATE EVOLVE AT WIPO, AND WHAT
IS THE U.S. POLICY POSITION IN THAT DEBATE?
To fully understand the TKGRF controversy, it is useful to
look at how TKGRF evolved as a discrete topic of discussion at
WIPO and the current explorations taking place there. Each
Member State articulates its national policy at WIPO, and it is
interesting to compare U.S. policy statements at WIPO with the
existing U.S. legislation relating to domestic indigenous TKGRF
protection.
A. Evolution of the International TKGRF Debate at WIPO
It is instructive to look at how the international TKGRF debate
has evolved within WIPO for three reasons. First, WIPO is the
only international organization examining TKGRF from a
technical intellectual property standpoint, although it appropriately
attempts to analyze current and potential legal protections within
their larger trade-related, economic, and social contexts as well.262

260

Coombe, New Dilemmas, supra note 165.
Id. at 89.
262
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources—An Overview, at 3, WIPO, Meeting on
Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, WIPO/IP/GR/00/2 (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter WIPO
261
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Secondly, it is important to understand the evolution of WIPO
analysis in TKGRF because many other international
organizations, particularly those under the United Nations
umbrella, are currently either temporarily deferring their own work
in the TKGRF arena until WIPO reaches membership consensus
on a protection plan, or they are working in tandem with WIPO in
attempting to develop their own guidelines for TKGRF use and
protection.263 Finally, the manner in which the TKGRF debate has
evolved within WIPO loosely parallels the course of the present,
slower awakening of U.S. awareness of and interest in TKGRF.264
Formal and systematic exploration of TKGRF at WIPO
evolved through two parallel, but initially unrelated, developments.
One line of inquiry emerged out of growing member interest in
examining genetic resources and intellectual property issues in the
biotechnology area.265 The other developed independently through
a contemporaneous probe into the theoretical legal intersection of
intellectual property law and indigenous peoples’ traditional
knowledge.266
With respect to the former, WIPO first began regularly
addressing issues related to intellectual property and genetic
resources under an exploratory program called “Biological
Diversity and Biotechnology” in 1998–1999.267 In conjunction
with the United Nations Environment Program, WIPO
commissioned a joint study on the role of intellectual property
rights in benefit-sharing related to the use of biological resources
and associated traditional knowledge.268 Intellectual property and
genetic resources issues also arose simultaneously in the third

GR Overview], http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/documents/word/ipgr002.doc (last visited Nov.
12, 2004).
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 2.
266
Erica-Irene A. Daes, Some Observations and Current Developments on the
Protection of the Intellectual Property of Indigenous Peoples, Opening Address at the
WIPO Roundtable on Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples [hereinafter Daes
Opening Address] (July 23–24, 1998), available at http://www.wipo.int/eng/meetings/1998/indip/daes.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
267
Matters Concerning IP, supra note 25, at 2.
268
WIPO GR Overview, supra note 262.
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session of the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents.269 At
this committee’s request, WIPO’s Working Group on
Biotechnology formulated a questionnaire to gather information on
genetic resources from member states, and this group subsequently
recommended convening a special meeting on these issues for the
larger WIPO membership.270 There, members discussed “access
to, and in situ preservation of, genetic resources” and the
relationship of this material to other intellectual property.271
Separately, during meetings relating to the Patent Law Treaty in
2000, another clear focus point arose concerning patent formalities
specifically associated with genetic resources.272 This evidence of
a recurring theme led member states to decide that WIPO needed
to begin examining the genetic resources/traditional knowledge
area in a more systematic fashion.273
At about the same time as the early genetic resources
examination was starting in 1998, WIPO also began independently
examining the field of “traditional knowledge, innovations, and
creativity,” as it was then called.274 A roundtable discussion was
held in Geneva and attended by WIPO member states, numerous
representatives from various indigenous peoples’ NGOs, and the
Rapporteur of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous
Populations.275 During the remainder of that year and the next,
WIPO conducted hundreds of interviews in nine fact-finding
missions among 28 countries “to identify and explore the
intellectual property needs and expectations of new beneficiaries,
including the holders of indigenous knowledge and
innovations.”276

269

See Matters Concerning IP, supra note 25, at 2.
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 3.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Daes Opening Address, supra note 266.
276
Annual Report 2000, WIPO, at 34 [hereinafter WIPO Annual Report 2000],
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/general/441/wipo_pub_441_2000.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
270
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A comprehensive report of the results was published in
2001.277 Among the needs identified were 1) “capacity-building,
awareness-raising, and dialogue” on traditional knowledge and IP
issues “among indigenous and local communities, government
departments,” and other stakeholders; 2) greater use of existing
intellectual property rights by indigenous and local communities;
and 3) development of new sui generis rights for more effective
legal protection of traditional knowledge.278
Efforts at WIPO to address the intersection of intellectual
property and folkloric expressions predate the inquiries into
intellectual property law’s convergence with genetic resources and
traditional knowledge.279
In fact, WIPO began exploring
intellectual property protection of folklore as far back as 1978, in
The “Model Provisions for
cooperation with UNESCO.280
National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore against
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions”281 were drafted as a
result of this joint effort. The majority consensus at WIPO, after
four subsequent WIPO-UNESCO joint regional consultations, was
that ongoing work was needed, preferably via a new WIPO
committee created specifically to explore folklore and traditional
knowledge.282
In 2001, as a result of these three experiences, WIPO created
the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (the
277

Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders,
WIPO Report on Fact-Finding Missions on Intellectual Property and Traditional
Knowledge (1998–1999) 25 (Apr. 2001), WIPO Publication No. 768(E)(2001),
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/final/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
278
Annual Report 2001, WIPO, at 38, http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/general/441/wipo_pub_441_2001.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). Interestingly, the
first two identified needs closely mirror the recommendations made in 1999 by the
USPTO in conjunction with its preliminary study for creation of the Database of Native
American Tribal Insignia. See infra Part III.D.
279
Traditional cultural expressions are now conceptualized within WIPO as “a subset of
traditional knowledge,” despite the fact that examination into folkloric tradition and
intellectual property began well before that of traditional knowledge. Matters Concerning
IP, supra note 25, at 3.
280
WIPO Annual Report 2000, supra note 276, at 3 n.289, 33–34.
281
Model Provisions, supra note 249.
282
Matters Concerning IP, supra note 25, at 3.
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“IGC”).283 This created a forum for systematic exploration of
these three growing areas of creativity, whose linkages had become
increasingly obvious in recent years but were, until then,
considered separately in a variety of disparate venues.284 The IGC
also provided a means for examining TKGRF from an
interdisciplinary intellectual property context, not limited to any
single field of intellectual property law.285
The initial mandate from the WIPO General Assembly required
the IGC to meet semi-annually for two years, beginning in the
spring of 2001.286 It was directed to study and then make
recommendations for action to the General Assembly concerning
intellectual property issues arising in the context of 1) access and
benefit-sharing pertaining to genetic resources; ii) “protection of
traditional knowledge, innovations, and creativity, whether or not
associated with” any genetic resources; and iii) “protection of
expressions of folklore, including handicrafts.”287
Pursuant to this mandate, the IGC completed its first report in
July 2003.288 During the course of its work, the IGC accumulated
valuable information about the mandated topics, commissioned
several fascinating studies relating to TKGRF, and made much of
this material freely available to the public.289 This material is an
invaluable addition to the scant systematic material that was
available just a few years earlier in these areas of law and policy.
The IGC not only served as a central collecting point for heretofore
scattered or completely unavailable national information on
relevant subjects, but the WIPO Secretariat (“Secretariat”) made a

283

Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 4.
287
Id. at 5.
288
Program Performance Report for the 2002–2003 Biennium, at 3, WIPO, Assemblies
of the Member States of WIPO, A/40/2 (July 23, 2004), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ab/pdf/a_40_2.pdf (last visited on Nov. 12,
2004).
289
Voluminous documentation of all meetings of the IGC and supporting material is
available on the Internet. See Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Folklore,
http://www.wipo.int/globalissues/igc/documents/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
284
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substantial contribution of its own to TKGRF scholarship in the
course of collecting, organizing, and summarizing the material.
Information published by the Secretariat during this time
period pertains to the following diverse topics: a composite study
on the protection of traditional knowledge (including specific
national experiences with and legislation concerning traditional
cultural expressions),290 a practical intellectual property
management toolkit for communities wishing to document their
own traditional knowledge,291 reviews of existing intellectual
property protection of traditional knowledge in national legislation
around the world,292 a study of the necessary elements of a sui
generis system to protect traditional knowledge and a consolidated
summary of national sui generis legislation in the folklore area,293
an electronic database of contractual practices and clauses
presently in use relating to genetic resource access and benefitsharing,294 a technical study of disclosure requirements relating to
290

Composite Study on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, WIPO,
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge &
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8 (Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Composite Study],
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_8.pdf (last visited
Nov. 12, 2004); see also Consolidated Analysis, supra note 72; Presentation on
Experiences, supra note 239.
291
Report on the Toolkit for Managing Intellectual Property When Documenting
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on
Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/5
(Apr. 1, 2003),
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_5.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Draft Outline of an Intellectual Property
Management Toolkit for Documentation of Traditional Knowledge, WIPO,
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge &
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/5 (Oct. 20, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_5.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
292
Consolidated Survey of Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Knowledge,
WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad.
Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/7 (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdr/grtkf_ic_5_7.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
293
Elements, supra note 6; Comparative Summary, supra note 24; see also Composite
Study, supra note 290.
294
Contractual Practices and Clauses Relating to Intellectual Property, Access to
Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell.
Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/9 (Mar.
31, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_9.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Report on Electronic Database of Contractual Practices and
Clauses Relating to Intellectual Property, Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
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genetic resources and traditional knowledge,295 technical proposals
for databases and registries for traditional knowledge and
biological/genetic resources,296 policy and legal option studies of
traditional knowledge and of traditional cultural expressions,297 a
study of the international dimension of TKGRF,298 and a catalogue
of periodicals and online databases of traditional knowledge.299
The Secretariat effectively used the expertise of personnel
possessing the highly specialized legal knowledge required to
gather, cull, digest, and process raw TKGRF data into intelligible
and systematic documentation, and it continuously updated and
made this documentation available for use by national
governments, private industry, legal scholars, and members of the
public with each successive meeting of the IGC membership.
Overall, the IGC seems to have made admirable progress on its
information gathering goals.
As required, the IGC reported to the General Assembly in the
early autumn of 2003.300 At that time, it reported having acquired
Sharing, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad.
Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/10 (Oct. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Report on
Electronic
Database],
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_10.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
295
Draft Technical Study on Disclosure Requirements Related to Genetic Resources and
Traditional Knowledge, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic
Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/10 (May 2, 2003),
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_10.pdf (last visited
Nov. 12, 2004); Initial Report on the Technical Study on Disclosure Requirements
Related to Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/11 (Nov.
20, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_11.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
296
Technical Proposals, supra note 192.
297
Revised Policy, supra note 235; International Dimension, supra note 11.
298
International Dimension, supra note 11.
299
Inventory of Traditional Knowledge-Related Periodicals, WIPO, Intergovernmental
Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/5 (Apr. 30, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkfic3_5.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Inventory of Existing Online
Databases Containing Traditional Knowledge Documentation Data, WIPO,
Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge &
Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/6 (May 10, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkfic3_6.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
300
The report was made to the Thirtieth (16th Ordinary) Session of the WIPO General
Assembly, which met in Geneva, Switzerland on Sept. 22–Oct. 1, 2003. Matters
Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic
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a “strengthened understanding of the policy basis and legal
mechanisms for protection” of TKGRF, identified “specific steps
to strengthen defensive protection of traditional knowledge and
associated genetic resources . . . including the enhanced practical
recognition of [traditional knowledge] as prior art in the
examination of patents,” developed “capacity building tools for the
practical protection” of TKGRF, and prepared a “draft technical
study on patent disclosure requirements relating to TKGRF in
response to an invitation from the Conference of Parties of the
CBD.”301 The member states of the IGC were not, however, able
to reach internal agreement on recommendations to the General
Assembly concerning a potential future mandate to continue their
work on TKGRF.302
Fortunately, however, this lack of consensus did not prevent
the General Assembly from recognizing the need to continue this
work and approving an extended mandate.303 The IGC has now
been directed to continue its work on an accelerated basis, focusing
in particular on the international dimension of TKGRF and
intellectual property.304 “The new mandate excludes no outcome
for the IGC’s work, including the possible development of an
international instrument or instruments in this field.”305 The
international community has, thus, clearly recognized the
importance of this work. It intends to ensure that the relation of
TKGRF to the field of intellectual property law is fully explored
and that appropriate legal protections for TKGRF are developed.

Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WIPO, General Assembly,
WO/GA/30/5 (Aug. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Report to the General Assembly],
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_30_5.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
301
See id. at 2; see also Convention on Biological Diversity: Disclosure Requirements
Concerning Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, WIPO, General Assembly,
WO/GA/30/7 (Aug. 15, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_30_7.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
302
Report to the General Assembly, supra note 300, at 3.
303
See Press Release, WIPO, WIPO Member States Agree to Fast-Track Work on
Traditional
Knowledge
(Sept.
29,
2003),
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/releases/2003/p362.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
304
See id.
305
See id.
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This is truly encouraging. Future work by WIPO, however,
would benefit from certain structural changes concerning direct
participation in the work by indigenous peoples and other private
parties. Currently, work is necessarily constrained to reflect the
interests and policy goals of national governments, which in many
cases may not reflect the interests of indigenous people. One of
the problems the IGC has faced in its work on TKGRF is that
WIPO’s organizational structure is not conducive to participation
by non-state actors.306 This means that valuable input from
members of local and indigenous communities, NGOs, private
enterprise, and academic institutions and faculty has been
somewhat limited. As a specialized UN agency, WIPO carries out
its work via a general assembly of national government
representatives from its member states.307 The IGC, consisting
also of member state officials, meets in its own assembly and, like
other WIPO bodies, allows “relevant intergovernmental
organizations and accredited international and regional nongovernmental organizations . . . to participate in an observer
capacity.” 308 WIPO has an accreditation procedure through which
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations may apply
for observer status, but individuals may not be accredited.309 The
ICG has its own “fast-track” accreditation process, whereby an
organization, but not individuals, may be allowed to observe the
IGC meetings.310
Unfortunately, even the IGC “fast-track” accreditation process
is both time-consuming and cumbersome.
An applicant
organization must file a form describing its organizational mission
and projects, including a written statement of the specific relevance
306

Report to the General Assembly, supra note 300, at 3.
See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (July 14,
1967, amended Sept. 28, 1979) arts. 5–6, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo029en.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
308
See Matters Concerning IP, supra note 25, at 4.
309
See generally WIPO, Member States, Criteria for Admission as Permanent Observer
with WIPO, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/members/admission/ (last visited Nov.
12, 2004).
310
See Application Form for Accreditation as Ad Hoc Observer to the WIPO
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (documents available on request from the WIPO
Secretariat and on file with author).
307
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of intellectual property to its work, after which the Secretariat staff
vets the application.311 Once the organization’s qualifications are
initially verified and approved by the Secretariat, member states
vote on whether or not to grant the organization accreditation and
admit it as an observer.312 Since the vote on new applicants is held
in Geneva at the opening of each IGC session, an organization
awaiting accreditation cannot, theoretically, determine in advance
of the opening of the session whether its representatives will be
admitted. Thus, long lead times can thus be required for a nonstate actor to: 1) learn about the existence and work of the IGC, 2)
submit a written application, 3) determine whether the application
has been pre-approved by the Secretariat, 4) determine after the
start of the session whether or not the accrediting vote has been
cast in its favor, and 5) send its representatives to Geneva for the
remainder of that session and following sessions. Of course, an
organization can gamble that it will succeed in being accredited
and can appear on-site at the start of the session (though it will be
denied entry if approval is not granted), or it can merely wait to
participate until the next session following its approval. Neither of
these alternatives seems particularly satisfactory, however, for
organizations or indigenous communities that have limited
financial resources and desire immediate collaboration with other
IGC participants.
The accreditation voting mechanism would theoretically allow
member states to block observation by any politically unpopular or
otherwise “undesirable” organization. While this does not appear
to have been a major problem to date, the IGC’s work is clearly
becoming more politicized and is only now becoming moderately
known outside official government circles. Whether groups such
as the Tibetan government-in-exile or activist groups identified
with politically sensitive issues will be widely allowed to
311

Id.
See Draft Agenda, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic
Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/1 Prov. (Dec. 1, 2003),
http://www.wipo.org/documents/en/meetings/2004/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_6_1prov.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2004). This document from a recent session provides a typical example
of the first part of any session agenda. After formal opening of the session, election of
the chair, and adoption of the prepared agenda, the Members address accreditation of
nongovernmental organizations.
312
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participate remains unknown. Also, since many indigenous
communities tend to be politically marginalized or even actively
repressed by their national governments, the accreditation
procedure could potentially become a highly selective filter of
participants, information, and dissent as the debate unfolds. It
would be most unfortunate if this were to occur, since it would,
ultimately, call into question the legitimacy and viability of
proposed TKGRF protections. Unless such protections are based
in meaningful participation by, and recognition of, a representative
cross-section of indigenous stakeholders and their concerns, rights,
values, and jurisprudential perspectives, proposed legal solutions
are unlikely to produce the desired results.
Although the occasional indigenous representative is invited by
its national delegation to participate at the meetings, and although
with each subsequent meeting of the IGC increasing numbers of
indigenous NGOs apply for observer accreditation, a more
immediate flaw in the IGC’s work to date is that relatively few
indigenous people have been directly involved in the
discussions.313 Since indigenous communities are often among the
most socially marginalized and least politically powerful groups in
their own countries, they frequently do not have any real voice in
official national position statements presented by their
governments at WIPO—or even at their own national
legislatures—on the matters affecting them most directly.314 Also,
indigenous groups interested in participating often lack the
financial means to do so, since IGC meetings are held in Geneva,
Switzerland.315

313

See Report to the General Assembly, supra note 300, at 3.
A discussion at the 4th IGC in December 2002 illustrates this problem. During one
question and answer session, a member of an NGO organization representing the interests
of various Berber tribes in North Africa asked a Tunisian government delegate why there
are no specific protections for Berber culture in Tunisia. The government delegate
replied that there is no reason for Tunisian law to provide such protection, since, he said,
Tunisia has no indigenous minorities. Statement of delegate from Tunisia, Exposé sur la
Protection des Expressions Culturelles Traditionnelles en Tunisie, 4th WIPO IGC, Dec.
10, 2003 (on file with author).
315
Telephone Interview with Maxine Hillary, Legislative Assistant, Navajo Nation (Jan.
29, 2003) [hereinafter Hillary Interview] (on file with author).
314
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In fact, this conspicuous absence of indigenous TKGRF
owners from discussions involving their interests has been a
pervasive problem in most international discussion forums, not just
at the IGC. Lack of input from indigenous communities is
probably the largest current obstacle to progress in the search for
TKGRF protection in any international forum, with the possible
exception of the UN Working Group. Thus, in the main, decisionmaking that may have far-reaching implications is currently being
led by actors who, however intelligent and well-intentioned, are
unlikely to have an accurate sense of the true characteristics of the
material at issue or of the cultural and customary legal context of
that material within the relevant indigenous societies.
Without this dual awareness, attempts to fashion TKGRF
protection, both against and within industrialized societies, can
only result in ineffective and inappropriate solutions. The best
way to optimize the search for TKGRF protection is to ensure that
a meaningful cross-section of stakeholders from all interest groups
participates in equal partnership in all phases of the exploration
and solution-seeking process.
Successive U.S. delegations to the IGC have suffered from the
same near-absence of indigenous members as have other national
delegations. Tribal members and some United States government
representatives agree that direct involvement of indigenous people
in intellectual property discussions has been extremely limited.316
Some representatives of Native American groups have voiced
frustration that they do not have a realistic avenue for participating
in the discussions at WIPO or in similar discussions at other
international and regional forums.317 Many tribes in the Southwest
were not aware of the WIPO conferences until recently.318 Even
316
Hillary Interview, supra note 315; Hardison Interview, supra note 231; Telephone
Interview with Eric Wilson, Deputy Director for the Office of American Indian Tribes,
U.S. Department of the Interior, Mar. 13, 2003 [hereinafter Wilson Interview 2003] (on
file with author); see also USPTO, Report on the Official Insignia of Native American
Tribes (Sept. 30, 1999) [hereinafter USPTO Report], at 14, 44. That study notes that, in
1994, it sent out letters to more than 500 federally recognized tribes concerning its
interest in compiling a list of official tribal insignia, but only received about ten answers.
Id. The study itself was compiled on the basis of only thirty-six responses. Id.
317
Hillary Interview, supra note 315.
318
Id.; Hardison Interview, supra note 231; Wilson Interview 2003, supra note 316.
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for those who wish to participate in the international dialogue, it
can be hard to find tribal funds for everyday needs, much less to
send representatives to meetings in other parts of the world.319
The IGC has recognized this shortcoming in its work, and the
recent report to the General Assembly reflects the IGC’s
concern.320 WIPO has already begun to take concrete steps to
solve this problem, responding in part by holding a series of
regional discussions and intellectual property education meetings
at various locations around the globe in 2002 and 2003, which
generated “a significant contribution” to the IGC’s work.321 In
December 2002, the IGC requested that the Secretariat prepare a
report addressing formalized participation of indigenous and local
community representatives.322 The issue was also included in the
formal agenda for the 5th session of the IGC in July 2003,323 and
the requested report was published at the end of March 2003.324
This report discusses various alternatives for direct and indirect
funding of indigenous and local community representatives to
attend IGC meetings, together with various mechanisms for
choosing such representatives.325
Unfortunately, present consensus among the IGC membership
is that national government members should determine which
indigenous groups receive funding, and present accreditation
constraints are to remain in place.326 Evidently, no real progress
has been made on this issue to date.
Other international forums have also been attempting to
include more indigenous and NGO groups in their TKGRF
discussions. Among those actively seeking indigenous input are
319

Hillary Interview, supra note 315.
Report to the General Assembly, supra note 300, at 3.
321
See Global Intellectual Property Issues, at http://www.wipo.int/aspac/en/activities/global_ip.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
322
See Report, supra note 68.
323
See id.
324
See Participation of Indigenous and Local Communities, WIPO, Intergovernmental
Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/11
(Mar.
28,
2003),
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_11.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
325
Id. at 12, 14–15.
326
See generally id.
320
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the FAO, the CBD membership, the United Nations Committee on
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), and the OAS.327
The OAS is making significant headway toward meaningful
indigenous participation. In February 2003, numerous indigenous
representatives attended a working session in Washington, D.C. on
the Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (“OAS Draft Declaration”).328 This document contains a
provision specifically devoted to the intellectual property rights of
indigenous people.329 To increase indigenous participation in that
meeting, the OAS established a voluntary member donor fund for
travel expenses of indigenous representatives.330 Also, in contrast
to WIPO, the OAS Draft Declaration working meetings are open to
the public, so there is no need to obtain prior approval to attend
and any group or individual may participate in these working
sessions. Thanks to widespread participation of indigenous groups
at the February 2003 meeting, floor discussion was lively, and
differing perceptions about TKGRF and Western forms of
intellectual property were clearly evidenced.
Through the TKGRF debate at WIPO and elsewhere,
substantive intellectual property law is being simultaneously
considered and conceptualized as much on the international level
as at the national level. Given the lack of consensus at WIPO,
international development and implementation of TKGRF
327
See, e.g., Press Release, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Indigenous Knowledge—A Key Weapon in Fighting HIV/AIDS (Nov. 29, 2001),
http://www.fao.org/News/2001/011108-e.htm; Convention on Biological Diversity,
Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing, at http://www.biodiv.org/programmes/socio-eco/benefit/project.aspx?id=8030 (last visited Nov. 12, 2004); Press Release,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New Avenues Needed to Protect
Traditional
Knowledge,
Urge
Experts
at
UNCTAD
Meeting,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=2670&intItemID=2023&lang=1
(last visited Mar. 11, 2000); U.S. Dep’t of State, Resolution on the Specific Fund to
Support the Elaboration of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples,
CP/RES.
817
(1319/02)
[hereinafter
Fund
Resolution],
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/oas/20822.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
328
See generally Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(approved by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at
its 1333rd session, 95th Regular Session), OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 (1997),
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga03/agres_1919.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
329
See id.
330
See Fund Resolution, supra note 327.
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protection would be more likely to advance through international
discussions concerning best practices in TKGRF and other “soft”
law sources, such as nonbinding international guidelines, rather
than through binding and enforceable international instruments.
But passage and implementation of substantive national legislation
in TKGRF seems to be receiving much of its impetus and
substance from the formal international discussions and
interactions in these various forums.
This is remarkable, since, prior to TRIPS in 1995, substantive
intellectual property law was strictly a creature of national law.331
With the exception of the establishment of the dispute resolution
mechanism, even TRIPS is aimed mainly at harmonizing member
laws to standards already developed domestically in industrialized
countries. The emerging law of TKGRF, on the other hand, is
perhaps the first substantive area of intellectual property law to be
developed in its definitions, use, management, and regulation from
a uniquely international platform. Substantive and procedural
TKGRF law is now being forged internationally, through
cooperative conceptualization, collective observation, review, and
analysis of national legislative experiments, and continuing joint
international efforts to reach consensus.
B. The U.S. Policy Position
The official U.S. policy position advanced at WIPO is
essentially this: legal treatment of TKGRF should be determined
by each country under its national legislation and in accordance
with its own sovereignty and laws, rather than determined by treaty
or other international mechanism, and TKGRF should preferably
be regulated within traditional regimes of intellectual property and
other established bodies of law.332 This national treatment should,
according to the U.S., be supplemented by a contract-based access

331

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, art. 64.
Lourie Statements, supra note 212. This was the policy position of the U.S. at the
time of the author’s first attendance at the 4th IGC in December 2002, and it did not
appear to have changed appreciably at the time of the author’s most recent attendance in
March 2004.
332
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and benefit-sharing system that includes periodic reporting.333
Dismissing the potential need for either sui generis laws or
international treaty regulation for TKGRF, United States officials
at international forums point to existing domestic U.S. laws,334
policy,335 and contract practices336 as sufficient and meaningful, or
even model,337 protections for TKGRF and indigenous owners.338
In the opinion of U.S. officials, it is premature, and perhaps
unnecessary altogether, to establish sui generis laws for
TKGRF.339 Protections available under established intellectual
property laws should first be fully examined, as well as the
potential effects that proposed sui generis laws might have on
other laws already in place.340 The limited case law in TKGRF
should also be very carefully considered, with an eye toward
minimizing disruption and conflict among existing laws.341 The
U.S. believes, correctly, that for contracting parties, potential
litigants, and the judiciary, predictability is crucial to effective
functioning of the international legal system, and radical
departures from laws that have been developed and tested over
time are likely to result in unforeseen problems and dislocations.342
333

Linda Lourie, letter to the editor, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003 [hereinafter Lourie
Letter] (responding to Nancy Kremers, Stolen Legacy: Indigenous Peoples Push to
Protect their Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources, and Folklore, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2003); E-mail from Ruth Ann Nyblod, Deputy Press Secretary, USPTO (Apr. 9,
2003) (on file with author).
334
Lourie Statements, supra note 212 (referencing the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of
1990 (25 U.S.C. § 305 (2003)), the USPTO Database of Native American Tribal Insignia,
and U.S. intellectual property laws); see also infra Part III.
335
Application Procedures and Requirements for Scientific Research and Collecting
Permits, Nat’l Parks Service, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter National
Parks Service Application], available at http://www.nps.gov/grca/research/ApplicationGuidelines.pdf; see POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 71; BIODIVERSITY
AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 316.
336
POSEY & DUTFIELD, supra note 27, at 71.
337
National Parks Service Application, supra note 335; see Report on Electronic
Database, supra note 294, at 9 (Model Memorandum of Understanding between the
Developmental Therapeutics Program Division of Cancer Treatment and Diagnosis,
National Cancer Institute).
338
Lourie Statements, supra note 212.
339
Id.
340
Id.
341
Id.
342
Id.
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The U.S. also advocates that as much TKGRF as possible
should be placed in searchable databases and made accessible to
patent examiners.343 This, U.S. policymakers say, would both
lessen the likelihood of issuing patents improperly based on others’
prior knowledge and diminish current objections to USPTO
novelty determinations, which are based purely on a “printed
material” prior art standard.344
While a cautious approach to any new area of law is
understandable, the official position of the United States on
TKGRF is at odds with many of the concerns voiced in the
international community.345 Unquestionably, tact and diplomacy
skills vary among individual U.S. officials, and perhaps the current
administration’s foreign policy style allows its delegates in the
various international forums to take greater attitudinal liberties
than at some earlier time. Even allowing for this possibility,
though, U.S. spokespeople in the TKGRF debate often come
across to others as nationalistic, obstructionist, and myopic.346
While this surely is the result of an interplay of many complex
factors, most foreign delegates to the IGC seem to believe that U.S.
trade protectionism and the USPTO’s own interest in maintaining
high revenues from its corporate clients are important motivating
forces behind current U.S. TKGRF policy.347
Extensive examination of U.S. trade policy and empirical
analysis of the composition of paying clients for patents and
trademarks are topics outside the scope of this Article. But it is
hard to ignore the clear harmony between the U.S. TKGRF legal
policy articulated at WIPO and the industrial and trade interests of
the U.S. American TKGRF policy at present is curiously
consonant with continued U.S. protectionism, with its enormous
farm subsidies, with corporate interests in maintaining private
contractual control over transgenic plant research and
343

See Lourie Interview, supra note 195; Lourie Letter, supra note 333.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2004).
345
See generally Weerawit Weeraworawit, Formulating an International Legal
Protection for Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: Challenges for
the Intellectual Property System, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 769 (Summer 2003).
346
These opinions are based on numerous background conversations between the author
and a variety of Member State representatives at the 4th and 6th IGCs.
347
See supra note 346.
344
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commercialization, and with the predominance of large corporate
patent and trademark holdings throughout the U.S. pharmaceutical,
dietary supplement, and personal care products industries.348 It
would not be surprising if the USPTO, in particular, were
influenced or biased to some degree in its TKGRF policy position,
since the bulk of patent and trademark examination fees come from
corporate clients, and those fees directly subsidize the operation of
the USPTO, unlike many other national patent offices.349
Despite its preeminent position at global TKGRF talks, the
USPTO is only one of a number of U.S. government bodies
regularly participating in TKGRF discussions. The Department of
State, the Department of the Interior, the Copyright Office, and the
American Folklife Center of the Library of Congress, also
regularly appear on U.S. delegations abroad to discuss TKGRF
issues. USPTO representatives, however, tend to be the de facto
lead U.S. spokespeople on TKGRF matters, ostensibly because so
many of the points currently at issue in TKGRF involve
intellectual property law.350 According to fellow U.S. delegates,
USPTO officials also often take the lead in organizing interagency
preparatory meetings, in an effort to “harmonize” a uniform
internal government stance prior to attending international
conferences.351
Unfortunately, for many reasons, USPTO leadership of the
U.S. delegations tends to cast doubt on the validity and impartiality
of all U.S. agencies in the TKGRF debate.352 This is due to some
of the USPTO’s internal practices and to the obvious conflict of
interest between the USPTO’s paying clientele and its duty to the

348

Stevan M. Pepa, International Trade and Emerging Genetic Regulatory Regimes, 29
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 415 (1998).
349
See Letter from Hon. Q. Todd Dickinson, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intell.
Prop., to Hon. Howard Coble, Chairman & Hon. Howard Berman, House Subcomm. on
Courts & Intell. Prop. (June 9, 2000); see also Statement of Fédération Internationale des
Conseils en Propriété Industrielle (June 12, 2000) (submitted to the USPTO in regard to
Proposed Fee Legislation, pursuant to FICPI Resolution on Official Surpluses in
Intellectual Property Offices).
350
See Coombe, Recognition, supra note 110.
351
See id.
352
See id.
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larger public interest of the American people.353 As one highly
respected legal scholar recently wrote, it is commonly recognized
in the world intellectual property community that there are great
shortcomings in the practices and procedures of the USPTO that
need to be addressed before its stance on traditional knowledge
appropriation will be considered seriously.354 According to this
scholar, the U.S. intellectual property regime has been brought into
widespread disrepute by the USPTO practices that: (1) create
internal incentive structures to reward examiners financially for
granting patents and penalize them for conscientious prior art
examination, (2) narrowly restrict the forms of prior art that can be
considered during the search process, and (3) lack an affirmative
obligation to respect the public interest.355 Moreover, the United
States has not endeared itself to the international community
through its dogmatic position against requiring patent application
source disclosure; though the articulated conflict with TRIPS is
technically correct, the United States refuses to consider amending
the TRIPS agreement to require TKGRF-related disclosure.356
With USPTO leadership of many delegations, it is not
surprising that the U.S. consistently has advocated using only
national legislation and private contracting to regulate TKGRF.357
It is unclear just what the proposed attendant “periodic reporting
requirements” might entail.
Nor do U.S. TKGRF policy
statements support the otherwise adamant international call for
greater transparency in patent applications and examining
procedures, not just in the U.S., but in patent offices around the
world.
In light of U.S. enthusiasm for decentralized TKGRF
regulation and the United States’ longtime failure to ratify the
CBD, it also seems unlikely that the United States would be
willing to adhere to the national clearinghouse structure espoused
by the CBD membership for verifying benefit-sharing and prior

353
354
355
356
357

See id.
Id. at 281.
Id.
See generally Pires de Carvalho, supra note 213.
See supra notes 332–38 and accompanying text.
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informed consent issues in TKGRF-related contracts.358 Nor is it
clear whether the USPTO, some other government agency, or the
contracting parties themselves would have the main responsibility
for self-monitoring and reporting, thus meeting “quasi-CBD”
responsibilities. The latter option would seem to be particularly
ill-advised, because of the clear inequalities in access to
information and in bargaining power between the parties in
TKGRF situations.
Where an indigenous community
independently is faced with negotiating its own contract with a
multinational corporate entity, the specific details of proposed
reporting requirements would be crucial in determining whether
the proposed contracts-based model would be likely to
substantively improve present practices.
A recent USPTO spokesperson to the WIPO IGC has voiced
the belief that the TKGRF controversy is more about human rights
and self-determination than about intellectual property or the
patent system.359 In her view, countries wanting to fix perceived
patent problems in TKGRF protections may be ignoring presently
available legal mechanisms that already provide effective legal
protection in the patent field, specifically the reexamination
procedure available in the USPTO.360 This procedure provides that
any person at any time may, upon payment of a fee, file a request
for reexamination of any claim of a patent on the basis of prior art
consisting of other patents or printed publications having a bearing
on the patentability of any claim of the patent at issue.361 If the
filing presents a substantial, new question of patentability affecting
any claim in the patent, re-examination will be ordered.362 In
addition, anyone may anonymously provide the USPTO with
written evidence of other patents or of written publications that
may bear on the patentability of any patent claim, and this
information becomes part of the official patent file.363 Presumably,
358

Bonn Guidelines, Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision VII/19, Access and
Benefit-Sharing as Related to Genetic Resources, Feb. 2004, http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/?m=cop-07.
359
Lourie Interview, supra note 343.
360
Id.
361
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2004).
362
35 U.S.C. § 304 (2004).
363
35 U.S.C. § 301 (2004).
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such evidence can be submitted prior to issuance and will be
considered by the examiner.
The USPTO believes these available mechanisms make the
U.S. patent system “self-correcting” if any errors are made in
patent examination and issuance, including in the TKGRF
context.364 But while it is true that these procedural mechanisms
exist, they place significant burdens on the potential victims of
patenting abuses to continuously monitor national patent filing
systems for early detection of pirated inventions, to pay possibly
substantial fees if large numbers of improper applications have
indeed already been filed and patents issued, and to pay high
attorney fees for proper submission of prior art citation
explanations and reexamination requests. It is ludicrous to imagine
that many of the least educated, and most poverty-stricken
communities in the world even have access to this information,
much less the sophistication and financial resources to undertake
continuous surveillance and monitoring. Advocating such an
avenue as a realistic approach to protection is merely one more
reason why the USPTO currently lacks international credibility in
the TKGRF debate.
Another USPTO view often chided by the global community is
that improperly granted patents in the TKGRF area to date have
occurred mainly due to examiners’ lack of access to foreign
information, rather than because of any real defects in the
examination system itself. Official USPTO agency wisdom also
holds that few indigenous groups could ever hope to make any real
money from patents based on TKGRF, because the percentage of
patented inventions, particularly in the pharmaceutical area, that
are ever successfully commercialized is extremely low.365 If third
party assessments of the large numbers of improperly granted U.S.
patents in the TKGRF area are correct,366 however, there would
presumably also be a concomitant increase in the estimated
number of patents that have been successfully commercialized
without attribution to, or benefit-sharing with, the traditional
knowledge holders.
364
365
366

Lourie Letter, supra note 333.
Cf. BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 83, at 249.
Gupta, supra note 227.
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One key feature of U.S. official statements about domestic
protection of TKGRF is the presumption that, under U.S. law, all
persons, whether indigenous or otherwise, already have a universal
right to equal access to all of the protections afforded by federal
patent, trademark, and copyright laws, as well as to any rights that
may be available under applicable state trade secret, trademark,
and unfair competition laws.367 It would be both unconstitutional
and against international treaty obligations, the USPTO has opined
(most recently at the IGC, but also in a study of its own), to grant
to indigenous U.S. populations any special intellectual property
protections that are not available to other U.S. citizens.368
While this concept may be true in the general sense, race-based
discrimination, which would presumably present the gravest
constitutional challenge to any legislation along these lines, has
been found to be constitutional in many other situations.369 So
long as the allegedly discriminatory policy or law survives a
judicial strict scrutiny test—that is, so long as the law in question
serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest—it may be likely to survive a constitutional
challenge on equal protection grounds.370
Particularized
intellectual property protection for indigenous U.S. TKGRF, which
constitutes a priceless part of U.S. heritage and much of which is
indisputably bound for extinction unless it rapidly receives better
protection, could likely meet a constitutional challenge of this type.
Under the proper factual conditions and with proper drafting,
protective TKGRF laws conceivably could be shown to conform to
various other legitimacy factors used by the U.S. Supreme Court in
racial discrimination cases, including the righting of past wrongs
caused by prior governmental discrimination.371
The constitutional aspects of TKGRF legal protection deserve
full study before dismissing this approach out of hand as a policy
and legal option. Unfortunately, this has apparently not been done
to date. U.S. officials’ tendency to eliminate the option of
367
368
369
370
371

Lourie Statements, supra note 212.
Id.; USPTO Report, supra note 316 (also discussed in detail in Part III.D, infra).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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specialized protection laws is premature and simplistic thinking,
and it is inconsistent with such presently existing, ethnicallyoriented protective laws as the Indian Arts and Crafts Act
(“IACA”)372 and the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act.373 The unconstitutionality of ethnic-based
protections is probably not nearly as settled as present official
spokespeople imply. More importantly, this dismissive attitude
may preempt creative thinking about a potential workable avenue
for protecting TKGRF within the already-established domestic
intellectual property law regime.
The U.S. government claims that all United States citizens
have equal access to intellectual property law protection.
Certainly, indigenous artists face the same difficulties as other
artists in terms of their limited access to legal counsel, financial
hardship, and unequal bargaining power with potential purchasers
of creative material.374 But indigenous communities in the United
States suffer from lower education levels and more pronounced
poverty than most other United States citizens, as well as greater
social and political marginalization.375 The official position
completely fails to acknowledge the vast gulf between the
financial, cultural, educational, political, and social opportunities
available to a middle-class white male Silicon Valley inventor
seeking a patent and those realistically available to a poor female
Native American rug weaver living on a remote plot of reservation
land. These unacknowledged differences and practical inequalities
force the conclusion that much of current U.S. official policy on
TKGRF is both unworkable and unrealistic.
Another aspect of U.S. official policy that is somewhat
misleading and inaccurate is the apparent government belief that
many of the TKGRF legal problems faced by indigenous peoples
outside the United States do not exist for domestic Native
372

Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
373
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 (2004) (“NAGPRA”).
374
See generally Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising
Questions about Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001).
375
See generally Richard Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American
Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111 (1995–96).
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Americans or Eskimo and Aleut populations. Federal officials
point out that Native Americans own their own land and are
viewed as sovereign nations within the U.S. legal system.376 This,
they say, gives Native Americans the ability to control access to
and use of their traditional knowledge and cultural expressions in a
way that many foreign indigenous groups cannot.377 While these
statements may be true for many indigenous U.S. groups, control
over land access alone does not ensure proper legal protection for
indigenous TKGRF.378 Control over land has little effect on
bargaining power inequalities between indigenous communities
and multinational corporations, and on the enormous differential
between them with respect to education and access to legal support
and financial opportunities.379
Spokespeople for domestic indigenous communities say they
experience many of the same difficulties in protecting their
TKGRF as do indigenous people outside the United States.380
While the few federal laws passed in the 1990s to protect Native
American cultural artifacts,381 to encourage Indian arts and crafts
marketing,382 and to create a reference tribal insignia database for

376

Lourie Interview, supra note 343; Wilson Interview 2002, supra note 84.
Lourie Interview, supra note 343; Wilson Interview 2002, supra note 84.
378
See Chetan Gulati, The “Tragedy of the Commons” in Plant Genetic Resources: The
Need for a New International Regime Centered around an International Biotechnology
Patent Office, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 63 (2001).
379
See id.
380
Hillary Interview, supra note 315. Ms. Hillary expresses the Navajos’ concern about
non-tribal copying of Navajo weavings and silver jewelry, and acknowledges that
Navajos need to find more effective ways to protect themselves by using the present legal
system. But she insists—as do many indigenous representatives—that the far greater
problem lies in the fact that the non-indigenous world does not understand that much
indigenous cultural expression is inextricably linked to the spiritual and sacred aspects of
life and to nature. This is part of the reason the Navajos do not want certain TKGRF
available at all to outsiders. Ms. Hillary cites as an example the propensity among nonNavajo people to use terms such as “myth” or “dance” for certain Navajo cultural
expressions, but, she explains, these actually have far deeper meaning within Navajo
society than the English terms “myth” or “dance” or the activities those terms describe in
Western culture. She points out that the Navajo people, in a comparable reverse
situation, do not generally presume to refer to the Bible as a “myth.”
381
IACA, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
382
Id.
377
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trademark examiners383 are useful, they do not provide widespread
legal protection for indigenous U.S. TKGRF.384 Nor do these laws
address any of the larger philosophical and legal questions that
remain unanswered at the IGC.385 Yet U.S. government officials at
WIPO and the OAS have represented these laws to be particularly
meaningful intellectual property protections, specifically reflecting
a U.S. policy interest in protecting domestic TKGRF.386 The
USPTO, however, has formally acknowledged that laws currently
protecting indigenous U.S. creations are not widely known
domestically—to indigenous people or to anyone else—and
considerable educational effort is needed before these laws can be
considered effective.387
In contrast to the rest of the world, the U.S. is discussing
TKGRF issues only in a scattered and piecemeal fashion, if at all.
Just as WIPO’s rather rigid organizational structure has influenced
international activity on TKGRF, U.S. governmental attitudes and
its laissez-faire policy position influence domestic perceptions
about the relative importance (or, perhaps more accurately,
unimportance) of TKGRF issues. Consequently, the level of
general awareness in the U.S. about TKGRF issues is much lower
than abroad. Additionally, because many of the member states at
WIPO are developing countries that increasingly perceive their
TKGRF to be a significant national resource, their interest in the
topic is far greater than the United States’. As U.S. public
consciousness is raised, however—and especially as awareness of
these issues increases among domestic indigenous communities—
U.S. thinking will evolve. Widespread acceptance of many ideas

383

25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 et seq. (2004).
See Guest, supra note 375.
385
See id.
386
Questionnaire on National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Expressions of
Folklore, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic Resources, Trad.
Knowledge & Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/7 (June 22, 2001), http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/questionnaires/ic-2-7/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2004); Questionnaire on
National Experiences with the Legal Protection of Expressions of Folklore: Response of
the United States of America, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/questionnaires/ic-27/usa.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Questionnaire Response]; see also U.S.
OAS Statement, supra note 16.
387
USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 46.
384
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that are currently anathema to domestic stakeholders, particularly
government officials, is then likely to follow.
III. THE ADEQUACY OF EXISTING U.S. LAWS FOR PROTECTING
TKGRF
A. The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990
The IACA388 is the provision of U.S. domestic law most
frequently cited at international forums by U.S. officials as
evidence of the great interest U.S. policymakers and legislators
have in protecting the TKGRF of Native Americans and other
domestic indigenous groups.389 IACA, its technical amendments
that were passed a decade later,390 and its associated implementing
regulations391 are the main sources of law relating to the Indian arts
and crafts portion of indigenous U.S. TKGRF.
To effectively evaluate IACA’s usefulness in protecting
TKGRF, we must consider a number of interrelated factors: 1) the
statutory language and administrative framework, 2) the makeup
and activities of the government board charged with implementing
IACA, 3) actual implementation of the law, 4) the legislative
history and intended usage of IACA, 5) the context of IACA
within the broader framework of domestic intellectual property and
consumer protection laws, and 6) IACA’s use by U.S. officials as
an illustrative tool of articulated U.S. TKGRF policy. Examination
of these factors reveals a gap between avowed official U.S. interest
in protecting indigenous TKGRF and the realities of available
protection under IACA.

388
Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). Congress passed IACA on a
unanimous voice vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate on November
29, 1990. Whether this indicates unusually broad interest in and unanimous support for
the bill, or general apathy toward an unobjectionable bill perceived by many to be
innocuous, or any number of other views, can only be a matter of speculation.
389
See, e.g., U.S. OAS Statement, supra note 16; Lourie Statements supra note 212.
390
Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-497, 114 Stat.
2219 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 305e).
391
See generally 25 C.F.R. § 309.1–.27 (2003).
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Under IACA, “[i]t is unlawful to offer or display for sale or sell
any good . . . in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian
produced, an Indian product, or the product of a particular Indian
or Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts organization, resident
within the United States.”392 IACA is implemented mainly
through the Indian Arts and Crafts Board (the “Board”), which has
been in existence since the 1930s.393 In 1990, however, Congress
expanded the Board’s mandate considerably, giving it the rather
grandiose new responsibility of “implementing the [IACA],
promoting the development of U.S. Indian and Alaska Native arts
and crafts, improving the economic status of members of federally
recognized Tribes, and helping to establish and expand marketing
opportunities for arts and crafts produced by U.S. Indians and
Alaska Natives.”394
The Board characterizes IACA as a “truth-in-advertising law”
designed to prevent the marketing of products misrepresented as
produced by Indians.395 Case law interprets IACA as a strict
liability statute with the dual purposes of: 1) protecting Indian
artists from unfair competition from counterfeiters, and 2)
protecting consumers from unknowingly purchasing imitation
products.396 Statutory violations carry fairly severe civil397 and
criminal398 penalties.
Both the structure and language of IACA and its associated
politics have been controversial ever since its passage more than a

392

18 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2004).
See 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2004); William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A
Critical Analysis of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1018
(2001) (providing an excellent discussion of the historical background and political
economy of Native American arts and crafts, including establishment of the Board, its
early activity, and events leading to the later passage of IACA).
394
Protection of Products of Indian Art and Craftsmanship, 66 Fed. Reg. 27915
(proposed May 21, 2001) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 309.1–.21).
395
See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Indian Arts & Crafts Bd., The Indian Arts and Crafts
Act of 1990, at http://www.doi.gov/iacb/act.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2004) (summarizing
the IACA).
396
See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Vill. Originals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880, 882
(N.D. Ill. 1998).
397
See 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2004).
398
See 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (2004).
393
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decade ago.399 One of the more problematic aspects of IACA is
that it arbitrarily limits those people defined as “Indian” to
members or certified artisans of a state or federally recognized
Indian tribe.400 This drastically limits the size and makeup of the
group of indigenous artisans that may unqualifiedly represent their
artistic creations to be Indian products. An “Indian tribe” is “[a]ny
Indian tribe, band, nation, Alaska Native village, or any organized
group or community which is recognized as eligible for the special
programs and services provided by the United States to Indians
because of their status as Indians” or “[a]ny Indian group that has
been formally recognized as an Indian tribe by a State legislature
or by a State commission or similar State organization legislatively
vested with State tribal recognition authority.”401 People not
formally enrolled as tribal members may be certified as nonmember Indian artisans of the tribe,402 but such people must be of
Indian lineage through one or more members of the certifying
tribe, and each certification must be documented in writing by the
governing body of the certifying tribe.403
Under some factual scenarios, these definitional provisions
may conflict with well-settled case law that an Indian tribe has the
authority to determine its own membership.404 IACA definitions
may also conflict with the many definitions of “Indian” used for
other federal statutory law purposes.405 In addition, there are many
legitimate reasons—including political and ideological ones—why
an individual of clear Indian descent might fail or refuse to be
officially enrolled in the membership records of a tribe or certified
as an artisan.406 This is likely to affect increasingly large numbers
of individuals, as more Native Americans move to urban areas and

399

See Hapiuk, supra note 393.
See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(1).
401
See 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(e).
402
See id. § 309.2(b).
403
See id. § 309.25.
404
See Hapiuk, supra note 393, at 1012 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 72 n.32 (1978)).
405
See id. at 1012 n.12 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1
(Rennard Strickland ed., 1982)). There is no single federal definition of “Indian tribe.”
See id.
406
See id. at 1013, 1063.
400
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a unitary, “pan-tribal” Indian identity emerges.407 Under IACA,
these people cannot unqualifiedly sell or market their artistic
creations as Indian or Native American products, even if both of
their parents are full-blooded members of the same tribe.408
As mentioned above, the Board, an independent board within
the Department of the Interior (and not, as often assumed, part of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs),409 is the main vehicle for Indian arts
and crafts promotion.410 Since 1990, the Board has been assigned
primary government responsibility for market research concerning
sales opportunities for Indian arts and crafts products, for engaging
in related technical research and assistance, and for coordinating
related activities among other U.S. government and private
agencies.411 The Board is also required to manage specific related
projects and to make recommendations concerning government
loans to support production and sale of Indian products.412 The
Board itself cannot borrow or lend money, nor can it deal in Indian
goods.413
It is particularly relevant to current TKGRF discussions that
since 1990, Congress has intended the Board to create, on a costfree basis, trademarks for qualifying Indian arts and crafts
producers.414 According to at least one legal thinker, this was
considered the most promising part of IACA at the time of its
passage.415 On the facial language of the statute, the Board has the
power to create trademarks for Indian products, either in the name
of the Board itself,416 or for individual Indians or Indian tribes or
407

See id. at 1063.
See 25 C.F.R. § 309.24; see also supra notes 402–03 and accompanying text.
409
See U.S. OAS Statement, supra note 16 (oral clarification made at presentation).
410
See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
411
See 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2004).
412
See id.
413
See id.
414
See Hapiuk, supra note 393, at 1069 (quoting 25 U.S.C § 305a(g)(3) (1994)).
415
See id. at 1067 (citing To Expand the Powers of the Indian Arts and Crafts Board:
Hearing on H.R. 2006 Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs Held in
Santa Fe, NM, 101st Cong. 13 (1989) (statement of Leo Calac, Vice Chairman, IACB).
416
Art and craft goods handmade by American Indians and Alaskan natives may be
trademarked as “Indian Arts and Crafts Board Genuine Handicrafts Certified Indian
Enterprise U.S. Department of the Interior” (certification mark registration number
2479552).
See
USPTO,
Trademark
Electronic
Search
System,
at
408
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Indian arts and crafts organizations.417 The Board also has the
authority to establish standards and regulations for use of
government-owned trademarks in the Indian arts and crafts area,
including setting licensing fees for trademark use.418 IACA gives
the Board power to register these government-owned trademarks
with the USPTO, free of charge, and to assign them and their
associated goodwill to individual Indians or Indian tribes, also free
of charge.419 The Board can pursue or defend court appeals or
proceedings with respect to any final determination of the USPTO
in relation to these trademarks.420
Unfortunately, the intended free trademark program for
qualifying Indians has never been implemented. One of the
longstanding problems with the law as drafted is that registration
of a mark that is intended at the time of filing not to be used by the
Board itself, but instead to be subsequently assigned to an Indian
tribe or other third party, legally results in a void mark.421 This is
because the Lanham Act requires that an applicant for registration
of a trademark must itself use that mark in commerce or in good
faith intend to so use it.422 Applications for registration of marks
that are intended from the start to be owned and used only by
Indians or Indian tribes obviously cannot meet this requirement.
Ironically, only the Board’s own certification mark meets the
statutory requirements. Today, an Indian producer who has
independently paid for and registered its own trademark can get
permission to use the Board’s mark in conjunction with the
producer’s own mark, thus certifying that the producer’s goods
meet the Board’s standards.423 But qualifying Indian individuals
http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinafter
TESS] (allowing searches by registrant’s name to access trademark registration
information).
417
See 25 U.S.C. § 305a(g)(1).
418
See 25 U.S.C. § 305a(g)(2).
419
See id. § 305a(g)(3).
420
See id. § 305a(g)(4).
421
See Hapiuk, supra note 393, at 1069 (noting that the Lanham Act requires that the
registrant be the user of the mark, and that such mark may not be one the government
intends to use).
422
See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2004).
423
See 25 C.F.R. § 308.2(a) (2004); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN ARTS AND
CRAFTS BOARD, FACT SHEET (“FACT SHEET”).
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and entities cannot obtain free trademarks of their own and use
them independent of the U.S. government’s name, standardssetting and control.
The Board is aware of the trademark problem and thus has not
attempted to register any Indian marks for assignment.424 In fact,
the chair of the Board explained the nature of this trademark
dilemma to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs prior to
passage of the Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000 and
offered draft language to resolve the problem,425 but the suggested
changes were not incorporated into that law.426 Today the problem
continues to exist.
In the summer of 2002, Senators Inouye and Campbell
introduced the “Indian Programs Reauthorization and Technical
Amendments Act of 2002” in the U.S. Senate during the 107th
Congress.427 The bill addressed many indigenous peoples’ issues,
ranging from Native Hawaiian health care improvements to
provisions concerning oil shale reserves and water feasibility
studies for particular tribes.428 Among the diverse items contained
in the bill as introduced were remedial amendments to IACA.429
After significant revisions, the bill passed the Senate in November
2002 as the Native American Omnibus Act of 2002, unfortunately
without the IACA amendments.430 The IACA corrections have not
been reintroduced in the 108th Congress, so the law remains
unchanged at this time.
Ironically, then, the only way the trademark provisions of
IACA have been implemented is that the Board has registered its
424
Telephone Interview with Ken Van Wey, Program Assistant, Indian Arts and Crafts
Board (Apr. 29, 2003) (on file with author).
425
See Implementation of the Indian Arts and Crafts Act: Hearing before the Senate
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Faith Roessel, Chair, Indian
Arts and Crafts Board).
426
See 25 U.S.C § 305e (2004).
427
S. Res. 2711.IS, 107th Cong. (2002) (as introduced in the Senate).
428
Id.
429
Id. § 301 (amending § 2(g) of the IACA).
430
S. Res. 2711.ES, 107th Cong. (2002) (as passed by the Senate). The revised bill was
referred to the House Committee on Natural Resources on November 22, 2002, but it did
not come before the full House for a vote before the session ended. See S. Res.
2711.RFH, 107th Cong. (2002) (as referred to House Committee after being received
from the Senate).
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own certification mark and established government standards for
Indian products and a procedure for indigenous use of the
government’s mark.431 According to the “Fact Sheet” published by
the Board on intellectual property matters relating to Indian arts
and crafts, “[e]ach eligible Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut crafts
marketing enterprise has the privilege of attaching to its [own]
registered trademark a certificate declaring that the Indian Arts and
Crafts Board recognizes their [sic] products as authentic Native
American handicrafts.”432
In this rather paternalistic style, the regulations require that an
Indian enterprise wishing to participate in its certification program
must 1) be entirely Native American owned and organized, 2) offer
for sale only genuine Native American handicraft products, and 3)
agree to apply the Board’s certificate of genuineness only to
products that meet the Board’s quality standards.433 Additionally,
it is implicit in the regulations that the Indian artist must first
register his or her own trademark in order to pay for and participate
in the program.434 This is a considerably narrower and more
difficult set of standards to meet than those which Congress
attempted to authorize on the face of the IACA statutory
language.435 In addition, the Fact Sheet gives readers wishing to
participate no definition of the terms “Native American” or
“genuine Native American handicraft products,” so it is difficult to
know from the publication how to meet the requirements of the
Fact Sheet.436
The Fact Sheet promises that the Board “is in the process of
setting up a trademark program, which will enable the Board to
431

See 25 U.S.C. § 305a(g)(1)–(3) (2004) (establishing the Board’s power to create and
license trademarks conferring “genuine” status); 25 C.F.R. § 308.3 (2004) (defining the
conditions for use of the government’s mark); FACT SHEET, supra note 423.
432
FACT SHEET, supra note 423.
433
See 25 C.F.R. § 308.3.
434
See id. § 308.2 (“[T]he Indian Arts and Crafts Board offers each such enterprise the
privilege of attaching to its trademark a certificate declaring that it is recognized by the
Indian Arts and Crafts Board as an Indian enterprise dealing in genuine Indian-made
handicraft products, and that its trademark has the approval of the Board.”) (emphasis
added).
435
See IACA, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
436
See FACT SHEET, supra note 423.
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register trademarks for federally recognized tribes and their
members.”437 In truth, however, the Board is waiting for new,
curative legislation to be passed before deciding on any of the
details of this trademark program.438 Of course, even if the
trademark program is implemented as originally envisioned, it may
not be attractive to some tribes or individuals who, quite
legitimately, wish to operate autonomously and without
government participation in, or direct knowledge of, their creative
endeavors.
In 1999, the USPTO recommended in a Congressionallymandated study that concerted government education efforts were
necessary to inform Native Americans and other members of the
U.S. public about the existence of IACA.439 Although that study
was written nearly a decade after the original passage of IACA, it
did not mention the trademark voidness issue.440 Instead, it stated
unambiguously that the Board has the power to create trademarks
on behalf of Indian tribes without charge;441 thus, it appears that
the USPTO was unaware that in this respect, IACA could not be,
and had never been, implemented.
The USPTO also noted in the same study that “enforcement is
the key to full enjoyment of [intellectual property] rights,” and it
opined that IACA provides an effective enforcement mechanism
through the Board’s power to refer IACA investigation and
enforcement actions to the FBI and the Attorney General.442
Unfortunately, the USPTO did not provide any statistical or
anecdotal analyses in the study that illustrate how many
investigations or formal legal enforcement proceedings had
actually been undertaken pursuant to Board referral during IACA’s
first nine years of existence.443

437

Id.
Written correspondence with Meredith Z. Stanton, Acting Director, Indian Arts and
Crafts Board (June 9, 2003) [hereinafter Stanton Correspondence] (on file with author).
439
See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 45.
440
See generally id.
441
See id. at 27, 39.
442
Id. at 39.
443
See id.
438
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No statistical information concerning IACA investigations and
enforcement is readily available to the public today, and the
recommended educational effort has apparently not taken place.
Additionally, it cannot be easily assessed whether the enforcement
referral mechanism is a meaningful feature of IACA or whether
IACA is independently enforced (without Board referral) by state
and federal agencies, since these activities, at least by federal
agencies, are not conducted transparently.444 It is clear, however,
that reported case law does not reflect widespread litigation under
either the civil or criminal enforcement provisions of IACA.445
Despite this, at the February 2003 meeting of the OAS, the
United States’ written statement relating to the intellectual property
rights provision of the OAS Draft Declaration proclaimed that the
Board’s top priority is enforcement and implementation of
IACA.446 The statement also specifically mentioned that one of
the purportedly available “special measures for Native American
Tribes”447 empowers the Board to register “government trademarks
444
In an attempt to determine the validity of policymakers’ claims of the value of IACA
to protect indigenous TKGRF through vigorous enforcement, I queried the Acting
Director of the Board, Ms. Meredith Stanton, in mid-2003 about the number of matters
the Board had referred to other agencies for investigation under the statute since 1990.
Unfortunately, Ms. Stanton agreed to consider only written questions and also would
respond only in writing. The written response to my general query about how many
matters had been referred by the Board to other agencies for civil or criminal
investigation since 1990 was only that on-going investigations could not be discussed.
The written response to a series of questions concerning the number of civil and criminal
convictions obtained under IACA since 1990 was that, though the Board is aware that
other agencies have filed legal actions, the Board does not know the status of any of
them. See Stanton Correspondence, supra note 438.
Sources at the Department of Justice were equally unforthcoming and were willing to
say only that the Department of Justice does not make available to the public any
information about investigations, that it does not keep statistics on convictions or
judgments obtained under IACA, and that its officials know of no other agency that does
so, either. This combined official reticence about IACA enforcement seems curious, in
light of the emphasis put on the value of IACA, and to its enforcement provisions
specifically, by U.S. officials in international TKGRF discussions.
445
See, e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18322 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2004); Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14289 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2004); Flodine v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4006 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2003); Native Am. Arts v. Earthdweller, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9750 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2002).
446
See U.S. OAS Statement, supra note 16, at 6.
447
See id. at 5.
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of genuineness and quality on behalf of individual Indians and
Indian tribes.”448 U.S. officials made a similar representation at
the 4th WIPO IGC in late 2002.449 These representations
obviously do not reflect the realities of actual implementation and
enforcement of IACA.
B. Alaska’s Silver Hand Program
Whatever IACA’s shortcomings in the federal venue, there is
an analogous, state-based program that is gaining popularity
among indigenous local artisans and local consumers. Alaska’s
unique indigenous handicraft certification program is known as the
“Silver Hand Program.”450 While state officials view it as a
“branding” mechanism or a kind of consumer protection
program,451 the Silver Hand Program actually functions much like
a state-owned certification mark.452 Not surprisingly, the Alaska
State Council on the Arts consulted the Indian Arts and Crafts
Board prior to launch of the Alaska program,453 and both parties
continue to confer concerning their respective program
development.454
The Alaska Native handicraft certification scheme was
designed in 1961.455 The Native certification program was
originally aimed at certifying the authenticity of one-of-a-kind
items created by individual Alaska Native artisans in cottage
industry settings, whereas the parallel program for non-Natives
was intended to cover the products of larger (even if still relatively
448

Id. at 9.
Lourie Statements, supra note 212.
450
ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.65.010–.070 (Michie 2003).
451
Telephone Interview with Saunders McNeill, Native Arts Program Director, Alaska
State Council on the Arts (Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter McNeill Interview] (on file with
author); see also Alaska State Council on the Arts, Silver Hand Permit Application,
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/aksca/forms/individuals/sh.pdf (last visited on Nov. 15, 2004).
452
State ownership and control of the mark—the Silver Hand seal—is analogous to
Board ownership and administration of its federal certification mark under IACA. One
very notable difference, however, is that an Alaska Native artist is not required to obtain
his or her own individual trademark before applying for and using the Silver Hand seal.
453
Stanton Correspondence, supra note 438; McNeill Interview, supra note 451.
454
McNeill Interview, supra note 451.
455
See FTC Takes Action against Fake Native Artwork, KENAI PENINSULA ONLINE, Oct.
8, 2002, at http://peninsulaclarion.com/stories/100802/ala_100802alapm0010001.shtml.
449
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small) arts manufacturing concerns.456 Under the statutory
scheme, a person who makes an authentic Native handicraft within
Alaska may, under certain conditions, obtain a permit to affix a
state-administered seal attesting to the origin and authenticity of
the article.457 The seal consists of a silver hand symbol bearing the
words “Authentic Native Handicraft from Alaska” and includes a
blank line on which the individual artist can write in his or her
name and the place of origin of the article.458 Tags or labels
bearing this seal are issued by the state to Alaska Native permit
holders for use solely on their own handicrafts; the permits are
issued for two years and must be renewed periodically,459 though
the permit number is assigned to the holder for life, whether or not
he or she continuously uses it.460 Silver Hand seals may be used
only when an article is made solely by an individual permit
holder,461 precluding works made jointly by an Alaska Native
permit holder and any other person who is not also a separate
permit holder in his or her own right, whether or not such person is
an Alaska Native.
By statute, the Alaska State Council on the Arts administers
issuance and control of the seals, supervises their use, issues
permits to agents who can distribute the seals to persons creating
qualifying handicrafts, and enforces associated laws and rules.462
It is also responsible for determining the design of seals, their
method of affixation, and their preparation and control.463
Although the statute does not specifically require it, the Alaska
State Council on the Arts in fact maintains a central registry of all
456
Id. The parallel program, “Made in Alaska,” was “designed to promote products
made or manufactured in the state and handicrafts produced by both Native and nonNative craftspersons.” ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 58.040(a) (2004); see also Made in
Alaska, About MIA, at http://www.madeinalaska.org/mia/about.htm (last visited Nov. 7,
2004).
457
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.010(a) (Michie 2004).
458
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.030(a) (Michie 2004).
459
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 58.020(d) (2004); Silver Hand Permit Application,
supra note 451.
460
McNeill Interview, supra note 451.
461
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 58.020(c)(3)(A) (2004).
462
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.020(b) (Michie 2004); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §§
58.005–.035, .060–.900 (2004).
463
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.020(b).
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permit holders qualified to use the seal on their handicrafts.464 Use
of the plural form of “seals” in the statutory language may mean
that more than one type or class of seal could be created for
various Native handicrafts, or possibly even different seals for
different tribes or indigenous groups, but presently only one seal
exists for all qualifying handicrafts.
Under Alaska’s statute, “‘authentic Native handicraft’ means
an article made in the state which is composed wholly, or in some
significant respect, of natural materials, and which is produced,
decorated or fashioned by an Alaska Native.”465 “‘Native’ means
[an Alaskan] resident having not less than one-quarter Eskimo,
Aleut or Indian blood.”466 An artisan must document this fact
either through possession of a Certificate of Indian Blood from the
United States Department of the Interior, “an official letter from a
village or regional corporation” established under the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, or an “official letter from a
village council or tribe in which the applicant is a member,”
together with a state driver’s license or other photo
identification.467 According to the Silver Hand permit application,
“American Indians whose tribes are indigenous to other states are
not eligible” to participate in the Silver Hand program,468 although
this is not clear from the statute itself. Presumably, this means that
an Alaska resident from the Navajo Nation could not use the Silver
Hand seal for his or her handicrafts, even if the articles met the
other required criteria; he or she could qualify only to participate in
the non-Native handicraft certification program, despite Alaska
resident status.
Criminal penalties attach to violations of the Alaska statute.469
Knowing or willful affixation of a seal to a non-authentic article, or
offer of sale or actual sale of a non-authentic article bearing such a
seal, is a Class B misdemeanor if the individual affixing or selling
464

McNeill Interview, supra note 451. The registry is available through the Alaska
State Council on the Arts website. See List of Silver Hand Permit Holders,
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/aksca/SilverHand2004.xls (last modified June 29, 2004).
465
ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.070(1) (Michie 2004).
466
Id. § 45.65.070(5).
467
Silver Hand Permit Application, supra note 451.
468
Id.
469
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.060 (Michie 2004).
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the article knows that the article is not an authentic Native
handicraft.470 Similarly, an agent who knowingly or willfully
issues a seal permit for an article that is not an authentic Native
handicraft is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor,471 as is anyone who
“knowingly or willfully alters, changes, or counterfeits” a Silver
Hand Program seal.472
The Silver Hand program envisions that the permit holder will
use the seal in connection with advertising and on marketing and
business materials associated with the handicrafts, so long as the
use is not false or misleading and so long as the seal is not
incorporated directly into a business logo or label or used in a
dominant manner in a product.473 Interestingly, the Alaska State
Council on the Arts, using its discretion, has discontinued a part of
the Silver Hand Program outlined by the state statute.474 The result
is that agents can no longer be appointed by the state to issue
permits to individual Native artisans.475 The Council took this
action because agents were failing to register individual artisans
properly and because it wanted to ensure appropriate quality
control of certified handicrafts.476 Since this change was effected
in 1998, the Silver Hand Program registry has grown from roughly
350 to more than 1100 permit holders.477
The program’s legal requirements and state-based regulatory
support are reminiscent of the requirements for establishing and
policing a certification mark in the federal trademark system.478
Although the Silver Hand seal is not specifically referred to in state
statutory or administrative materials as a certification mark or
trademark per se—and it is apparently not viewed as such by its

470

See id. § 45.65.060(a)–(b).
See id. § 45.65.060(f).
472
See id. § 45.65.060(c).
473
See id.
474
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.045(b) (Michie 2004); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §
58.030 (2004).
475
McNeill Interview, supra note 451.
476
Id.
477
Id. As of June 29, 2004, there were 1125 registered Silver Hand permit holders. See
List of Silver Hand Permit Holders, supra note 464.
478
See infra notes 487–93 and accompanying text.
471
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administrators479—it actually appears to function in a strikingly
similar manner. The seal enjoys growing popularity among
artisans, and it appears to be quite successful and useful, both to
them and to consumers.480
The Silver Hand program could be a useful model for other
indigenous groups and states interested in locally run government
certification programs for TKGRF. This type of program seems to
function effectively in providing a reliable system under which
consumer familiarity and confidence in the uniform quality of
indigenous handicrafts and works of art can grow, so long as the
certifying entity plays an active role in ensuring that quality control
with proper supervision is supported by meticulous registration and
records keeping.
One advantage of this kind of state certification program
(especially if it includes criminal as well as civil penalties), which
lies outside a “pure” state trademark rubric but within the province
of consumer-type statutes, is that both state and federal agencies
may have concurrent jurisdiction and, thus, greater willingness to
jointly participate in enforcement than in a formal trademark
scenario. With respect to Alaska’s statute, the State Attorney
General’s office, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the
Department of Justice, and the U.S. Customs Service have all,
from time to time, been involved in investigating complaints
arising in connection with the Silver Hand Program.481 Also, from
an indigenous peoples’ standpoint, state-run programs dispense
with the necessity of using scarce tribal financial resources for
program operating expenses, trademark registrations, and attorney
fees, though state programs also prevent tribal autonomy over the
specifics of certification standards.482
479
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.045(b) (Michie 2004); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §
58.030 (2004).
480
See, e.g., note 477 and accompanying text.
481
Id.; Telephone Interview with Chuck Harwood, Regional Director, Northwest
Region, FTC (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Harwood Interview] (notes from interview on
file with author); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC Distributes 300,000 Postcards and
Brochures to Educate Shoppers Seeking Authentic Alaska Native Art (July 22, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/07-/alaska.htm; FTC Takes Action against Fake Native
Artwork, supra note 455.
482
See Hapiuk, supra note 393, at 1065.
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C. Federal Trade Commission Act
In conjunction with the Alaska experience, the Federal Trade
Commission has become interested in handicraft authenticity
issues and has investigated numerous violations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”).483 The FTC Act applies in
the TKGRF context when there allegedly has been a material
misrepresentation to consumers concerning goods supposedly
created by Native Americans, but in fact produced by others.484
The FTC has also made a modest effort to educate Alaska’s
summertime tourists about this problem, distributing brochures and
postcard information to cruise companies, travel agencies, airlines,
and others, informing them about how to determine the
authenticity of indigenous handicrafts.485 It has investigated
several complaints about related consumer protection violations in
the state over the last few years, and it successfully settled one case
in 1996, in which Eskimo carvers were producing handicraft items
and falsely marketing them for sale in the United States as the
creations of Northwest Coastal Indians.486
D. USPTO Database of Native American Tribal Insignia
Another feature of U.S. law that is widely cited by U.S.
officials as evidence of government support for legal protection of
indigenous TKGRF is the Database of Native American Tribal
Insignia (“Database”), which is maintained by the USPTO.487
Contrary to its name, the Database is not an independent database,
separate from other USPTO information, but is just one component
of the general trademark database administered by the USPTO.488
It may be accessed and searched electronically via the Trademark

483

15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994).
Harwood Interview, supra note 481.
485
Press Release, FTC, FTC Heads Education Campaign to Help Shoppers Assure
Alaskan Native Art is Authentic (May 14, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/05/akart.htm.
486
See Press Release, FTC, Ivory Jack’s and Northwest Tribal Arts Agree to Settle FTC
Charges that They Sold Fake Native American Artwork (Apr. 12, 1996),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/04/ivory-j.htm.
487
See USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22.
488
See id. (at response to question 2).
484
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Electronic Search System, or TESS.489 “‘Official insignia of
Native American tribes’”—“the insignia that may be registered in
the database—”means the flag or coat of arms or other emblem or
device of any federally or State recognized Native American tribe,
as adopted by tribal resolution and notified to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office.”490
The tribal insignia database is maintained as a reference tool
for federal trademark examiners.491 If, for example, a third party
attempts to register a mark that falsely suggests a connection with
a Native American tribe that has its official insignia on file, the
examiner refers to the collection in the database and can, where
appropriate, refuse registration to the third party mark.492 While
this is somewhat useful, U.S. officials at recent IGC and OAS
meetings have gone so far as to champion the Database as a
valuable legal tool that demonstrates the U.S. government’s
commitment to protecting the intellectual property rights of
indigenous peoples.493
This position is more than a little misleading. In reality, the
Database appears to be a rather pro forma attempt to comply with
international treaty terms, rather than to represent any real or
concerted effort to protect indigenous TKGRF. It seems to have
been created for reasons largely unrelated to government concern
for TKGRF. The Database was the result of a Congressionallymandated USPTO study,494 which in turn resulted from the United
States’ desire to accede to the Trademark Law Treaty495 in the late
1990’s. That treaty is aimed mainly at eliminating the enormous

489

See id.; see also TESS, supra note 416.
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
25:67.1, at 25-152–25-153 (4th ed. 2002) (quoting USPTO Report, supra note 316, at
24).
491
See USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22 (at response to question 8).
492
Id.
493
See Lourie Statements, supra note 212; see also U.S. OAS Statement, supra note 16.
494
USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 2. The study was mandated by Title III of Public
Law 105-330.
495
WIPO, Trademark Law Treaty, adopted at Geneva, Switz. Oct. 27. 1994 [hereinafter
Trademark Law Treaty], http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/tlt (last visited Nov. 15,
2002).
490
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variation among countries in trademark registration formalities.496
When Congress passed the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation
Act497 in 1998, it required, incidentally, an insignia protection
study as part of the overall treaty compliance package.498
While the USPTO had, in 1994, contacted all federally
registered Native American tribes with the objective of compiling
a list of official insignia for use in determining general trademark
registrability, “to ensure that third parties do not register
trademarks that give a false impression of the true origin of the
goods or services,” no database had resulted.499 Conveniently,
however, this initial tribal contact was repackaged five years later
in the USPTO Report, under the somewhat dubious heading, “The
PTO Takes an Active Role in Protecting Native Americans.”500 In
reality, the Database was finally created as a direct result of the
later treaty obligations, a fact substantiated in a much later official
U.S. response to a WIPO questionnaire on TKGRF.501 This survey
response was submitted by the USPTO itself, through the thenAdministrator for External Affairs, Robert Stoll, well after
completion of the USPTO study.502 This sequence of events lends
credence to the theory that creation of the Database did not, reflect
any pronounced interest by the U.S. government in protecting
indigenous intellectual property, contrary to present U.S. policy
characterization in international discussion forums.
The 1998 Congressional mandate required that the USPTO
study the impact that a tribal insignia database, along with
concomitant changes in U.S. trademark law or policy potentially
prohibiting marks identical to official tribal insignia, would have
on Native American tribes, on the agency itself, and on other

496

Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 20 (1998).
497
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 112 Stat. 3064
(1998) (enacted Oct. 30, 1998 and codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
498
See id. § 302(a)(2).
499
See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 14, 45.
500
See id. at 14.
501
Questionnaire Response, supra note 386, at 1.
502
Id.

KREMERS FORMAT

1/25/2005 6:10 PM

2004] U.S. I.P. PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURES

89

interested parties.503 The USPTO was also directed to study the
effects of prohibitions on new uses of such insignia, and changes in
law or policy with respect to defenses to claims of insignia
infringement.504
The administrative feasibility and cost of
protecting official tribal insignia were examined, as well as the
effect of prohibiting registrations or new uses.505 Congress
unequivocally directed the Commissioner of the USPTO to solicit
public comment and to use “any appropriate additional measures,
including field hearings, to obtain as wide a range of views as
possible from Native American tribes, trademark owners, and other
interested parties.”506
In response, the USPTO published notice of the upcoming
study in the Federal Register.507 The agency scheduled field
hearings to consider the study’s issues in Albuquerque, NM; San
Francisco, CA; and Arlington, VA.508 Those wishing to testify
were required to give written notice to the USPTO prior to the first
of the series of hearings, along with a written copy of planned
testimony.509 The agency allocated between five and fifteen
minutes per speaker, and prior agency approval was required.510
Only information that speakers wished to be electronically
accessible for public dissemination was to be submitted.511
Under these circumstances, the agency received only thirtythree written responses, and a mere thirty-six witnesses gave oral
testimony.512 Among the respondents were the powerful American
Intellectual Property Law Association, DaimlerChrysler, the
International
Trademark
Association,
Mohawk
Carpet
Corporation, the National Coalition on Racism in Sports and
503

See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 7–8; see also Trademark Law Treaty
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, § 302, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998).
504
See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 7–8.
505
See id. at 8.
506
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act § 302(b)(1).
507
Request for Comments, 63 Fed. Reg. 71619 (Dec. 29, 1998).
508
Notice of Hearings, 64 Fed. Reg. 29841 (June 3, 1999).
509
Id. at 29842.
510
Id.
511
Id.
512
See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 3. The USPTO’s 1994 inquiry had received
only approximately ten responses. See id. at 14.
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Media, the New Mexico Book Association, two state universities,
and two Congressional offices; twenty-five responses came from
individuals or from Native American tribal representatives
identifiable as such by their names.513
This can hardly be said to be a representative cross-section of
opinion of the nearly 600 federally recognized Native American
tribes.514 Of course, U.S. government communications are not
always user-friendly, and intellectual property issues can be
complex, even when the intended audience has the necessary
educational and business background. It would not be surprising,
though, if the considerable advance notice and written preparation
requirements were off-putting obstacles, especially for participants
wanting only to testify orally. Financial and travel burdens were
likely also to have been insurmountable for many potential
participants, particularly since many indigenous U.S. peoples live
in remote locations, far from the three scheduled testimony points,
including in Alaska and Hawaii.
The USPTO, however, apparently viewed its actions as
tantamount to taking all “appropriate additional measures,
including field hearings, to obtain as wide a range of views as
possible” from North American tribes.515 Based on this miniscule
sampling of indigenous opinion, the USPTO posted written
comments and hearing transcripts on its website several months
earlier than the Congressionally imposed deadline of September
30, 1999.516
The USPTO Report recommended that it “should create,
maintain, and update” an “accurate and comprehensive database
containing the official insignia of all State and federally recognized
Native American tribes.”517 It concluded that existing trademark
law already provided legal tools sufficient to prohibit registration
513

Id. at 4–6.
See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003) (giving notice of “the
current list of 562 tribal entities recognized and eligible for funding and services from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs by virtue of their status as Indian tribes”).
515
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, § 302(b)(1), 112
Stat. 3064 (1998).
516
See USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 3.
517
Id. at 47.
514
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of official insignia or simulations in cases where the applicant is
not the tribal owner.518 It deemed new legislation aimed at
examination and registration unnecessary, as this could potentially
cause unforeseen complications for innocent parties.519 The
agency concluded that both retrospective and prospective changes
in existing law would be unfair to members of the public who had
in good faith been using terms or designs similar or identical to
tribal insignia before the USPTO Report, so long as they did not
intend to associate themselves falsely with a tribe and their goods
or services were not so associated in the minds of consumers.520
The agency also recommended against amending Lanham Act
§2b,521 which prohibits registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or
comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of the United
States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, or
any simulation thereof.”522 The USPTO concluded that additional
protection was not necessary “and might risk violation of U.S.
international treaty obligations if it [offered] exclusive trademark
protection to a particular indigenous group.”523
In the fall of 2003, USPTO personnel confirmed that, more
than four years after its inception, the entire Database consisted
only of five tribal insignia.524 Usage was believed to be low, partly
because, as even the USPTO admits, the Database is mainly useful
to examiners, and there are no immediate advantages to trademark

518

See id. at 44.
See id.
520
See id. at 26.
521
MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 25:67.1, at 25-151.
522
15 U.S.C. § 1052(b) (2001); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 25:67.1, at 25151 n.3; cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 25:67.1, at 25-154 (citing Mohegan Tribe of
Indians of Conn. v. Mohegan Tribe and Nation, Inc., 255 Conn. 358, 769 A.2d 34 (Conn.
2001) (holding “that one group of people from the Mohegan Indian tribe could not
prevent another group of Mohegans from using the terms ‘Mohegan’ and ‘Mohegan
Tribe’ because the designation “Mohegan” was a generic name for all Native American
Indians of Mohegan descent”)).
523
USPTO Report, supra note 316, at 45.
524
Telephone Interview with Ari Liefman, Trademark Examining Attorney, Office of
the Commissioner for Trademarks (Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Liefman Interview] (on
file with author). At the time of the interview, the agency had, however, just completed
the positive step of sending out a mass mailing about the Database to all recognized
tribes, in an effort to raise awareness. Id.
519
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owners that would provide an incentive to participate.525 Tribes
that do register their insignia in the Database are not, on this basis
alone, afforded any of the benefits of trademark registration.526
Rather, tribal owners must separately register their insignia as
trademarks—and they must themselves pay the concomitant
administrative and legal fees to do so—before trademark
protection is available.527 Low participation may also be due to
somewhat cumbersome Database registration requirements.528
All of the foregoing factors tend to show that the Database,
despite official representations to the contrary at international
meetings, does not offer any broad or meaningful legal protection
for indigenous TKGRF, nor does its creation signify any
significant governmental policy interest in indigenous TKGRF
protection.
IV. HOW COULD U.S. LAW BE EXPANDED TO GIVE GREATER
PROTECTION TO INDIGENOUS TKGRF, YET STILL REMAIN WITHIN
ESTABLISHED REGIMES OF WESTERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW?
Limited, but still meaningful, improvement in U.S. TKGRF
protection could be attained within a relatively short time period by
amending or improving implementation of current laws that
specifically address Native American TKGRF.529 As discussed
above, more meaningful implementation of the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act, through prompt amendment of its trademark
provisions, expansion of state certification mark programs, greater
enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act within a
TKGRF context, and more substantial use of the USPTO’s
Database of Native American Tribal Insignia, is a necessary step
toward greater TKGRF protection in the U.S.530
525

Id.; see also USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22 (at response to question 8).
See USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22 (at response to question 6).
527
See id.; see also USPTO, Basic Facts About Trademarks, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/doc/basic (last modified Nov. 8, 2004).
528
See USPTO, FAQ, supra note 22 (at response to question 5).
529
See supra Part III.
530
See supra Part III.A.
526
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A further, important step, which respects current U.S. policy
goals, is to expand indigenous use of U.S. intellectual property
laws generally through: 1) wider use of certification and collective
trademarks by indigenous creators;531 2) increased use by
indigenous groups of Lanham Act §2 to prevent offensive or
disparaging trademark registrations;532 3) expansion of the current
moral rights regime, particularly on the state law level;533 and 4)
establishment of a domestic system of geographical indications law
for TKGRF protection.534 These topics are discussed below and
followed by general observations on U.S. law and policy
concerning TKGRF.
A. Encourage Wider Indigenous Use of Current Trademark Tools
Present U.S. trademark law contains provisions that could be
more effectively implemented to provide indigenous U.S. peoples
with better protection of certain TKGRF. In particular, two special
types of trademarks, certification marks535 and collective marks,536
could be more frequently and effectively used to protect Native
American products and services that embody or are derived from
TKGRF. The trademark provisions of IACA should be redrafted
as explained above.537 Its implementation should be as originally
intended,538 but with special emphasis on certification and
collective marks. Specialized, free legal expertise concerning
certification and collective marks in the TKGRF context should
also be made available to Native Americans wishing to take
advantage of an amended IACA trademark program. Section 2(a)
of the Lanham Act, which prevents registration of offensive or
disparaging marks, could be publicized and used more widely by
indigenous U.S. populations and others to ensure proper treatment
of TKGRF in the trademark field. The resulting body of
531

See discussion infra Part IV.A.1–2.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.3.
533
See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
534
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
535
See generally Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 17, and 28 U.S.C.) (2004).
536
See id.
537
See supra notes 421–29 and accompanying text.
538
See supra notes 414–19 and accompanying text.
532
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interpretive law in this area could delineate constitutional
boundaries of any new legislation that might give special
protection to indigenous TKGRF.
However, a major limitation of all trademark law for protecting
TKGRF is that trademarks are merely indicators that provide
reliable information about the source of goods and services to
consumers, to prevent confusion as to origin.539 Trademarks offer
no protection for the actual knowledge itself; they protect only the
source designation of products (whether goods or services) created
from that knowledge, and they are applicable only in a commerceoriented context.540 But for portions of TKGRF that indigenous
groups do wish to commercialize, trademark law could be quite
useful in delineating indigenous origin and production methods, as
well as in educating the larger public about and creating wider
respect for traditional goods and services.
1. Certification Marks and TKGRF
As previously mentioned in the Saami example, one of the
concerns among indigenous people is that their knowledge,
creations, and methods of creation may be taken by others, without
authorization, and used in a manner that does not reflect
indigenous origin at all or used to create another work that is not
authentic and does not embody proper respect for the indigenous
source society.541 In the context of the U.S., this means that goods
or services may be passed off as “Indian” or as somehow
originating in Indian culture, when actually they do not. While
IACA resolves some of this issue in the arts and crafts area, it does
not address TKGRF material that is neither art nor craft.542 And
though the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act may also address
part of the problem in the commercial context,543 neither of these
federal statutes facilitates development of public awareness of the
specific identities, geographic homes, and creative contributions to
539

See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004).
Id.
541
See supra notes 68–77 and accompanying text.
542
See generally IACA, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
543
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2004).
540
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U.S. society by the wide variety of indigenous groups in the United
States. This is a key facet of what indigenous groups are rightfully
asking for now: greater recognition of who they are and their
specific contributions to our present society.544
For many indigenous groups, their geographical origin is an
important part of their societal identity. In light of the unique
interdependence of many indigenous communities with their local
natural environments,545 this is not surprising. Only two areas of
established intellectual property law, however, afford protection
based on geographic origin: 1) geographical indications, which are
discussed further below and which have not traditionally existed in
U.S. law,546 and 2) and certification marks, which exist within the
larger body of trademark law.547 Neither of these methods of
protection has been greatly emphasized in international TKGRF
discussions, but both may offer a partial solution for certain kinds
of TKGRF protection.
Until the signing of TRIPS, the only method available in the
U.S. for registering a property right in a geographic source
indicator was by registering a certification mark with the
Trademark Office.548 The Lanham Act defines a certification mark
as:
any word, name, symbol, device or any combination
thereof . . . used by a person other than its owner . . . to
certify regional or other origin, . . . material, mode of
manufacture, . . . or other characteristics of such person’s
good or services or that the work or labor on the goods or
services was performed by members of a[n] . . .
organization.549

544

See Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the United States, National
American
Indian
Heritage
Month
Proclamation
(Nov.
19,
2001),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011112-4.html;
see
generally
Systematic Analysis, supra note 25.
545
See Presentation on Experiences, supra note 239, at Annex III.
546
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
547
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004).
548
See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19:90.
549
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004) (emphasis added).
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The purpose of a certification mark thus differs somewhat from
that of a “regular” trademark or service mark: a certification mark
is owned by one party but used by others to certify that their goods
or services conform to specified characteristics (which can include
geographic or labor origins) set by the owner.550
In the U.S. federal trademark system, there is no government
control over the standards that are set for using any particular
certification mark, apart from those for certification marks owned
by the government itself.551 Instead, the mark owner sets the
relevant standards.552 Then the owner convinces consumers,
usually via advertising, that his certification system provides useful
and reliable information about the quality and origins of associated
products.553 This means that a Native American tribe, for example,
could organize an entity to register a certification mark for tribal
products or services and could require that they actually be
produced or performed by tribal members, using only specified
components and particular traditional methods. Producers not
meeting these standards would not, by definition, have access to
use of the mark. Consumers would, over time, come to associate
the certification mark only with tribal products of a particular
quality and method of production.
There are special criteria for certification mark registration and
maintenance in the U.S. A certification mark may not be
registered, and it is grounds for cancellation of an otherwise valid
mark, if the owner of the mark:
(A) does not control . . . the use of such mark, or (B)
engages in the production or marketing of any goods or
services to which the certification mark is applied, or (C)
permits the use of the certification mark for purposes other
than to certify, or (D) discriminately refuses to certify or to
continue to certify the goods or services of any person who

550
551
552
553

MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19.91.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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maintains the standards or conditions which such mark
certifies . . . .554
A certification mark thus functions as a kind of guarantee of
certain characteristics common to the certified goods or services,
rather than as a direct indicator of source.555 A certifier-owner also
cannot produce goods under the certification mark, however,
because the party who is setting the standards for certification is
presumed to lose his objectivity concerning those standards if he is
also a competitor in the same market.556
Additionally, the certifier-owner cannot refuse to license the
mark to anyone who meets the standards for using the mark, so the
owner needs to think carefully about the characteristics of the
audience to whom he will be required to license, in addition to the
desired qualities of the certified goods themselves, when setting
certification standards.557 In the TKGRF context, then, it might be
especially important to require the creation of goods solely by
tribal members or exclusively by using a form of traditional
knowledge in the production methods, which could require
supervision by shamans or other indigenous authorities. Because
the tribe itself could not own a certification mark and also sell the
certified products and services, it would probably want to form
some other legal entity to own the mark.
It may be possible to develop common law rights in a
certification mark without registering it federally, so long as the
mark owner defines and requires adherence to certification
standards.558 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and
at least one court in the Eighth Circuit have stated that such
common law rights can be created in certification marks.559 For
indigenous groups unable to raise the fees associated with
registering a federal certification mark, this might provide a viable,
if somewhat risky, strategy for establishing a certification mark.
554

15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2001).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19:94.
556
See id.
557
See id.
558
See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19:90.
559
See id. (citing Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746 (8th
Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18 (1995)).
555
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Of course, such a mark might be judicially determined to have
inherent local geographic and market limitations, a problem not
faced by a federally registered mark.560
Presently, only a few indigenous groups have independently
registered their own federal certification marks.561 The current
lack of popularity of certification marks among indigenous U.S.
groups may result from various sources. First, lack of information
among indigenous people about these specialized types of marks is
extremely likely, since detailed knowledge and understanding
about trademarks in general is probably very limited among all
U.S. citizens who are not trademark attorneys. Second, registering
a trademark requires paying a fee,562 and usually also attorneys’
fees, and this can present a substantial obstacle to many indigenous
groups.
Third, proper use of certification marks requires
considerable effort on the part of the mark owner to set standards
and to ensure that producers’ goods and services consistently meet
them.563 At the very least, this requires some sort of centralized
560

See Lourie Statements, supra note 212.
Author’s search of USPTO registration information (conducted on April 26, 2003,
using the TESS search engine (see supra note 416)), specifically for certification marks
containing such terms as “Native American,” “Indian,” “American Indian,” “Eskimo,”
“Aleut,” “Shaman,” “Apache,” “Arapaho,” “Navajo,” “Hopi,” “Zuni,” “Sioux,”
“Lakota,” “Tulalip,” “Six Nations,” “Athabascan,” “Yupik,” “Inuit,” “Tribe,” “Tribal,”
and other similar terms revealed four such live marks. Three of these marks belong to the
Council of the Cowichan Indian Band in Canada (certification mark registration numbers
2222979, 2219102, and 2221870), and one mark belongs to Mountain Chief Corp. in
Montana (certification mark registration number 2392744). The latter mark certifies that
goods using the mark are made by Native Americans. Another certification mark
(registration number 1384860), owned by the Council of American Indian Artists
Charitable Trust, was registered but has been cancelled for over ten years.
The author conducted a similar series of searches in connection with collective
marks. These searches obviously are not exhaustive, and special marks not containing
the designated keywords in their registration documentation are not identified in these
searches. The author offers no conclusions concerning the status of any other type of
U.S. trademark that may be held by indigenous groups, since, according to USPTO
personnel, there is no way to verify accurately how many standard trademarks and
service marks may be owned by indigenous groups. Liefman Interview, supra note 524.
562
See Basic Facts About Trademarks, Application Filing Fee, at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/doc/basic/appcontent.htm#fee (last modified Nov.
8, 2004). The current registration fee is $375 for paper filings and $325 for electronic
filings. See FY 2005 Fee Schedule, Trademark Processing Fees (Jan. 4, 2005),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs-/ope/fee2004oct1.htm.
563
See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2004).
561
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record keeping and quality control, which may be costly and hard
for indigenous owners (or anyone else) to establish and
consistently maintain.
If these obstacles could be overcome, however, certification
marks could be far more valuable than standard trademarks for
protecting some Native American TKGRF. While standard
trademarks identify only the source of goods or services,
certification marks can convey much more specific quality, labor,
and geographic origin information to consumers, who may in turn
become loyal to that mark over time.
2. Collective Marks and TKGRF
Another special type of trademark that could be useful in the
TKGRF context is the collective mark. A collective mark is a
trademark or service mark used by the members of a cooperative,
an association, or other collective group or organization.564
There are two different types of collective marks.565 The first
type is used to identify members of a particular group, all of whom
produce specific goods or services; it is intended to show that the
relevant goods or services are produced by qualifying members
meeting the membership standards of the organization.566 In
contrast to certification marks, qualification is based on the
producer’s ability to meet the standards for membership in the
group, rather than whether the attributes of his goods and services
meet specified standards.567 The second type of collective mark
can be thought of as a collective membership mark, and members
of a group or organization use this kind of mark merely to show
their membership in that entity.568 This type of collective mark is
the only registrable symbol not used by the sellers of anything; it
merely reflects membership and does not refer at all to goods or
services.569

564
565
566
567
568
569

See id. § 1127.
MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 19:99.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. § 19:101.
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Both types of collective marks are of interest for indigenous
TKGRF protection because, while either could be used to show the
creator’s membership in an Indian arts and crafts organization or
tribe or other ethnic group, neither would require the exacting
product standards and quality control of a certification mark.570 A
collective mark would thus be less difficult and expensive to
register and maintain than a certification mark.571 If appropriately
structured, the first type of collective mark could communicate
much of the same information about indigenous producers as
might a certification mark. And collective marks could provide a
potential intermediate vehicle through which to create public
awareness of specific tribes and of individuals’ membership in
those tribes, for later development into certification mark
standards. A collective membership mark might also be used to
promote useful public awareness of tribal identity, even if the mark
were only indirectly linked to TKGRF.
Like certification marks, collective marks originated at
common law, when clubs, churches and schools often had “trade
names” protected under common law unfair competition principles
developed prior to the Lanham Act.572 This characteristic may
allow some indigenous groups, initially unable (for financial or
other reasons) to register formal collective marks, to develop
unregistered marks to build local market identity.
At present, a few Native Americans have registered collective
marks in the federal system. Among these are the Navajo Code
Talkers Association,573 the Cowlitz Indian Tribe,574 and the InterTribal Indian Ceremonial Association, Inc.575 Unfortunately,
collective marks are not widely exploited by indigenous groups;
probably, like certification marks, their potential for TKGRF
protection is not widely understood.

570

See id.
See id.
572
See id. § 19:98.
573
See TESS, supra note 416 (search using registration number 2487105).
574
See TESS, supra note 416 (search using registration number 2326707).
575
See TESS, supra note 416 (search using registration number 1567693). According to
its registration application, this collective association “promotes the preservation of the
Native American or American Indian culture, traditions, art and related activities.” Id.
571
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Collective and certification marks are registrable and
enforceable in the same manner as other trademarks.576 A useful
characteristic of these marks for indigenous groups—whose
members may be physically isolated from population centers and
each other, and who have limited financial resources—is that a
registrant does not need an industrial or commercial establishment,
if he maintains proper control over the mark.577
Thus, for many reasons, both collective and certification marks
might be much more valuable tools than “regular” trademarks for
protecting the unique characteristics of indigenous TKGRF.
However, any government trademark registration program, under
IACA or other legislation, must offer specialized trademark
expertise and advice so that applicants may effectively utilize these
specialized tools.
An effective marketing and advertising plan needs to
accompany proper choice of mark and registration, to ensure
optimal development of consumer awareness of the meaning and
ownership of the mark.578 Since the Board’s congressional
mandate under IACA encompasses identifying and developing
market opportunities for Indian arts and crafts, perhaps federal
funding and assistance with tribal marketing plans could also be
given directly to tribes. Of course, financing and expertise for
policing marks would also be needed in all cases to ensure
successful goodwill development and mark maintenance after
registration. If such an integrated approach were used, indigenous
certification and collective marks could, over time, effectively
create sophisticated consumer markets for traditional products,
including public awareness of specific tribal identities, practices,
and knowledge and materials components.

576

See 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (2004).
See id. § 1054 (2004).
578
See Mark Abell & Michael Stirling, Assessing and Enhancing Trademarks’ Value,
Int’l Bar Ass’n (May 12, 2004), at http://comml-iba.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=59.
577
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3. Lanham Act § 2(a)
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act579 is another provision in the
U.S. trademark law regime that could be more widely used to
protect indigenous peoples’ TKGRF. Though little used until
recently, this section enables the USPTO to refuse to register
marks that may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with
persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring these
into “contempt or disrepute.”580 This provision of U.S. law is
analogous to a similar provision in New Zealand’s new trademark
act, discussed earlier, though the New Zealand provision makes
specific reference to the act’s special applicability to its indigenous
Maori community.581
Indigenous people have not often used the U.S. provision, but
it has the potential to provide unique protection against culturally
and religiously offensive uses of indigenous TKGRF by third
parties—uses that might in many other contexts be protected by the
First Amendment.582 Its drawback, of course, is that it applies only
to offensive uses in connection with federal trademarks,583 an
inherently narrow segment of TKGRF material.
Under Lanham Act § 2(a), the test for false suggestion of a
connection requires: 1) that the name point uniquely to the opposer
and be unmistakably associated with the person or institution
opposing the mark application, and 2) that a connection with the
579

See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2004).
Id. § 1052(a) (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal
register on account of its nature unless it—(a) [c]onsists of or comprises immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring
them into contempt, or disrepute.”)
581
See Trade Marks Act, cl. 17, 2002 (N.Z.), available at http://www2.piperpat.co.nz/tmlaw/s000.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2004). Among other things, in clause 17, it
updates the registrability standard, which previously prohibited marks that were
“scandalous” or “contrary to law or morality.” See Trade Marks Act, cl. 16(1), 1953
(N.Z.) (repealed 2002), available at http://www2.piperpat.co.nz/tmlaw/tmact.html. It
will, instead, now prohibit marks that are “likely to offend a significant section of the
community, including Maori.” Trade Marks Act, cl. 17(1)(b)(ii), 2002 (N.Z.). See also
supra note 243–45 and accompanying text.
582
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
583
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
580
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opposer be presumed by a potential purchaser seeing the mark used
on the applicant’s goods or services.584 A few religious and
political groups have successfully sued, and marks such as Senussi
(the name of a Muslim religious sect) cigarettes585 and Madonna
wines586 have been refused. One interesting decision of the
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (“TTAB”), made during the
Cold War, held that a mark depicting a hammer and sickle with a
cross through it could not be registered because it tended to
disparage a national symbol of the then-Soviet Union.587 By
contrast, “Buddha Beachware” was held not to be disparaging to
the Buddhist religion.588
Recently, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia decided a prominent case interpreting disparaging
marks.589 In Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., the TTAB cancelled the
REDSKINS trademark of the Washington, D.C. professional
football team because it disparaged Native Americans.590 The
D.C. District Court reversed the TTAB’s finding of disparagement
based on insufficient evidence and the applicability of the laches
defense.591 Nevertheless, Harjo established that “[w]hether . . .

584

See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, at § 19:76 (citing United States Navy v. United
States Mfg. Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1254 (T.T.A.B. 1987)).
585
See id. § 19:77 (citing In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.m.b.H., 122 U.S.P.Q.
339 (T.T.A.B. 1959)).
586
See id. § 19:77 (citing In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938)).
587
See id. § 19:76 (citing In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Congress, Inc., 161
U.S.P.Q. 304 (T.T.A.B. 1969)).
588
See id. § 19:77 (citing In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994)).
589
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). For a complete
discussion of the Harjo decision, see generally Rachel Clark Hughley, The Impact of
Pro-Football Inc. v. Harjo on Trademark Protection of Other Marks, 14 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327 (2004).
590
50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1743 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.
Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003).
591
Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 145. “The Court’s conclusions in this case, as to the
sufficiency of the evidence before the TTAB and the applicability of the laches defense,
should not be interpreted as reflecting, one way or the other, this Court’s views as to
whether the use of the term ‘Washington Redskins’ may be disparaging to Native
Americans.” Id. at 98.
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trademarks disparage Native Americans is ultimately a fact-bound
conclusion that rests with the fact-finder in the first instance.”592
Prior to Harjo, the TTAB and the Federal Circuit judged
applications according to whether they would be considered
disparaging by a “substantial composite” of the general public.593
In cases of doubt, opposing applications were published so that any
disparagement determination could be based on public response,
rather than on the TTAB’s own judgment as to what constitutes
offensiveness.594
In Harjo, although not at issue on appeal, the D.C. District
Court found no error in the TTAB’s approach to the
“disparagement” inquiry.595 The TTAB determined that the
“scandalous” and the “may disparage” language of the statute
constitute two distinct bars to registration, each involving an
independent analysis.596 “Scandalous” looks to the reaction of
U.S. society as a whole to the usage, while “may disparage” targets
an identifiable group of persons.597 Only the perceptions of the
specific, identifiable group’s members are relevant in a “may
disparage” determination.598 Evaluating the “may disparage”
language involves a two-step process: 1) determining whether the
designation would be understood as referring to persons in an
identifiable group, and 2) determining whether the designation is
viewed as disparaging (or offensive) by a “substantial composite”
of the persons in that identifiable group.599 The TTAB thus found
that the REDSKINS registration disparaged Native Americans, as
perceived by a substantial composite of Native Americans,
592
Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (“The issue of disparagement, like the issue of
likelihood of confusion, requires a fact-based judgment that depends heavily on the
particular circumstances of each case.”).
593
See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 19:77 (citing In re Malvety Media Group, 33 F.3d
1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
594
See id. (citing In re Hines, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1376 (T.T.A.B. 1994)).
595
See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 124.
596
See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1738; see generally MCCARTHY, supra note 490, §
19:77.1.
597
See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 124.
598
See Harjo, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
599
See id. at 1739. “Offensive” was viewed by the TTAB as the equivalent of the
“disparaging” test. See id. at 1734 n.86. According to the TTAB, a “substantial
composite” can be less than a majority if it is “an appreciable number.” Id. at 1746 n.120.
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although the district court found this determination not to be
supported by substantial evidence.600
Determining disparagement by analyzing the target group,
rather than by viewing U.S. society as a whole, provides a more
clearly defined standard for indigenous opposers to meet. Where
the specific customs, practices, and religious beliefs of the
offended group are not widely known to the U.S. population at
large, the standard provides courts with identifiable criteria to
determine disparagement.601 This recent interpretation of the law
may noticeably increase the usefulness of Lanham Act § 2(a) for
protecting indigenous TKGRF.602
Also useful is the fact that standing to sue under this law is
extremely broad.603 Individuals can bring suit even though they
are not representatives of a disparaged group—mere moral outrage
at a potential registration can be sufficient.604 This would tend to
eliminate problems that might otherwise arise if, for example, a
person wishing to sue in a TKGRF-related situation is not a
formally enrolled member of the relevant tribe or is a member of a
tribe not formally recognized by federal authorities and thus unable
to sue under other laws such as IACA.605 It also would appear to
allow any member of the U.S. public, whether an indigenous
person or not, to bring suit.606
600

See id. at 1743.
See Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 124 n.25.
602
Although the TTAB’s holding was reversed, the disparagement standard established
by the TTAB in Harjo remains the standard used by TTAB and the Federal Circuit to
determine if a mark is disparaging. See, e.g., In re Mothers and Fathers Italian Ass’n,
2000 TTAB LEXIS 52, at *6; Boswell v. Malvety Media Group, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1600
(T.T.A.B. 1999); Order Sons of Italy in Am. v. Memphis Mafia, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d
1364 (T.T.A.B. 1999). The standard announced in Harjo was applied in each of these
cases.
603
See MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 19:77.2 (discussing the ease of establishing
standing under Lanham Act § 2(a)).
604
See id. § 19:77.1 (citing Ritchie v Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Bromberg v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978)).
605
Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
606
Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 490, § 19:77.2 (stating that offended individuals in a
non-commercial group may have standing to sue, even though such members are not
affected in a related business and have not suffered commercial damages) (citing
Bromberg, 198 U.S.P.Q. 176)).
601
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U.S. trademark law thus has several features that could be
exploited more effectively by indigenous communities and on a
much broader scale, at least for the TKGRF that tribes wish to
commercialize. In combination with redrafting the trademark
provisions of IACA,607 greater education and government support
are also needed to encourage widespread tribal use of amended
IACA benefits and the USPTO’s existing tribal insignia database.
Certification marks, collective marks, and the preventive
provisions of Lanham Act §2(a) are tools available in the current
intellectual property law that could also be more widely used for
greater protection of indigenous TKGRF.
While wider use of trademark varieties and registration features
could help Native Americans establish and demarcate markets for
their traditional products (and, potentially, services—such as
traditional healing practices), trademarks cannot legally sequester
the traditional knowledge itself from use by others.608 Also,
specialized trademarks, like patents, require considerable,
expensive legal expertise for proper mark registration and later
enforcement, which may be virtually unobtainable by many
indigenous groups.609
B. Expand State and Federal Moral Rights Protections
U.S. moral rights law, if expanded and developed, might also
afford some interesting and creative avenues of protection for
indigenous TKGRF. Moral rights are new to the U.S. legal
system,610 but they are well-developed in many civil law copyright
systems and are a familiar part of the intellectual property law
regime in most of the world.611
1. Background
Consideration of this issue in the TKGRF context requires
comparing the underlying philosophies of U.S. intellectual
607

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See supra notes 539–40 and accompanying text.
609
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
610
See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02[A]
(2003) (discussing the adoption of moral rights under U.S. intellectual property law).
611
See id. § 8D.01[A] (discussing the basis of French copyright law).
608
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property law with its European and international treaty
counterparts and examining the protection goals of TKGRF
owners.
The general idea behind U.S. patent and copyright law is that
an inventor or artist should be granted a period of monopoly
control over his or her creation during which he or she may reap
any associated economic rewards.612 Thereafter, the creation falls
into the public domain and may be freely used by others for
personal enjoyment or further creative uses.613 In theory, without
such a period of monopoly control, little or no incentive to create
exists, because a would-be creator knows he or she will later face
ruinous competition from subsequent innovators who can freely
exploit the work without incurring the same initial costs of
creation. Subsequent innovators bear but only the incremental
costs of reproducing and distributing their innovations.614
This strictly economics-based model of intellectual property
has traditionally been the sole measure of “the Progress of Science
and useful Arts” 615 in the United States. In the TKGRF context,
then, an inherent limitation of the U.S. view is that it values only
the economic potential of a creative work and is aimed at
maximizing innovation via commercialization.616 By contrast,
TKGRF often is considered to have intrinsic value apart from the
marketplace, and, while indigenous owners sometimes may wish to
commercialize all or part of their TKGRF, in other cases, they may
prefer to prevent its use and dissemination.617
In contrast to the U.S. model, European intellectual property
law has not been shaped solely by economic theory, but by other
useful concepts as well. One such concept is moral rights, or le
droit moral.618 The idea is that, at the time of creation of a literary
612

See id. § 1.05[D] (discussing the reasoning for limiting the period of copyrights).
See id.
614
See id. § 1.03[A] (discussing the purposes of copyrights as an incentive to creativity).
615
See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
616
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 1.03[A] (discussing the purposes of
copyright as an incentive to creativity).
617
See, e.g., supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text; cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 610, § 8D.01[A] (discussing the view that certain works deserve value for noneconomic reasons and that moral rights are owed to the creator of a work).
618
See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[A].
613
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or artistic work, some part of the artist’s own being or personality
is incorporated into the work, and, as a result, certain perpetual
rights arise in the artist that can affect future treatment of the
work.619 These so-called “moral” rights are often thought to be
non-transferable because they are inherent in, and arise solely
from, the unique relationship between the artist and the creation.620
Moral rights, however, generally can be waived by the artist, and
619

Id. Nimmer notes, as many English-speaking legal scholars have, that English
terminology for various legal concepts found in le droit moral is both off-putting and
unfortunate. Id. The author agrees with this observation and believes that this translation
problem is especially acute for U.S. citizens who, on the one hand, are still widely
influenced by their Puritanical heritage, yet, on the other hand, are equally devoted to
personal freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment and the developing law of
personal privacy. Might the U.S.’s general lack of understanding of or interest in the
European moral rights tradition—and resistance to incorporating moral rights into our
jurisprudence—stem in part from the somewhat offensive and overly intimate
connotations conveyed by the English-language terms for core concepts in this area of
law? The French “droit morale,” “personnalité,” “traitement dérogatoire,” and “droit de
divulgation” are often directly translated into English as “moral rights,” “personality,”
“derogatory treatment,” and “right to divulge,” respectively. See DENIS GIRARD, THE NEW
CASSELL’S FRENCH DICTIONARY 254, 265, 270–71, 496, 556, 729 (1982). These words,
at least in the U.S. cultural context, are enthymemes carrying strong underlying
connotations. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[A]. It is not at all clear
that the English terms accurately convey their French (European) conceptual
counterparts, and it seems likely that they imply pejorative or negative connotations that
are in fact not present in the original terms. See S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986 § 8.112 (1987).
Non-native readers may be confused further by the various French terms used by
French legal scholars to describe concepts that in U.S. law have only one meaning and a
single nomenclature. For example, current U.S. copyright law uses the term “works of
authorship.” By comparison, French legal writer Henri Desbois uses the term oeuvres de
l’esprit (“works of the spirit”) to describe what are apparently works of authorship when
he discusses the dual system of French copyright law. See HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT
D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE (2d ed. 1978). In that system, intellectual and moral rights (droit
intellectuelle et moral) take legal precedence over their associated economic rights of
copyright (droits d’auteur). Id. By contrast, another French legal scholar, A.
Chambellan, uses the term “works of the intellect” to refer, apparently, to these same
works in her English-language summary of French copyright law. See generally
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EUROPE (George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed., 1995).
In the TKGRF context, because of the spiritual or sacred element present in much
indigenous creative material, these subtle linguistic and conceptual distinctions could
become exceedingly important when assessing whether particular types of Western law
may be suitable for protecting specific TKGRF.
620
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[B] (citing GAVIN, LE DROIT
MORAL DE L’AUTEUR § 255 (1960)). Many national laws prohibit the transfer of moral
rights. See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.104.
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thus extinguished permanently, when the work is sold or otherwise
transferred to a third party.621 In contrast to the United States,
moral rights protections in the civil law tradition are usually widely
available to the creator of any artistic, literary, or musical work.622
Moral rights originated in France in the 19th century, and they
still remain stronger there than in any other country.623 But moral
rights have since been incorporated into the legal regimes of many
other European countries, including Germany, where they are
known as das Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht (“the authorpersonality right”),624 and Italy, where they are known as il diritto
d’autore (“the right of the author.”).625 Moral rights are wellestablished in the law of many developing countries, particularly
those that were colonized by France or Belgium and that have
continued Napoleonic Code and other French legal traditions,
including, for example, Senegal, the Congos, Benin, the Central
African Republic, Cameroon, and Gabon.626 Moral rights have
also long been recognized in Mexico and throughout much of
Central and Latin America.627 The trend among common law
countries now is to recognize these rights, at least to some degree,
and the United States, Australia, and Great Britain have all passed
protective legislation in this area since 1990.628 The Berne

621

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[B] (stating that nothing in the
Berne Convention requires unwaivability).
622
See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.92. For a discussion on U.S. moral rights law,
see infra Part IV.B.2.
623
See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.93–.94.
624
Colleen P. Battle, Note, Righting the ‘Tilted Scale:’ Expansion of Artists’ Rights in
the United States, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 441, 446 (1985/86).
625
See RICKETSON, supra note 619, at § 8.94–.101; see also Italian Copyright Act, arts.
20–24, available at http://www.certh.gr/cordis/t_en/p/it/p_r51_en.asp-adtid=1010.htm
(last visited Sept. 23, 2004).
626
See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.104 n.510.
627
Cf. Report on the Review of Existing Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional
Knowledge, at 2–5, WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & Genetic
Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/7) (Nov. 5, 2002)
[hereinafter Existing IP Protection Report], http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_4_7.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
628
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.06[D].
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Convention’s international copyright regime has also long required
recognition and protection of moral rights.629
Legal and philosophical treatment of works of authorship can
vary widely between the United States and Europe, in part because
of the moral rights tradition. U.S. copyright law encourages
viewing a picture or book, at least from a legal standpoint, quite
superficially—merely as tangible property to be commoditized.630
The European moral rights tradition, on the other hand, facilitates
the understanding of these same creative works as possessing not
only the superficial characteristics of commodities, but also as
embodying something more, i.e., an intangible part of the creator
himself631—analogous, perhaps, to that “something” that
differentiates a living organism from a dead object.
This distinction becomes crucial in the TKGRF context. Some
forms of TKGRF may be viewed by tribal owners as partially
embodying the identity of the tribe itself, a notion analogous to
moral rights concepts.632 TKGRF owners may also be particularly
concerned with attribution of origin and unauthorized alteration,
concerns for which established moral rights law concepts (further
discussed below) may provide appropriate protections.633
In addition, often the legal thinkers and policymakers at WIPO
discussions who seem most open to broad TKGRF protections tend
to come from civil law countries in which the moral rights tradition
has long been accepted; the underlying philosophical similarities in
thinking may account in part for this pattern of easier
acceptance.634 This could also partially explain why the United
629
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9,
1886, revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available
at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo001en.htm.
630
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 1.03[A].
631
See RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.93.
632
Cf. id. (discussing the moral rights ideology that a work embodies a part of its
creator).
633
See infra note 743–44 and accompanying text.
634
In all fairness, however, there are notable exceptions. Australia and New Zealand,
both common law countries, have been pioneers in innovative exploration of legal
protections for TKGRF, though not in the moral rights area per se. See Paul Kuruk,
Protecting Folklore under Modern Intellectual Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the
Tensions between Individual and Communal Rights in Africa and the United States, 48
AM. U. L. REV. 769, 846 n.549 (1999). Presumably, these countries have been greatly
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States’ position on TKGRF is so noticeably at odds with that of so
many other countries. Those delegates who have long been
comfortable with droit moral in the copyright context may find it
easier than U.S. delegates to intuit and accept analogous concepts
for TKGRF protection. Longstanding familiarity with moral rights
may indirectly predispose non-United States delegates toward
accepting other proposed TKGRF protections, such as source
attribution in patent applications or nonderogation and right of
withdrawal of sacred material in copyright laws.
Historical U.S. antipathy towards moral rights law may also
negatively influence U.S. views regarding TKGRF protection.
Apart from not having a moral rights tradition, the United States
vociferously resisted incorporating these rights into domestic
copyright law for an entire century, and long refused Berne
Convention membership for this reason.635
In the late 1970s, however, individual U.S. states, beginning
with California, began enacting their own moral rights
legislation.636 While most of these laws are noticeably more
restrictive than many foreign moral rights laws, this state-based
activity was extremely important, because it represented the first
formal incursion of moral rights into U.S. jurisprudence.637 Now, a
resurgence of state legislative activity could provide an effective
route for expanding moral rights in the TKGRF context, and it
could facilitate the spread of other TKGRF protective legislation
relating to state trade secret, unfair competition, and contract laws.

motivated by their well-defined and vocal indigenous communities, in comparison to
Great Britain, another common law country lacking a moral rights tradition, which lacks
identifiable indigenous communities. The U.S., without a moral rights tradition but
possessing easily identifiable indigenous communities, cannot be considered a similar
pioneer.
635
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
636
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987, 989 (West 1979 & Supp. 1996) (California’s current
moral rights statutes).
637
Fourteen states now have moral rights legislation. See infra note 681, and
accompanying text.
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2. Development of U.S. Domestic Moral Rights Law
To understand the protections that expanded moral rights could
provide indigenous TKGRF holders, it is useful to look at the
historical development of moral rights in the United States.
Moral rights law was incorporated into the U.S. system in 1988
for reasons similar to those leading to the creation of the Database
for Native American Tribal Insignia, i.e., legislators made this
specific concession in exchange for gaining access to broader
international treaty benefits.638 By the late 1980s, the U.S.
recognized that the advantages of harmonizing U.S. domestic law
with prevailing global standards outweighed the minor
inconveniences of international copyright treaty compliance,
including in moral rights.639 Even then, however, the United States
initially took the position that its domestic copyright law,
substantially revamped in 1976 but still lacking any federal
acknowledgement of moral rights, was sufficient to meet its Berne
Convention obligations to protect moral rights.640 This argument
was supported by the state legislative activity during the prior
decade concerning artists’ moral rights.641
Only two years later, however (and perhaps unsurprisingly in
light of subsequent widespread international criticism and
Congress’ own recognition of the inadequacy of domestic moral
rights law),642 the national legislature enacted the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).643 VARA formally created federal
moral rights for the first time in U.S. history.
VARA recognizes moral rights only for a narrow range of
visual artists, however, and even those rights are limited to strictly
circumscribed rights of integrity and attribution.644 The federal
law establishes conditions under which state moral rights laws are

638

See generally H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
See generally id.
640
Id. at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917.
641
Id. at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6918.
642
Id.
643
Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 102, 106A, 107, and 601 (2004)).
644
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2004).
639
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preempted,645 but the extent and nature of that preemption is by no
means clear, even today. It is clear, though, that federal
recognition of moral rights in the United States is still extremely
limited646 and would have to be expanded considerably to provide
meaningful protection in the TKGRF context. Nearly fifteen years
later, VARA has been neither widely used nor extensively tested in
the courts, undoubtedly because, not unlike indigenous groups,
many artists do not possess the considerable financial resources
required to litigate and enforce legal protection of their work.647
Nor are artists likely to incorporate effective moral rights
protection in private contracts, since many lack the means to hire
counsel during negotiation and drafting.648
Like VARA, the Berne Convention protects rights of integrity
and of attribution.649 In the classic French droit moral, however,
numerous other protections exist, and moral rights consist of a
broad bundle of inalienable and perpetual rights belonging to the
author of a creative work.650 The protected work can be within any
of the creative realms normally falling within copyright law,
whether literary, pictorial/graphical, or musical.651 The main rights
comprising classic droit moral are: 1) the right of attribution,652 2)
the right to prevent others from making deforming changes in the

645

17 U.S.C. § 301(f ) (2004).
Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Moral Right and Moral Righteousness, 1 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 65, 66 (1997).
647
See generally Maralee Buttery, Blanket Licensing: A Proposal for the Protection and
Encouragement of Artistic Endeavor, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1245 (1983).
648
In light of artists’ often limited financial means, an increasing number of states have
established volunteer organizations that provide pro bono legal and accounting services
for artists. See, e.g., Texas Accountants and Lawyers for the Arts, at
http://www.talarts.org/abouttala.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004); Washington Area
Lawyers for the Arts, at http://www.thewala.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
649
See Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 6bis.
650
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.02[D][1].
651
See id. § 8D.02[A].
652
Le droit au respect du nom (“right to respect of the name”) or droit à la paternité
(“right to paternity”). Nimmer explains that he uses “attribution” in place of “paternity”
to avoid linguistic gender bias. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.01[A] n.8.
This is another example of the importation of American cultural and social mores into
foreign legal terminology, whereas the original terminology may not convey such gender
bias to a French audience.
646
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work,653 3) the right to publish the work or to withhold it from
publication,654 4) the right to withdraw a published work from
distribution if it no longer represents the views of the author,655 and
5) the right to resale royalties from the work.656
The French right of attribution consists of various components,
including the right to be known as the author of the work, the right
to prevent attribution to the author of any work that is not his, and
the right to prevent others from being named author(s) of his
work.657 It includes the author’s right to publish the work
anonymously or pseudonymously, as well as his right to change his
mind later and use his own name.658 A particularly important
aspect of the French right of attribution is the author’s right to
prevent others from using his work or name in a way that reflects
adversely on his professional standing.659
By contrast, as mentioned above, the Berne Convention
recognizes only two moral rights: attribution and integrity.660 An
author has the right to claim his authorship, and he has the right to
object to any distortion, mutilation, modification of, or derogatory
action relating to his work when it is prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.661 Like the French droit moral, but in contrast to
VARA, the Berne Convention protects the integrity of the work as
long as it exists, but it does not prevent outright destruction of the
work.662 Integrity and attribution constitute the minimum agreed
international moral rights standard under the Berne Convention,
although national laws can provide for greater protection.663

653

droit au respect de l’oeuvre—“right to respect for the work.”
droit de divulgation—“right to divulge.”
655
droit de retrait—“right of retraction” or droit de repentir—“right to repent.”
656
droit de suite—“right of following” or, more colloquially, “right of follow-up.”
657
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610, § 8D.06[B][1].
658
Id.
659
Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in
United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 24 n.122
(1994).
660
Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 6bis(1).
661
Id.
662
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2004); Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 6bis(1).
663
Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 19.
654
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Redress for violation of the treaty’s moral rights provisions664 is
left to national legislation.665
Under VARA, an author of a qualifying work of visual art is
entitled to rights of attribution and integrity666 similar to those
provided by the Berne Convention, and he or she may prevent any
distortion, mutilation, or modification that would be prejudicial to
his or her honor or reputation.667 “Right of integrity” under VARA
means the right of an artist to prevent the mutilation, distortion or
destruction of his creation without his consent.668 “Right of
attribution” means the right of an artist to have his name properly
and publicly associated with his creation,669 including the right to
prevent such attribution if his creation has been so mutilated or
distorted by someone else that attribution to him would somehow
damage or reflect negatively on his reputation or honor.670 If the
work is of recognized stature, the artist may be able to recover
damages for willful or grossly negligent destruction of the work,
subject to certain limitations for destruction of works that are
incorporated into buildings.671
As mentioned above, moral rights in the civil law tradition
usually apply to works of authorship of all types normally
regulated by copyright law, and this is also true under the Berne
Convention.672 Under VARA, however, moral rights apply only to
authors of specified works of visual art.673 A “work of visual art”
is restrictively defined under VARA, and is limited to paintings,
drawings, prints, sculpture, and still photographic images produced
for exhibition purposes only, any of which may exist as a single
copy or in a limited edition of 200 or fewer copies that are signed

664

Id. art. 6bis(3).
Id. art. 36.
666
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).
667
Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
668
Id. § 106A(a).
669
Id.
670
Id.
671
Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
672
Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 2(1).
673
17 U.S.C. § 106A(b). This limitation appears to conflict with the Berne Convention
and, if so, arguably brings the United States out of treaty compliance in this respect.
665
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and consecutively numbered by the author.674 The VARA
definition specifically excludes works made for hire, unfixed
works, and a long list of other creative works, including
audiovisual works, motion pictures, electronic publications,
applied art, and merchandising or promotional material.675
Moral rights under VARA may be waived in writing, but they
may not be transferred.676 This is also generally thought to be the
case under the Berne Convention.677 This transfer limitation is
consistent with the civil law tradition, as explained earlier: the
rights exist only as a function of the artist’s “personality” extends
into his creation, and that personality cannot be owned by anyone
other than the creating artist.678
VARA rights endure in most cases only during the life of the
artist, but for any work of visual art which was created before June
1, 1991, and for which title has not been transferred away from the
artist, moral rights duration under VARA is the same as other U.S.
copyright rights (usually measured at present by the life of the
author plus seventy years).679 Under the Berne Convention, by
contrast, moral rights endure for the same length of time as the
author’s economic rights in the work, subject to national legislation
of member states, which may provide that moral rights cease to
exist upon the death of the author.680
Statutory moral rights protection for artists are provided by a
number of states, including California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
674

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
Id.
676
Id. § 106A(e).
677
See Berne Convention, supra note 630, art. 6bis(1) (“Independently of the author’s
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”). But see RICKETSON, supra note 619, § 8.104
(Moral rights are inalienable under many national laws; however, there is nothing in the
Berne Convention “which prohibits national laws from allowing authors to assign their
moral rights either temporarily or permanently.”).
678
See supra note 619 and accompanying text.
679
17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
680
Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 6bis(2).
675
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and Utah.681 Many of these laws were originally passed prior to
enactment of VARA.682 Nearly all of the state moral rights laws
extend protection only to visual artists or creators of works of fine
art, but a few, such as Massachusetts and New Mexico, extend
protection to other creative works containing a visual
component.683 Several states extend protection to craft items as
well as more traditional “fine art.”684 A particularly crucial
difference between VARA and some state moral rights laws is that
the latter provide protection not only to original visual art and
limited editions, but also to reproductions.685 This expands moral
rights coverage well beyond VARA’s limits, especially in states
where the definition of fine art may include works in digital
media.686
Moral rights legislation in most states follows one of two main
models, either that of the California Art Preservation Act
(“CAPA”)687 or that of the New York Artists Authorship Rights
Act (“NYAARA”).688 While both models have certain elements in
common, the CAPA model contains a public interest element689
that distinguishes it from the New York model, as well as from
VARA and the Berne Convention. In addition to granting moral
rights to artists themselves, CAPA also grants independent
standing to California arts organizations to pursue injunctions to
preserve or restore the integrity of works of fine art, so long as
681
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987–89 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 42–116t (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 320/0.01 (West
1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2151–56 (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §
303 (1985 & Supp. 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S (West 1989 & Supp. 1996);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 597.720–.760 (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A (West
1987 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (Michie 2002); N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1996); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 §
2101 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-22-16
(Michie 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-6-409 (1996).
682
See supra notes 679–81 and accompanying text.
683
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2.
684
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2.
685
See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153;
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 597.740.
686
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S.
687
CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp.1996).
688
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03.
689
CAL. CIV. CODE § 989 (West 1982).
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such works are of recognized quality and substantial public
interest.690 “Substantial public interest” is determined by the trier
of fact, as is a determination of “recognized quality.”691 CAPA
extends moral rights protection for the life of the author plus fifty
years,692 and statutory liability attaches to anyone (other than an
artist in possession of his own work or a framer, conservator, or
restorer not grossly negligent) who intentionally commits or
authorizes any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or
destruction of a work of fine art.693
California’s moral rights law is also quite unusual in that it
contains a provision granting artists the right to resale royalties694
in the classic French droit de suite tradition. By comparison, the
Berne Convention recognizes this right in Article 14ter, but only to
the extent permitted by national legislation.695 There is no U.S.
federal recognition of this right.696 Only one other state, South
Dakota, has enacted resale royalties legislation, but its law is very
narrowly circumscribed, applying only to resale of state-owned
works of art that do not constitute part of a sale of the building in
which they are located.697
In contrast to CAPA, NYAARA does not contain any formal
recognition of a public interest in art, separate from the artist’s own
moral rights.698 The grant of moral rights under NYAARA
extends to “fine art or limited edition multiple[s] of not more than
three hundred copies,” as well as to reproductions thereof.699 “Fine
art” means paintings, sculpture, drawings, works of graphic art,
and non-multiple prints.700 This statute contrasts with the federal
690

See id.
Id. § 989(d).
692
See id. § 987(g)(1).
693
See id. § 987(c).
694
See id. § 986(a).
695
Berne Convention, supra note 629, art. 14ter(2).
696
Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations: A Property-Law Framework
for the Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights, 69 TUL. L. REV. 935, 949 (1995) (stating that
while courts have refused to recognize moral rights directly, they have used existing legal
doctrines to extend moral rights protection indirectly).
697
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-22-16(5) (Michie 1992).
698
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1996).
699
Id. § 14.03.1.
700
Id. § 11.01(9).
691
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system, which does not protect moral rights for reproductions and
protects limited editions only to the first 200 copies.701 NYAARA
does not require a protected work to be of recognized quality or
stature.702 Liability under NYAARA attaches to anyone, other
than the artist or someone acting with his consent, who, in New
York, knowingly displays in public or publishes “a work of fine art
or limited edition . . . or a reproduction thereof in an altered,
defaced, mutilated or modified form [representing to be, or]
reasonably [likely to] be regarded as being[,] the work of the artist,
and damage to the artist’s reputation is reasonably likely to
result . . . .”703 This means that public display or publication and
likelihood of damage to reputation are both elements that must be
proven before liability attaches under NYAARA.704 The statute
does not specify the duration of moral rights, but it refers to
assertion of the rights by the artist himself,705 so presumably
NYAARA is similar to VARA in that rights exist only during the
artist’s lifetime.706
The moral rights laws of certain other states differ in important
ways from VARA, the two main state models, and the French and
international moral rights regimes.
One such law is the
Massachusetts Art Preservation Act (“MAPA”).707 This law
contains a legislative finding that physical alteration or destruction
of fine art is detrimental to the artist’s reputation and that there is a
public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic
creations.708 MAPA, on which New Mexico’s law was later

701

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01(9), 14.03(1). New York has one of the
largest Native American populations in the United States. See 2000 Census, American
Indian
and
Alaskan
Native
Tribes
in
the
United
States,
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t18/tab047.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2005);
2000 Census, American Indian and Alaskan Native Tribes in New York State,
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t18/tab001.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2005).
703
See id. §§ 14.03.1, 14.03.3(e).
704
See id.
705
See id. § 14.03.1.
706
17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2004).
707
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
708
Id.
702
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modeled,709 contains the broadest definition of protected works of
fine art in any of the state laws and is much broader than VARA’s
definition. “Fine art” under MAPA means “any original work of
visual or graphic art [in] any media[, including] but not limited to,
any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft object, photograph,
audio or video tape, film, hologram, or any combination thereof,
[so long as it is] of recognized quality.”710 Under MAPA, not only
the artist, but any union or artists’ organization authorized by him
in writing has standing to bring suit to protect these rights on his
behalf.711 Moral rights in Massachusetts endure for the life of the
artist plus fifty years.712
Louisiana’s moral rights law also contains unique protections
not found in other domestic or foreign moral rights laws. It
specifically extends moral rights protection to all statutorily
defined works of fine art, regardless of their date of creation.713
Liability attaches not only in cases of display or publication within
Louisiana of altered works of fine art, but also to “acts in violation
of this [law] by a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of
[Louisiana].”714 Thus, a public display of a mutilated work in
another state by a Louisiana resident might be actionable within
Louisiana. A Louisiana corporation displaying distorted work on
the Internet via a server located outside the state might also be
subject to liability in Louisiana.
3. Federal Preemption of State Moral Rights Laws
To determine whether expanded domestic moral rights laws
might better protect indigenous TKGRF, it is necessary to examine
whether VARA preempts state moral rights laws and, if so, to what
709

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (Michie 2002). New Mexico’s law is nearly
identical in much of its wording to MAPA, but it applies only to “fine art in public view.”
Id. § 13-4B-3(A). “Public view” means “on the exterior of a public building or in an
interior area of a public building.” Id. § 13-4B-2(E). The status of New Mexico’s moral
rights protections is critical from a TKGRF standpoint because so many Native
Americans live in that state.
710
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S(b).
711
Id. § 85S(g).
712
Id.
713
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2155(G) (West 2004).
714
Id. § 51-2155(E).
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extent. If VARA totally preempted earlier state moral rights laws,
then attempts to expand them further would obviously be a useless
strategy for protecting TKGRF. If, on the other hand, VARA has
not preempted or has only partially preempted state moral rights
laws, state legislatures would have the potential to improve
indigenous TKGRF protection. State law expansion would obviate
the need to confront powerful entertainment lobbies opposed to
federal moral rights or to win over federal policymakers who may
be unsympathetic to greater TKGRF protection.
The Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”) provides for general
federal preemption of state copyright laws.715 This general
preemption scheme provides that, on or after January 1, 1978, the
1976 Act governs all legal and equitable rights equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope and subject matter of
copyright in works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium (“§
106 rights”), regardless of creation date and regardless of whether
such works are published.716 Certain exceptions to the general
preemption scheme exist: most importantly, it does not apply to
subject matter outside the scope of the 1976 Act or to state or
common law rights not equivalent to § 106 rights.717 For example,
state law causes of action for misappropriation, trade secret,
trademark and trade dress violations, unfair competition, and rights
of publicity or privacy are not subject to general preemption.718
In 1990, with the passage of VARA, Congress added a new
preemption provision pertaining solely to works of visual art.719 It
provides that, as of June 1, 1991, “all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent [to those] conferred by § 106A [of the 1976 Act]
with respect to works of visual art . . . are governed exclusively by
[the relevant provisions of the 1976 Act (as amended by

715

17 U.S.C. § 301 (2004).
Id. § 301(a). This type of preemption is referred to in this paper as “general
preemption,” that is, federal preemption of state copyright law on grounds other than
VARA/moral rights grounds. Preemption on VARA/moral rights grounds under § 301(f)
is discussed infra, notes 719–41 and accompanying text, and referred to in this paper as
“VARA-type preemption.”
717
17 U.S.C. § 301(b).
718
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931.
719
17 U.S.C. § 301(f).
716
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VARA)] . . . .”720 The statute also specifies that common law and
state statutes are not preempted by federal copyright law to the
extent that: 1) they cover causes of action commencing before June
1, 1991; 2) they confer “rights that are not equivalent to any of the
rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual
art”; or 3) they concern violations of rights extending beyond the
life of the author.721 Put another way, it appears from reading the
moral rights preemption provision in § 301(f)—or “VARA-type
preemption”—that Congress intended state moral rights statutes to
apply where: (1) title in a protected work was transferred from the
artist to another party before the effective date of VARA, (2) state
law grants rights different from those provided by VARA, (3) state
law protects copyrightable works not covered by the VARA
definition of works of visual art, and (4) state law allows legal
actions for events occurring after the artist’s death.722
General preemption under § 301(a) and (b) applies to § 106
rights, whereas VARA-type preemption under § 301(f) applies to §
106A rights (moral rights).723 It is important to make the
distinction between general preemption and VARA-type
preemption, because voluminous case law exists to explain general
preemption,724 whereas there is next to none dealing directly with
VARA-type preemption. Just as § 106 rights fundamentally differ
from moral rights under § 106A, the applicable preemption rules
also differ.
Unfortunately, confusion on this issue is not uncommon among
courts and commentators alike, with the result that the question of
U.S. moral rights law preemption has become needlessly

720

Id. § 301(f)(1).
Id. § 301(f)(2).
722
Patrick Flynn, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Visual Artists
Rights Act, 138 A.L.R. FED. 239, 248 (1997). See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), at 21,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931.
723
See supra notes 719–22 and accompanying text.
724
See, e.g., Foley v. Luster, 249 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2001); Fischer v. Viacom Int’l
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 535 (D.Md. 2000); Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 676 F.2d
494 (11th Cir. 1982).
721
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blurred.725 Courts and legal scholars have extensively examined
the legislative history in trying to determine the scope and
application of VARA-type preemption, but little of binding
precedential value has actually been decided.726
A discussion of VARA-type preemption under § 301(f) can be
found in House Report No. 101-514 (1990).727 It specifies that
federal preemption will occur for works of visual art when a state
grants legal or equitable rights equivalent to those embodied in
§106A.728 But federal law does not preempt state causes of action
relating to works not covered by VARA, including, specifically,
audiovisual works, photographs produced for non-exhibition
purposes, and works in which the copyright has been transferred
before the effective date of VARA.729 Also, state artists’ rights
laws that grant rights not equivalent to those under VARA are not
preempted even when relating to works covered by VARA.730 The
Report gives some specific examples of situations where VARAtype preemption is not intended to occur, such as a cause of action
for misattribution of a reproduction of a work of visual art or
violation of a state-granted right to a resale royalty.731 It also
clearly states that “the Copyright Act prior to [VARA] does not
preempt state law misappropriation, unfair competition, breach of
contract, and deceptive trade practices claims, and they will not be
preempted [after passage of VARA].”732 Interestingly, though, the
Report also says that state laws granting rights of attribution or
integrity for works falling within the VARA definition of works of
visual art will be preempted by federal law, even if the State
ground is broader than that afforded under VARA.733

725

Joseph Zuber, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990—What it Does and What it
Preempts, 23 PAC. L.J. 445, 508 (1992).
726
See generally Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (1994); Zuber, supra note
725.
727
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6931.
728
Id.
729
Id.
730
Id.
731
Id.
732
Id.
733
Id. (emphasis added).
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While some courts and legal scholars in the years since passage
of VARA have speculated that the federal law may substantially
preempt state moral rights laws, Congress’s determination that
state moral rights laws constituted an important basis by which
U.S. domestic law met Berne Convention requirements734 seems to
contradict the argument that the legislative branch intended VARA
to fully preempt, and thus severely limit or even destroy, the only
other existing area of domestic moral rights law.735 Nor does this
seem logical when protection given to artists under VARA is in
some ways narrower than that available under precursor state laws
at the time of Berne Convention accession.736 Yet this seems to be
precisely what the few courts that have tangentially considered the
issue have assumed,737 as well as some legal scholars.738
In contrast, interpreting the VARA preemption provisions and
the legislative history together to mean that Congress intended
federal law to preempt state moral rights laws only to the limited
extent those state laws directly conflict with VARA, allows for
Congress to have acted consistently with its public position in 1988
and also to have legislated in a proactive and forward-thinking way
in 1990.739 This interpretation would cohere with the pre-VARA
Congressional testimony of Ralph Oman, then Register of
Copyrights.740 Concerning the potential preemptive effect of
VARA on state moral rights laws, he said: “If a state decides to
grant greater protection [than VARA], it would not be preempted
734

See id.
This assertion is the authors, however it is also made by Greg Vetter. See Greg R.
Vetter, The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563,
658 (2004).
736
JOHN MERRYMAN & ALBERT ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 257–80 (4th
ed. 1998).
737
See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 136 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (Ct. App. 2d 1996).
738
See, e.g., Zuber, supra note 725, 492–502; NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON
COPYRIGHT § 1.07[1] (2d ed. 2000).
739
See Jane C. Ginsberg, Second Frankfurt-Columbia Symposium on Comparative Law,
Harmonization of Laws in Federal Systems: A Comparative Perspective, 2 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 463, 472 (1996).
740
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and Copyright Office Report on Copyright
Liability of States: Hearings on H.R. 1131 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop.,
& the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989)
(testimony of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
735
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by this act. H.R. 131690 provides only a minimum threshold of
protection and permits States to enact more expansive
protection.”741 Of course, this is only the opinion of one individual
who, while influential, was not a legislator. It seems unlikely,
however, that Congress would have intentionally acted in a manner
diametrically opposed to the views of an expert of Mr. Oman’s
stature, particularly in a field as arcane (at that time) as copyright
and moral rights law.
4. Expansion of Moral Rights Laws for TKGRF Protection
From the TKGRF perspective, it would be helpful for states to
pass moral rights legislation providing broad coverage to creative
works of all types. Extending state law moral rights protections to
as much TKGRF material as possible, particularly such items as
indigenous-made jewelry, weavings, pottery, kachina and Eskimo
dolls, Native dance and dress paraphernalia, etc., would be a
valuable addition to present legal protection for TKGRF.
Enactment of broad state laws allowing creator rights to resale
royalties would also be an obvious way to increase indigenous
creators’ returns from sharing and use of their TKGRF with third
parties.
Since state laws that allow moral rights protection for terms
extending beyond the life of the artist may survive a federal
preemption challenge, state laws should be drafted to extend
protection terms beyond the life of the artist for specific types of
TKGRF. Legislating in favor of an independent public interest
element, similar to that in CAPA,742 might also present an avenue
for avoiding preemption and for providing creative protection of
qualifying indigenous works for an indefinite term, either on a
case-by-case basis or as identifiable bodies of work. Enjoining
741

Id. HR 131690 was the draft version of VARA under consideration at the time of this
testimony.
742
Brian T. McCartney, Creepings and Glimmers of the Moral Rights of Artists in
American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35 (1998) (“CAPA was enacted with
two goals in mind. First, ‘to uphold the artist’s reputation, since fine art is ‘an expression
of the artist’s personality,’ thereby triggering the artist’s interest in protecting the work;
and [second] to promote the ‘public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and
artistic creations.’”).
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further use of tribal designs or motifs by nonmembers of a tribe
without tribal permission, for example, might be one interpretation
of “preserving or restoring the integrity” of existing tribal works.
Native Americans could, if funding and legal counsel obstacles
could be overcome, explore the use of existing moral rights laws to
protect their qualifying works of art. The right of integrity, in
particular, might be creatively used to prevent non-indigenous
people from describing derivative or copied works as “Indian”inspired743 or from using motifs or designs of one or more
identifiable tribes, unless the use of such foundational material is
accurately portrayed, properly attributed, and does not damage the
underlying indigenous artist’s reputation.744 Attempts to use the
right of attribution to prevent distorting, later uses of collectively
owned tribal work, however, would be difficult, since U.S. law
may view collectively owned material as part of the public
domain.745 But disseminated works based on tribal art that is
normally not shared outside tribal members might be successfully
argued to be mutilations or distortions damaging to the tribal
artist’s reputation, depending on the factual circumstances of
publication and customary legal limitations on access to the
material within the tribe. Particularly in California, the public
interest element of moral rights law might also be effectively used
to maintain the integrity of well-known tribal art.
In conjunction with expanded moral rights legislation, courts
should examine relevant customary law to determine analogous
practices within indigenous societies concerning ownership,
attribution, and integrity of artistic and other creative works.
While United States courts in the past generally have not taken
judicial notice of or inquired into Native American customary law,
743
For information on the conditions under which arts and crafts may be promoted or
labeled as “Indian,” see IACA, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662 (1990) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). As
discussed elsewhere in this paper, however, IACA approaches the issue from a consumer
protection or “truth-in-advertising” standpoint, rather than from a moral rights position.
See generally Part III.A.
744
David B. Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Domestic Intellectual Property Law
and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can it Fit?, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
93, 106 (2001).
745
Id.

KREMERS FORMAT

1/25/2005 6:10 PM

2004] U.S. I.P. PROTECTION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURES

127

Bulun Bulun746 and related cases should be recognized as relevant
examples of emerging trends in common law; counsel for
indigenous litigants should argue vigorously in favor of similar
judicial inquiry and notice by U.S. courts.
If more states were to enact broader moral rights legislation,
both policymakers and the creating public would also become
better educated about the nature of moral rights. At present, due in
part to lobbying pressure by big entertainment entities, VARA and
the moral rights provisions of the Berne Convention have been so
tightly circumscribed in the United States that they are rarely used
or litigated, and the U.S. public is nearly as unfamiliar with moral
rights now as it was in the early 1980s.747 Consequently, there is
little surprise that international talk of requiring source attribution
and prior informed consent in patent applications or withdrawal of
indigenous consent to use TKGRF—equitable concepts in a sense
very akin to the creator’s moral rights of attribution, integrity, and
divulgation, though unarticulated as such—is a mental and
intuitive stretch for U.S. lawyers, yet readily acceptable to many of
their international colleagues. Instead, in part because the United
States lacks a longstanding foundation in this area of intellectual
property law, United States policymakers sometimes fail to
comprehend the unique void that moral rights and moral rights-like
protections might fill, and they fail to grasp its potential value for
protecting some otherwise problematic types of TKGRF material.
With expanded use, more lawyers and legislators would develop an
understanding of moral rights, and dismissive attitudes toward this
law as unimportant or irrelevant to U.S. creators, or dangerous to
U.S. free speech and enterprise, might then dissipate.
Widespread perception outside the United States of the
benignity of the droit de derogation748 makes its inclusion in
planned protections for TKGRF much more palatable to the
international community than it is to U.S. lawyers and legislators.
746
Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles Pty. Ltd., 157 A.L.R. 193 (1998), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/federal%5fct/1998/1082.html?query=%5e+bulun (last updated Sept. 8, 1998) (involving the copyright entitlements of
an aboriginal people over the artwork of one of its members).
747
See generally NIMMER, supra note 610.
748
See Kuruk, supra note 634, at 830–31.
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This moral rights tradition, followed in many countries, allows a
creator the ability to prevent others from acting in “derogation” of
his work.749 It is often explained as a right to prevent others from
criticizing or taking derogatory action toward the work. This is
rightly a matter of serious concern and reservation for U.S.
policymakers, for whom free speech values are paramount. This
right could present serious First Amendment problems in some
scenarios. Other, well-established intellectual property law,
however, such as the Lanham Act §2, presents a similar challenge
and has long successfully coexisted, in a carefully circumscribed
way, with First Amendment freedoms. Use of the droit de
derogation as a potentially useful protection mechanism should not
be prematurely dismissed merely because it abuts First
Amendment protections.
Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in the
developing world, are victims of a mutual unfamiliarity with the
boundaries inherent in the First Amendment tradition on the one
hand, and the moral rights tradition on the other.750 All parties to
the TKGRF debate may lack a mutual appreciation of the deep
degree to which these traditions are entrenched in the respective
national legal and social psyches of the peoples involved. Greater
familiarity on both sides with the other’s legal traditions, including
customary law traditions, might facilitate finding adequate
international solutions to protect TKGRF much more rapidly and
more cohesively than at present.
U.S. legal scholars have a greater obligation to invest their time
and effort into developing this awareness than do their foreign
counterparts, if only because U.S. lawyers may be likely to know
less about foreign legal traditions than their overseas colleagues do
about U.S. law. But arguably, the United States also stands to
benefit most from including moral rights into its legal traditions. If
the moral rights tradition were ever fully brought into U.S.
jurisprudence, a uniquely U.S. strain of this law would
undoubtedly develop and become an important contribution to
legal thought. Domestic courts and legislators would undoubtedly
749
750

Id.
See generally Kuruk, supra note 634, at 825–27.
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harness their well-known U.S. ingenuity to find creative ways to
craft moral rights concepts in such a way that they could
successfully coexist with the free speech, fair use, and other vital
legal traditions that are unique to the U.S.
In this way, the United States could create a model for an U.S.based intellectual property law that is more consonant with
international norms, yet embodies some of the deepest principles
upon which an open and free society is built. This “blended”
intellectual property model might be more amenable than our
present regime to adoption and adaptation by other countries that
are presently in search of useful drafting models for TKGRF and
other intellectual property legislation. This usage would in turn
facilitate the spread of some of the U.S.’s cherished legal
principles among other nations.
For the immediate term, however, while expansion of domestic
U.S. moral rights laws should ideally occur on both the federal and
state levels, it would probably be easier to make headway among
state legislatures. Indigenous populations and their supporters
likely would have greater success lobbying for legislative changes
within their own state governments, given financial constraints and
the considerable time needed to educate legislators about the
meaning and importance of moral rights laws.
One of the main questions likely to be raised by state
legislators in this process is whether VARA preempts state moral
rights legislation. Because it is likely that federal law would not
preempt large tracts of state moral rights law,751 even as presently
written, state legislators might be persuaded to legislate in this area
as an avenue for TKGRF protection. This could be a useful step
toward successfully helping to protect indigenous TKGRF within
established regimes of intellectual property law.
C. Establish a Domestic Geographical Indications Regime for
TKGRF
In addition to changes in trademark and moral rights
protections, the United States should also establish a prospective
751

See supra note 645 and accompanying text.
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domestic geographical indications regime for TKGRF.752 Besides
offering a valuable addition to present intellectual property law
protections for TKGRF, this would have the useful side effect of
bringing the United States more clearly into compliance with its
present TRIPS obligations.753 Creating a new domestic channel for
TKGRF protection—in an area of law well-established in many
countries—might also relieve growing pressure for sui generis
laws that might entail greater legal uncertainty.
Geographical indications law, like moral rights law, is wellestablished in traditional European intellectual property law,754 but
has not, until TRIPS, existed in U.S. jurisprudence.755 Since the
signing of TRIPS in 1995, geographical indications law has gained
broad global acceptance and legal legitimacy.756
TRIPS
encourages expansion of geographical indications law for use as a
trade-enhancing mechanism.757 TRIPS not only contains specific
directives concerning the use and application of geographic
indicators, it also mandates that all member states negotiate with
each other to further develop this area of intellectual property
protection.758
According to the TRIPS definition, geographical indications
are “indications which identify a good as originating in the
territory of a Member [country], or a region or locality in that
territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic
of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”759
Thus, under TRIPS, a geographic indication is a source indicator
that is based both on geographic origin and on an additional
identifying characteristic linked to that particular geographic
752

A geographical indications regime is a framework for the protection and enforcement
of goods originating from a particular territory, region or locality. See generally TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 94, pt. II, § 3.
753
See Leigh Ann Lindquist, Champagne or Champagne? An Examination of U.S.
Failure to Comply with the Geographical Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, 27 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 330–32 (1999).
754
Id. at 312.
755
Id. at 314.
756
Id. at 315.
757
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, pt. II, § 3.
758
Id. pt. II, § 3, art. 24.1.
759
Id. pt. II, § 3, art. 22.1.
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origin.760 This is important when considering geographical
indications as a method of TKGRF protection because, like that of
most indigenous peoples, the Native American’s flora, fauna, and
other TKGRF characteristics are often inextricably tied to a
specific geographic location.
Geographical indications are not trademarks; though both are
source indicators, the protection these two types of intellectual
property offer is fundamentally different.761 As discussed earlier in
this paper, while certain special forms of trademarks can be
adapted to function in a way that can be similar to geographical
indications, trademarks exist mainly for the benefit of
consumers—to prevent consumer confusion as to the source—and
do not inherently require any qualifying link to a specific
Hence, though they may in some
geographic origin.762
circumstances appear similar, trademarks are not per se coextensive with geographical indications.
While a U.S. certification mark in a TKGRF-related situation
might closely approximate coverage given by a geographical
indication,763 the mark would be limited to recognition and
enforceability only in the United States, since there is no
international system of trademark registration.764
But an
international system of geographical indications might one day
become accessible for TKGRF, and creating a new international
geographical indications system of notice, registration, recognition,
and mutual national enforcement is currently being discussed at the
WTO.765 Since TKGRF owners can often be spread over several
760

Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312.
Id. at 311–12.
762
Id.
763
This would occur, for example, if the mark’s underlying standards were carefully
drafted to tie product certification with geographic location, indigenous producer group,
and traditional production method.
764
See generally WIPO, Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks (adopted June 27, 1989) [hereinafter Madrid
Protocol], http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/madrid_protocol.pdf.
765
WTO, News, Intellectual Property Council Debates Call to Expand Geographical
Indications Protections, Mar. 28, 2000, at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news00_e/trips_e.htm [hereinafter Call for GI Expansion]. The Madrid Protocol offers
an international registration application system similar to that for patents under the PCT,
but trademark applications filed under the Madrid Protocol still operate within a
761
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national borders, this might be more useful for TKGRF protection
than national trademark systems.
Prior to TRIPS, two main types of common source indications
were used to show geographical significance: 1) appellations of
origin and 2) indications of source.766 Like moral rights, these
types of intellectual property protection were first legally
recognized in France, beginning in the early 19th century.767
Gradually, both became formally recognized elsewhere in Europe,
and eventually they were protected by an international treaty,
beginning in 1883 with the Paris Convention768 and continuing in
subsequent treaties into the 20th century.769 These culminated
most recently in the geographical indications provisions of
TRIPS.770
While indications of source merely state where a product is
made, appellations of origin signify the geographical region in
which the product originates and the features of the product that
are directly attributable to natural and human factors specific to
that region.771 These features can include, for example, particular
climate and soil characteristics of a specific locality or a
traditional, region-specific method of manufacture.772 Examples
would be Roquefort cheese, Portuguese port, and French
Champagne.

somewhat harmonized system of national registrations and national substantive laws. See
generally id.
766
Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312.
767
Id.
768
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10, Mar. 20, 1883,
revised July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm.
769
Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on
Goods, arts. 1(1) , 4, Apr. 14, 1891, revised Oct. 31, 1958, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo032en.htm; Lisbon Agreement for the Protection
of Appellations of Origin and their International Registrations, Oct. 31, 1958, revised
July 14, 1967, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo012en.htm.
770
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94.
771
Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312.
772
Stacy D. Goldberg, Who Will Raise the White Flag? The Battle between the United
States and the European Union over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 22 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 108 (2001).
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Because of this required link between product characteristics
and identifiable geography, geographical indications could provide
legal coverage for some aspects of TKGRF not readily protected
by other types of intellectual property law. Moreover, the
collective ownership and limited term protection problems in
copyright and patent law do not exist with geographical indications
law, so this type of law would meet some of the criteria of TKGRF
owners.
Unfortunately, however, geographical indications law has
traditionally only been used in connection with food and
beverages, and this has also been the case under TRIPS until very
recently.773 TRIPS applies to “goods” only,774 but its geographical
indications provisions do not specify that they may be used solely
for comestibles, even though slightly elevated protection is
provided specifically for wines and spirits.775 Many developing
countries feel that this higher level of protection for wines and
spirits should apply to all agricultural goods.776 Even if this
change were implemented, TKGRF nevertheless includes a wide
spectrum of material that is neither agricultural in nature nor
“goods.”
Mexico has pioneered the expansion of the traditional notion of
geographical indications law for TKGRF protection.777 It recently
gave appellation of origin protection, under the name “Olinalá,” to
certain types of traditionally lacquered articles made of a particular
local wood and originating in the municipality of the same
name.778 Mexican legislators also considered using geographical
indications law to protect other unique ironwood carvings, dolls,
and other artifacts traditionally created by indigenous Seri
tribespeople.779 In both situations, before the new protective
773

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 94, pt. II, § 3, art. 22.60.
Id. art. 22.1.
775
Id. art. 23.
776
See Call for GI Expansion, supra note 765.
777
See Existing IP Protection Report, supra note 627, annex II, p. 2.
778
Id. annex II, p. 4.
779
Id. at 2. Trademark protection, rather than geographical indications, was the legal
protection vehicle ultimately chosen for the Seri creations, since protection was required
for a number of different types of products made by a variety of traditional manufacturing
methods. Id.
774
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legislation was passed, indigenous producers found themselves
facing increasingly stiffer competition from copies made by
mestizo craftspeople using cheaper mass production methods.780
The Mexico case is an example of creative thinking aimed at new
ways to protect TKGRF and the possibilities offered by
geographical indications law, and the United States should
carefully consider the same avenue of protection.
Many indigenous stakeholders have identified other
problematic areas of TKGRF for which geographical indications
law might be a useful protective tool. For example, because some
indigenous national dress is made according to traditional methods
and from distinctive local materials, such dress often incorporates
detailed and specific information about the geographic origin of
both the dress and its wearer. Geographical indications law might
provide a protective avenue for this kind of creative material.
Distinctive indigenous textiles and handicrafts incorporating
peculiarly local vegetable dyes, wool, or fibers obtainable only
from local plants or animals might be especially susceptible to this
type of protection.
One major obstacle standing in the way of harmonized global
development of geographical indications, whether for TKGRF
protection or for any other use, is the underlying philosophical
difference between the United States and the European Union in
this area of law.781 Unlike the European Union, the United States
disregards locality per se as a valid protective property right under
intellectual property law.782 Any indigenous group wishing to
expand geographical indications use for TKGRF protection can
expect to face obstacles from the United States, due to its general
opposition in the WTO to any expansion of geographical
indications law.783 While U.S. officials often explain that this

780

Id.
See generally Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312–14 (noting the different approaches
between European and U.S. vintners); see also Goldberg, supra note 772, at 107.
782
Goldberg, supra note 772, at 109.
783
Interestingly, the position of the U.S. Trade Representative on geographical
indications at the WTO is inconsistent with at least one current project of the U.S.
government. See infra text accompanying note 793.
781
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difference of opinion rests on legal grounds,784 the main reasons
may instead be economic and political.785
U.S. trademark law does not allow registration of geographic
terms as trademarks, because they are primarily descriptive and
thus not sufficiently distinctive.786 By contrast, Europe has long
allowed protection of certain products based solely on
geographical indications.787 The inherent difficulty with the U.S.
legal position is twofold: 1) geographical indications by their very
nature are fundamentally different from trademarks,788 and 2)
viable geographical indications convey very particularized
information about origin, which might be viewed as somewhat
analogous to the “distinctiveness” requirement of U.S. trademark
law.789
Continued U.S. government opposition to geographical
indications is particularly important to the U.S. wine industry.790
The government’s resistance to expansion of this area of law may
be the most difficult obstacle for TKGRF advocates to overcome.
European immigrants brought with them much of the original
grape stock used to produce U.S. wines today.791 Naturally, once
they had established vineyards in their new country, they labeled
their products with the same familiar regional names they had used
in Europe.792 Developing and marketing U.S.-produced wines and
spirits, and educating U.S. consumers to buy them, have been a
very costly investment for domestic vintners to date, and U.S.
growers are determined to protect this investment for as long as
possible.793
Provisions on geographical indications were
ultimately included in TRIPS, despite staunch U.S. opposition to
them, but the current treaty language is the result of a hard-fought

784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793

Goldberg, supra note 772, at 138.
Lindquist, supra note 753, at 343; Goldberg, supra note 772, at 149.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2004).
Lindquist, supra note 753, at 312.
See id. at 312–13.
Id.
Lindquist, supra note 753, at 313.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.; Goldberg, supra note 772.
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battle—one that continues today.794 Geographical indications
remained highly contested at the recent WTO ministerial summit
in Cancún, Mexico, and the dispute will probably remain unsettled
well into the future.795
Despite continuing U.S. opposition, geographical indications
have received an unprecedented level of global attention postTRIPS.796 As geographical indications law becomes more widely
familiar, it is likely to be increasingly used in many countries as a
vehicle for emerging TKGRF protection.797 Other than the
ramifications for U.S. trade protectionism in wine and spirits, there
appears to be no reason why a well thought out, strictly
prospective, geographical indications law system for TKGRF
could not also be implemented in the United States. Implementing
such a system for TKGRF would probably have the added benefit
of helping to alleviate current international doubts about the U.S.’s

794

Id.
See generally WTO, The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, at
http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_e.htm (last visited Nov.
17, 2004). Special interest groups in the U.S. have successfully entrenched their
opposition at home even after TRIPS was signed. As author Leigh Ann Lindquist notes,
Congress has now codified certain regulations of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms relating to wine and spirit labeling. This has had the effect of memorializing in
national law the semi-generic, and thus relatively unprotected, nature of some wine
names in the U.S. market. This Congressional response to successful lobbying by the
wine industry has made it considerably more difficult, both for the E.U. to have these
same names recognized as protected geographical indications, and for the U.S. Trade
Representative to utilize them in any meaningful way in the further negotiations on
geographical indications that are required of all members under TRIPS Article 24.
Lindquist, supra note 753, at 324–29.
796
See WTO, TRIPS Material on the WTO Website, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
797
U.S. opposition may eventually crumble, as more U.S. agencies become familiar
with the usefulness of this intellectual property law vehicle. For instance, in response to
a question I posed at a Washington, D.C. public discussion forum in the spring of 2003,
one high-ranking official from the United States Agency for International Development
confirmed the existence of ongoing U.S. assistance in Guatemala to develop, via
geographical indications law, improved marketing and protection of Guatemalan coffee.
The official admitted that this assistance seems inconsistent with the U.S. Trade
Representative’s position on geographical indications at the WTO, but was enthusiastic
about the apparent success of the Guatemalan program. See USAID, Global Coffee
Crisis, USAID’s Response to the Global Coffee Crisis, at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/coffee.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2004).
795
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good faith adherence to TRIPS.798 Additionally, it would provide
another vehicle for expanded TKGRF legal protection within
already-established intellectual property law regimes, consistent
with present U.S. policy objectives.
V. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, THE INTERNET, AND BEYOND: THE
BROADER RELEVANCE OF THE TKGRF DEBATE TO U.S.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT
Presently, many U.S. intellectual property practitioners do not
see broad relevance in the current TKGRF discussion, despite the
fact that it is receiving great attention and interest in many other
countries. However, understanding gained through study of
traditional knowledge systems may have applications far beyond
resolving the immediate intellectual property problems identified
thus far in the TKGRF controversy. And while relatively few
public conflicts have arisen in the U.S. to date, with growing
awareness of TKGRF legal issues among Native Americans, it is
only a matter of time until this occurs.
Equity and fairness require that the creative works, knowledge,
and genetic resources in the custodianship of indigenous societies
be protected to a degree at least equal to that given to more
familiar forms of intellectual property in industrialized societies.
Understanding how customary law manages TKGRF material
within traditional societies may give us novel ideas on how to
manage all intellectual property, including TKGRF, more
effectively in Western society. But careful examination of the
components of traditional knowledge and customary legal
management also offers us an avenue for understanding some of
the voids and limitations of Western intellectual property law, not
just with respect to TKGRF, but with respect to creative material
and dissemination methods not yet conceived. TKGRF study may
reveal those areas of intellectual property law that hold the most
promise for adaptation and application to future discoveries,
innovations, or creations totally unrelated to present-day TKGRF.
798
See Lindquist, supra note 753, at 337–38 (discussing this facet of the geographical
indications controversy).
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The study of customary law and TKGRF—and how to
interface these with Western intellectual property law—encourages
the exploration of legal concepts in an original way. The vast
majority of lawyers, judges, and legal thinkers today are schooled
almost exclusively in, or at least heavily influenced by, legal
systems that originated in Roman law and that have many common
characteristics.799 Most national legal systems, including that of
the U.S., have generally dismissed customary law as irrelevant to
modern society and jurisprudence.800 This dismissal has most
often occurred summarily, without any examination of customary
law precepts.801 Many Western thinkers have commonly held the
assumption that customary law has nothing to do with “their”
societies, so they do not need to know about it or consider what it
may have to offer.802
A few courts and national legislatures are beginning to suspect
that this is an erroneous view.803 Collaborative study of legal
systems not founded on Western principles of law may offer all
cultures new ways of thinking and fruitful jurisprudential crossfertilization.
This cannot happen however, succeed without far greater
participation by indigenous people in national and international
TKGRF dialogues. Leaders from indigenous societies, traditional
knowledge practitioners, and indigenous custodians of customary
law must all participate much more in these discussions. Only
members of indigenous societies can help Western scholars to
sense something of the true character, context, and appropriate
usage of TKGRF material. Absent this collaboration, fashioning
effective legal protections may be impossible.
Protective
mechanisms based solely on Western legal concepts are likely to
prove increasingly flawed when tested over time.
799

See Saarland Univ., Inst. of Law and Informatics, Questions and Answers on Roman
Law, at http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/Rechtsgeschichte/Ius.Romanum/RoemRFAQ-e.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
800
See Steven R. Ratner, International Law: the Trials of Global Norms, FOREIGN
POL’Y, Spring 1998, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/law/intllaw/2003/0624ratner.htm.
801
See id.
802
See id.
803
See, e.g., supra note 746 and accompanying text.
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Synergistic brainstorming among Western and indigenous legal
thinkers could be a fertile new source of legal ideas and structures
that could help solve other novel IP problems. In some
Information Age contexts, flexible definitions of “intellectual
property” may prove to be more useful than the traditional
categories we have developed up to now. This kind of conceptual
growth could, in turn, lead to better problem-solving in other
intellectual property areas, including biotechnology.
As just one example of this, the Internet community,
particularly in the open source movement, resembles many
indigenous societies, in that it originates from a foundational
structure based on principles of collective ownership and free
sharing of benefits among community members. One overarching
goal is to optimize the community structural framework for the
good of everyone.804 The Internet has retained these characteristics
in many respects, but it has now morphed into a more complex
organism.805 It consists increasingly of discrete layers: information
controllers and information users, all of whom possess, or wish to
possess, varying access and usage rights to the communal
content.806
Both of these structural stages are analogous in some respects
to traditional indigenous societies. Most traditional communities
exhibit similar characteristics and have developed effective ways
to control—yet share fully for the greater community—access to
and use of community knowledge and genetic resources, as well as
members’ individual contributions to associated tangible and
intangible creative works.807 Perhaps customary law and practice
could give us a better idea of how to regulate the Internet for the
good of the many, rather than, as is increasingly the case, the
corporate few.
Similarly, many indigenous societies have developed strictly
defined and carefully observed systems for use and development of
the genetic resources and the natural environment in which they
804

See id.
See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Internet: Law at a Lightning Pace, Pike &
Fischer Internet Law & Regulation, http://internetlaw.pf.com (last updated Sept. 2004).
806
Id.
807
See supra Part I.B.3.e.
805
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live.808 These systems must be effective, since indigenous people,
unlike majority populations, tend to live in a sustainable fashion in
the natural world (at least until indigenous communities are
intruded upon by outside influences).809 There is much to learn
from these communities, not just about the nature and use of
TKGRF itself, but about effective methods of legal management
and the jurisprudence associated with stewardship of this material
and of the natural environment.
The world is rapidly transforming across many sectors—
agriculture, industry, health, medical, and entertainment. The
potentially rich avenues that TKGRF and indigenous people may
offer concerning how to legislate and adjudicate symbiotically
across biological, informational, and intellectual property systems
must not be ignored.
Because the Western world has done little to protect
indigenous knowledge, while contributing much toward its
decimation,810 the ability to return to the “reference book” of
indigenous TKGRF, and to the biodiversity it sustains and
complements, is becoming increasingly difficult. This material
must be protected and nurtured, not just scientifically, but
jurisprudentially, or the cultures and natural habitat from which it
has evolved will rapidly and permanently disappear.811 With this
disappearance, a crucial part of the heritage of man and his
roadmap—not just for his evolution, but for his ultimate survival—
will be lost forever.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined a variety of legal steps that could be
taken to bring the United States new credibility and a position of
808

See, e.g., AUGUSTA MOLNAR ET AL., WHO CONSERVES THE WORLD’S FORESTS?
COMMUNITY-DRIVEN STRATEGIES TO PROTECT FORESTS AND RESPECT RIGHTS 3–10 (2004)
(describing community-driven conservation efforts of indigenous societies),
http://www.forest-trends.org/whoweare/new/move/Who%20Conserves%2011-4-04.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
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See, e.g., id.
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See Farley, supra note 42, at 11–12.
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respect in the TKGRF controversy, both at home and abroad. The
suggested steps are consistent with the stated U.S. policy goal of
protecting indigenous TKGRF within established intellectual
property law regimes.812 The proposed steps could also give rise to
new opportunities to export U.S. legal doctrine relating to
innovation and creativity, including freedom of speech and fair
use. In addition, the U.S. would reap the benefits of wider global
acknowledgment of the validity of intellectual property laws,
including TRIPS.
The first step that must be taken towards meaningful TKGRF
protection in the United States is widespread education about the
availability of present intellectual property laws for this purpose.
The recommendations for education contained in the USPTO
Report813 should be implemented for all U.S. citizens, including
Native Americans, without further delay. Few U.S. citizens are
familiar with the most basic concepts of patent, trademark, and
copyright law, and education would help bring the public greater
awareness of the proper and improper uses of all of these,
including indigenous TKGRF.
Indigenous education about
specialized trademarks, IACA, state-based certification programs,
and the USPTO database of Native American tribal insignia would
facilitate immediate, increased TKGRF protection.
But legislative changes are also needed for truly meaningful
protection of TKGRF to exist in the U.S. Useful TKGRF
protective activity can occur first in state legislatures. Grassroots
U.S. consciousness can be raised on TKGRF issues without having
to confront powerful national lobbying interests that have thus far
influenced federal policymakers away from instituting meaningful
TKGRF protection.814 State legislatures should begin now to
amend unfair competition and contract laws to require equitable
minimum standards for TKGRF-related projects. Legislators
should enact appropriate safeguards, requiring all contracts to
ensure prior informed consent of indigenous stakeholders, equal
access to neutral legal counsel, and benefit-sharing appropriate to
812

See generally supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
814
Jennifer Amiott, Investigating the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Protections
for Traditional Knowledge, 11 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 3, 7 (2003).
813
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the communities involved. States could become a present-day
incubator for future federal TKGRF legislation, just as they shaped
the moral rights landscape during the 1970s and 1980s for the
federal legislation of 1990.815
States lacking moral rights laws should promptly adopt them
for all authors of creative works, indigenous and non-indigenous.
To decrease likelihood of federal preemption, these laws should
protect the broadest possible spectrum of creative material, be
enforceable beyond the life of the artist (preferably along CAPA
public interest lines),816 and provide for author rights to resale
royalties.
More state legislatures should create publicly funded
certification systems, perhaps along the lines of the Alaska Silver
Hand Program,817 to facilitate handicraft and other indigenous
product protection.
As an alternative to state-administered
programs, local funding could be made available for privately-run
programs for infrastructure, marketing, and advertising efforts, or
to otherwise support tribal holders who want to obtain certification
and collective marks but lack the means to register and maintain
them.
Federal legislative changes are also needed for systematic,
long-term TKGRF protection. While the U.S. presently holds a
leadership role in current international TKGRF discussions, this
appears to be due to the U.S. preponderance in patenting, rather
than because of widespread international respect or perceived
legitimacy of the U.S. in the leadership position. There is distaste
for the U.S., in part because of the seeming arrogance of U.S.
representatives, but also because of the narrow commercial scope
of U.S. intellectual property law and perceived interests.818 Many
delegates to the IGC talks privately state that U.S. interests in
intellectual property, including TKGRF, are limited to corporate
815

See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra notes 690–93 and accompanying text.
817
See discussion supra Part III.B.
818
See Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 73, 110 (2003) (“U.S. copyright law differs in many of its features from the
copyright systems of European countries by de-emphasizing moral rights and
emphasizing exploitation of the commercial value of the created work.”).
816
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moneymaking and global political influence, untempered by any
deeper cultural, humanitarian, or historical concerns.819 Without
domestic legislative changes, growing American isolation in
international forums will probably force the U.S. to an
embarrassing retreat, but not before much time, effort, and
goodwill have been exhausted.
Congress should promptly ratify the CBD; until this occurs,
U.S. officials should be allowed to attend Working Group
meetings only as nonparticipating observers. The defective
trademark provisions in IACA820 should be repaired immediately,
allowing prompt implementation of originally intended indigenous
protections, and the Board should make specialized legal expertise
available to indigenous clients to advise them about the advantages
of registering certification and collective trademarks for TKGRF.
Until IACA is repaired and the trademark program implemented,
U.S. government officials should desist from making misleading
references in international forums to trademark opportunities
available to indigenous people under IACA.821 Congress could
probably take both of these legislative steps rapidly, if its interest
in protecting TKGRF is indeed authentic.
Other, more ambitious, federal efforts must also be
implemented before meaningful TKGRF protection can exist in the
United States. Present domestic law does not require any equitable
benefit-sharing or prior informed consent in the TKGRF context,
source disclosure in patent applications, or conformity with the
CBD. This leaves the U.S. vulnerable to criticism that the U.S.
pays lip service to the importance of TKGRF but in actuality
provides meaningful protection only to the lucrative corporate
interests that pad USPTO coffers.

819

Cf. id. (“For example, granting an intellectual property right to commercially exploit
traditional knowledge may facilitate economic expansion and growth by permitting the
expansion of capital. But such protection may come at the cost of social and cultural
development if economic expansion disturbs traditional social structures like the family
or village network. Similarly, intellectual property protection based on traditional social
and cultural systems, such as reliance on the memory of tribal elders or village medicine
men, may be at the cost of economic development.”).
820
See supra notes 414–30 and accompanying text.
821
See discussion supra Part III.A.
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Together with protecting TKGRF within existing IP laws, the
additional linchpins of stated U.S. policy are “national treatment,”
“private contractual solutions,” and “periodic reporting
requirements.”822 Therefore, Congress should begin drafting
legislation to enact enforceable national guidelines for private
TKGRF contracting, and it should establish an oversight
mechanism for periodic national reporting. As U.S. officials
presently advocate, leaving implementation details to national
legislatures is appropriate: it respects the sovereignty of nations,
and allows for adaptation to national legal traditions and
consistency with the historical national development of intellectual
property law.823 But national safeguards for TKGRF contracting
must exist in every country, not just a few, and those safeguards
must adhere generally to emerging international standards of fair,
non-exploitative, and honest treatment of indigenous TKGRF
custodians.824 The United States should take a leadership role in
protecting TKGRF by legislating its fair treatment at home.
Minimum legislative standards must require that all TKGRF
contracts contain appropriate safeguards ensuring prior informed
consent of contracting parties, equal access to neutral legal
counsel, and benefit-sharing appropriate to the communities
involved. Instituting a geographical indications law for TKGRF
and a broader moral rights law would also noticeably expand
domestic indigenous TKGRF protection under familiar intellectual
property law principles.825
Finally, in the case of TKGRF-related inventions, formal
recognition by courts and government agencies of an equitable link
between patent enforceability and proper source attribution and
benefit-sharing is crucial.
Other than national minimum
contracting guidelines,826 a link to enforceability, rather than to
patentability, would expand TKGRF protection more effectively
than any other measure. This step could be taken immediately by

822
823
824
825
826

See supra notes 332–38 and accompanying text.
Lourie Statements, supra note 212.
Id.
See Lindquist, supra note 753, at 310; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 610.
See discussion supra Part I.B.3.b.
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U.S. courts, obviating any need to amend TRIPS, which would
surely take years before consensus could be reached.
Taking these steps—or even laying significant and concrete
groundwork to take them—would thrust the U.S. into the spotlight
as a model for effectively protecting TKGRF within established
intellectual property and contract law regimes. This approach
minimizes both experimentation in untested new areas of law and
potential disruption to prior intellectual property rights holders.827
Implementing this scheme in the United States would likely
influence other countries to adopt similar legislation, relieving
pressure to rapidly draft an international TKGRF treaty.
Rather than pursuing its present obstructionist path, the U.S.
should also participate in an open-minded and good faith manner
with international efforts to explore larger TKGRF questions.828
The United States should help examine and honestly assess current
Western intellectual property institutions and laws, including its
own patent system, to analyze shortcomings and make
improvements. Though USPTO officials should continue as active
participants in TKGRF policy formulation, they should no longer
be the main spokespeople for U.S. delegations to international
forums. No agency can objectively assess itself, especially under
the scrutiny of an international audience. The USPTO, due to its
funding sources and clientele, is especially vulnerable to
allegations of bias.829
De facto USPTO leadership of U.S. delegations has had an
unnecessarily corrosive effect on U.S. credibility in the TKGRF
arena,830 and it should immediately be discontinued. Since
TKGRF issues affect the entire spectrum of intellectual property
law, the USPTO in fact has no greater subject matter expertise in
TKGRF than counsel from the Copyright Office, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, or other federal agencies formulating TKGRF
policy and procedure. Instead, independent intellectual property

827
828
829
830

See Nuño Pires de Carvalho, supra note 213, at 372.
TAUBMAN PRESENTATION, supra note 48.
Coombe, supra note 110, at 281.
Id.
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counsel, perhaps from within the Office of the Solicitor General, or
elsewhere, should coordinate U.S. policymaking in TKGRF.
The United States, with its long tradition of ideological,
religious, and racial diversity, should also take the lead in
including indigenous representatives in all TKGRF discussions.
U.S. officials should ensure that as many indigenous
representatives—especially elders—participate in the search to
preserve and protect indigenous TKGRF. The U.S. has many
indigenous people who could contribute invaluable insights,831 and
it possesses an exceedingly well-educated and diverse population
of indigenous and nonindigenous legal thinkers, all of whom could
provide leadership in international efforts. U.S. participants should
also cultivate a new attitude of humility in their role as leaders in
this important international work effort.
These adjustments in domestic law and policy would germinate
a new fluidity of thinking among U.S. lawyers, judges, and
scholars, not just in the TKGRF arena, but in many other areas of
law as well. Experience gained now through creating effective
legal interfaces among extraordinarily diverse peoples, systems of
jurisprudence, and dispute resolution mechanisms may be
singularly useful in the future. More creative and expansive legal
thinking is a necessary prerequisite to visionary problem-solving in
many blossoming legal interface situations, particularly in
cyberspace and biotechnology.
Ultimately, these skills could also facilitate peaceful interaction
with other new civilizations that will undoubtedly possess
unfamiliar systems of law. Such systems are likely to be
noticeably divergent from ours, especially in their governance of
inventions and technology, information, and creative works.
Finding successful, new ways to deal with legal diversity in the
TKGRF context is an invaluable opportunity to prepare to meet
similar challenges, in new contexts, in the future.

831

See generally L. Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 750–52 (2001) (discussing the growing population of
indigenous people in the United States).

